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Does the United States bilateral aid to African
countries promote socio-economic dependence or development?
This is the major question considered in the study.
The modernization analysts contend that bilateral aid
from the United States promotes development whereas the
radical analysts maintain that it promotes dependency.
The research consisted of a critical analysis of the
United States foreign aid program in the African nations
of Egypt, Sudan and Zaire. It involved the investigation
and evaluation of the economic and social consequences of
the American foreign aid program in countries under study.
Using the aggregate data of projects sponsored by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
the effects of foreign aid (independent variable) on such
dependent variables as income distribution, trade, employ




Our analysis and evaluation of the available data
strongly support the dependence/development paradigm.
Despite official claims to the contrary, the study shows
that the effects of aid have been increased underdevelop-
ment and inequality in countries that are recipients of
such aid.
The United States foreign aid to Africa is often not
intended for development but for geopolitical and strategic
considerations, weapons of cold war and of control of
recipients and for monetary gains. Besides, since aid is
often tied to domestic procurement, it often imposes
control on the recipient in decisions concerning develop
ment .
A lot of waste results from mismanagement, and massive
debts are incurred by countries that depend heavily on
aid. Therefore, rather than promote development, it pro
motes inequality and dependence.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When in the 1960s African nations had the taste of
political independence for the first time in seventy
years, both the political leaders and African intellectuals
undoubtedly dreamed of how much they would accomplish for
the people using this newly acquired tool. Among other
things, Africans believed that political independence
would be employed in leading their people to a second in
dependence, namely, from hunger, abject poverty, economic
and political dependence.
However skeptical some Africans might have been about
the ability of political independence to perform miracles,
they certainly did not anticipate that decades after
political emancipation Africans would still be suffering
from economic dependence, poverty and growing underdeve-
1 opment.
Many Africans after independence believed that this
new tool was going to provide a step towards broadly-based
vibrant capitalist economies similar to those of Western
Europe, the United States and Japan. It was this kind of
mood that was reflected in a conference entitled "Africa:
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The Dynamics of Change" held in March 1959 at the then
University College of Ibadan. This conference brought
together intellectuals from newly independent and soon to
be independent countries of black Africa for the purpose
of discussing the prospects of representative government.
It was a unique meeting providing one of the earliest
opportunities for both Francophone and Anglophone intel
lectuals in Africa to air their views of the new freedom
they had come to experience.
Influenced, no doubt, by the theme of the conference,
the participants expressed their expectations in no un
certain terms. It was obvious from the various papers
presented that the participants wanted to "throw off the
imperialist yoke," and "end discrimination and exploita
tion of man by man." They wanted economic development,
freedom and respect for black Africa. Also implicit in
the expressions in this conference was the hope that
higher studies in Western education and advanced skills
in science and technology such as the leaders of the
newly independent nations possessed would be the most
important attributes that would enable these leaders to
achieve the goals . 1
Contrary to the hopes expressed in this and many
similar conferences, Africans have discovered to their
dismay, almost thirty years after political independence,
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that their economies still remain characterized by de
pendency at various levels, stagnation, increased poverty
and advancing underdevelopment. Indeed, in many African
countries these features even prevail today in the degree
and manner that they did not before independence. As
Timothy Shaw puts it:
Independence meant a change of control over
political institutions. It did not involve
control over social economic apparatus. In
stead formal independence stood in contrast
to continued economic and social backward
ness.2
It is the elusiveness of the above goals that has
led to coup d'etats in some countries and single party
states in others, both of which are often designed to
achieve political order if not development. Political
control, especially in the past decade, has become im
perative as a result of the progressive underdevelopment
and powerlessness of African states to control their
resources. As J. Ajayi has graphically pointed out:
The most fundamental aspect of post-
independence Africa has been the
elusiveness of development, however
characterized...The optimism of develop
ment plans of the 1960s has given way to
increasing frustration in the 1970s and
disillusionment in the 1980s. The general
lament is that this was not what was
expected of independence. 3
There is no doubt that Shaw and Ajayi are right in
their analyses of the situation. But one is bound to ask
the question today, what went wrong after all the rhetoric
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and political proclamations of the 1960s? There are some
who contend that the problem derives from the fact that
African leaders in the 1960s only "expressed their ex
pectations in abstract terms and were much clearer about
what they wanted to end than what they wanted to put in
its place."4 They argue that beyond mere rhetoric the
African leaders "had very little conception of the society
they were striving to build."5 Furthermore, these people
contend that these African leaders had no "clear cut
goals" and "nothing like a blueprint for development."6
Incidentally, this paper takes exception with the
above argument. The position of this paper is that
Africans certainly had a goal, which was to develop Africa
into a capitalist economic system. Indeed, they employed
different strategies towards this goal which we shall
discuss in the next section. The fact was not that they
did not have a clear cut goal, for they did, wrong though
the goal might have been. The problem with Africa was
that the different national leaders not only selected
wrong goal but having selected the goal, they also employed
wrong strategies to achieve this goal.
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Since the advent of political independence in the
1960s, African states have sought to adopt different
strategies towards development. These strategies have
ranged from the concept of import-substitution industriali
zation to exporter diversification and the use of foreign
aid as a financial source of development. Especially,
since the emergence of the concept of New International
Economic Order (NIEO), foreign aid's popularity has con
tinued to increase both among African nations and other
less developed countries (LDCs).
The rationale for the employment of this strategy
has been that the constraints on the economic growth and
development in African states as in other LDCs have been
brought about by the following factors: 1) insufficient
domestic savings and capital formation - the so-called
"saving gap;" 2) insufficient availability of foreign
exchange for importation of essential goods - so-called
"foreign exchange gap;" and 3) insufficient technological,
managerial and related skills - the so-called "technology
gap."
Advocates of foreign aid as a source of development
finance argue that aid, foreign investment and trade are
essential instruments through which economic constraints
could be reduced, thus paving the way for economic
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development. Edward Martin, one of the strongest advocates
of this point of view, contends that "well designed
concessional aids, combining capital grants or soft loans
with technical assistance usually addresses all three
(problems) simultaneously."7 Thus analysts of this school
called the "Modernization School" perceive the problem of
underdevelopment as being inherent in the lack of resources
for such development. They contend that the best way to
obtain these resources is through foreign aid.
But the continued backwardness and increasing
advancement of underdevelopment in African countries and
all LDCs in spite of all aids have led other analysts to
question the effectiveness of foreign aid as a source of
development finance. Indeed, some have gone further to
suggest that not only does aid not accomplish the desired
goals of the 1960s but it has even aided in deepening the
underdeveloped condition of African states and perpetuat
ing the continued dependence of LDCs on the developed
industrialized countries (DICs) which are the sources of
these so-called concessional aids. For example, analysts
such as Samir Amin (1967) Claude Ake (1981) and Leonard V.
Goncharov (1977) of the so-called "Radical School" reject
the contention that aid injects development capital into
Third World economy. Rather, they argue that aid through
transfer of profit and payment of interest on capital
7
invested in LDCs enables the developed countries to drain
the much needed capital from the LDCs to the DICs. The
constant drain of capital from the LDCs, Goncharow argues,
is the source of lack of development capital of the Third
World countries.8
So the above analysts see the inability of LDCs to
achieve their economic and political goals as being
primarily a function of their dependence on the global
system which fosters unequal exchange between the LDCs
and the DICs. Aid, they maintain, helps to foster this
relationship. Another proponent of this point of view,
Joan Spero, presents the argument in the following way:
Foreign economic aid is frequently advocated
by academicians and policymakers as a road
to development...Economic aid was used
because it fitted well the desires of the
developed market states to maintain the
existing structure of international economic
relations and at the same time to garner
political influence in the developing world
by responding to the South desires for
development. Aid, however, was a second-best
solution for the South, for it involved
neither a change in management nor a meaning
ful redistribution of economic benefits.y
Still another strong advocate of this viewpoint,
Timothy Shaw argues that
the cost of dependence upon foreign capital
and technology are high. Moreover, given
the general dependence of African states on
global economy, confrontation with the
multinational corporations may not by itself
sufficiently improve the prospect of develop
ment.10
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Shaw goes on to suggest that "to escape from underdevelop
ment African regimes need increased domestic control to
advance their international confrontation."I1 He points
out that economic development in Africa requires a funda
mental restructuring of global political economy as well
as new international institutions - which presently are
organized to encourage the dependence of less developed
countries on the developed countries. If these institu
tions were organized to allow equal exchange between
these two economic systems, Shaw argues, then there would
be no need for foreign aid.12
Also, Guy Arnold, one of the most ardent critics of
aid in its present form, writing about aid to African
countries observes that:
Aid is given in direct proportion to the
need for maintaining a system acceptable to
the donor, it is not given to enable the
recipient to achieve economic independence.
If this central fact about it is understood
much else at once becomes clear.13
Finally, radical critics like Samir Amin and Susan
Bodenheimer argue that aid cannot encourage development.
They contend that aid is designed to perpetuate and
increase underdevelopment since in their view aid stunts
agriculture, encourages trade and investment dependence
and reinforces the dominance of exploitative Third World
elites.14
9
From the above references it is obvious that the
critics of foreign aid do so on two grounds: first, that
by its very nature aid encourages and creates dependence
and second, that it retards rather than fosters development
The question therefore to be asked is, what kind of impact
does foreign aid have on African countries? Does it
promote development as Martin maintains or does it create
dependency and consequently retard development as the
radicals assert? These therefore are the questions to be
pursued in this study.
DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
In a study like this it would be inappropriate to
start without defining the major concepts that will be
employed. Therefore, we shall devote this section to the
conceptual definition of three major concepts to be
employed here.
Foreign aid. Generally, foreign aid is often
described as the transfer of "real resources' from develop
ed industrialized countries to less developed countries.
However, this definition raises a number of questions.
First of all , how does one define the term "real resources".
Does it include for example tariff cuts by developed
countries on goods imported from less developed countries.
For instance, with preferential access, some developed
countries allow some less developed countries to sell
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their goods at higher prices in the developed countries'
markets than without such tariffs cuts. This is a gain
for the less developed country involved and a correspond
ing loss for the developed country. There is a sense, of
course, in which such transaction involves a resource
transfer.15 However, in this study such disguised flow
will be excluded from consideration.
A second question is whether one should include all
transfers of capital resources to less developed countries
when one is discussing foreign aid. For example, should
the private capital flow in the form of government
guaranteed loans be counted as foreign aid? These loans
for the most part involve normal commercial market trans
actions. They are often prompted by private commercial
considerations and profit oriented. Since these kinds of
transfers generally benefit both parties, it seems appro
priate that rather than consider them as aid they be
instead categorized as international trade.16 They are
normally not considered to be aid just as imports and
exports are never considered to be aid. It is for this
reason that flows such as loans from the United States
Export-Import Bank will not be included in this study
since their primary objective is the promotion of exports
in the United States.
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Foreign aid in this study will refer to government-
sponsored flows of "real resources" made available on
concessional terms to foreign governments on either bi
lateral basis or multi-bilateral basis. Their objective
should be non-commercial from the point of view of the
donor; as already pointed out, it should be characterized
by concessional terms. This, of course, means that the
terms on which capital is provided should be "softer"
than commercial terms.
The above concept of aid will therefore embrace
official bilaterial and multilateral grants and conces
sional loans either in cash or in kind which are broadly
aimed at transferring resources from the developed indu
strialized countries to less developed or so-called Third
World countries.
In adopting the above definition of aid, note has
been taken that to justify aid to taxpayers, administrators
of aid very often emphasize that, security, commercial
and other advantages will result from aid to donors.
Further, note is also taken that to be able to evaluate
the real cost or gain to both less developed and developed
countries would have to involve complex analysis extending
to private capital flows, international trade and other
forms of bilateral transactions. Nevertheless, this study
does not include these.
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Specifically, therefore, aid in this study will refer
to what are often known conventionally as development
assistance or loans, technical assistance and military
aid.
Dependence. A dominance-dependence relationship
exists when a country is able to participate in a definitive
and determining way in the decision-making process of
another country. The second country, however, by virtue
of its inferior position in the relationship is not able
to participate equally in the decision-making process of
the first.
By economic dependence is meant the extent to which
the economic structure of one nation depends on the
foreign trade, payment, capital, technology and decision-
making of other nations to generate domestic processes.17
Economic dependence can take place in various forms.
It may be in the area of trade. It could also take place
in the area of investment. Furthermore, it could take
place in the area of monetary policies. Lastly, many
analysts argue that not only does foreign aid create its
own form of economic dependence but it also reinforces
the other forms of dependence.18
Let us now examine the nature of these different
forms of economic dependence mentioned above. First of
all, let us look at trade dependence. Most LDCs earn a
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large percentage of their Gross National Product (GNP)
from trade with DICs. Besides, most of the LDCs have a
very small internal market and consequently depend on
large DIC markets for the sale of their products. Thus,
the LDCs are very highly sensitive to factors in the DICs
- both market and political - which shape the DICs1 demand
and thus influence their trade.
Furthermore, a large proportion of LDCs1 exports are
concentrated in a single and small number of primary
products, which, of course, reinforces sensitivity to
foreign demands by making the country vulnerable to the
fluctuations of demands in primary products.
Thirdly, a large proportion of LDCs' trade is often
with a particular DICs' market which in effect aggravates
the exporters1 sensitivity and vulnerability to demand
factors and conditions of that single market.
Fourthly, some of the LDCs1 manufacture products
such as textile and steel are not only a threat but in
competition with such products in the DICs. Consequently,
the LDCs are always sensitive to these factors which for
the most part will influence their trade policies. Trade
dependence is therefore characterized by one country's
significant dependence on trade with another and the high
level of sensitivity to factors that influence that trade.
Economic dependence as pointed out earlier may also
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take place in the area of investment. For instance, a
large percentage of investment stock in many Third World
countries is often owned by investors from DICs. This in
effect means that the investment policies adopted by these
Third World countries will certainly be influenced by the
terms and conditions set by investors. Thus, policymakers
in LDCs are often sensitive to conditions and factors in
the countries they expect investment from.
Another form of dependence is monetary dependence.
In this case the currency and monetary policies of the
dependent country are directly linked to the currency of
the dominant country or countries. Monetary dependence
also occurs when, for instance, a Third World country in
a chronic balance-of-payment difficulty depends on exter
nal balance-of-payment assistance from another country
which then reserves the right to shape and directly
influence the domestic and foreign monetary policies of
the recipient nation.
As pointed out earlier there have been strong argu
ments on the part of many to the effect that aid creates
dependence. These analysts point to the fact that foreign
economic assistance is often concentrated in industrialized
countries, thus allowing the manipulation, management and
decision-making from outside.20
Since this paper is going to deal directly with the
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effect of aid, I shall leave further discussion of this
point until later on in this study.
Development. It is important to define the concept
development as used in this study to distinguish its use
here from the conventional definition of the concept.
Traditionally, the concept economic development has
been associated and sometimes even equated with the rise
in Gross National Product (GNP).
Much as the definition of this concept may include
the above, the inadequacies of this statistical measure
of development becomes obvious when it is examined more
closely. For example, this indicator cannot be identified
with improvement in economic welfare for an arithmetic
mean. It does not yield the crudest indicator of output
(income) between people, groups or regions. Besides,
this indicator cannot be identified with improvement in
total welfare since it does not take into account such
factors as displacement of traditional crafts, dislocation
of kinship groups and the tension and confusion that result
from the introduction into the society of new values and
aspirations necessary for increased production for markets
which may come in conflict with traditional the ones.
But even when such an inadequate indicator as GNP is
used, the statistics of economic growth of less developed
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countries between 1960 and 1978 still show that in spite
of foreign aid there was no significant progress in the
area of development in these parts of the world.
Except for a few capital surplus oil exporting
nations, the less developed countries experienced an
average annual GNP increase of 5.6 percent in the period
1960 through 1970. However, because of the astronomically
rising population, the per capital GNP in those years
only rose at an annual rate of 3.1 percent.21 Besides,
it should be pointed out that most of the Third World
countries did not experience even this rate of growth.
It was a few rapidly growing middle income less developed
countries that accounted for most of the growth. While
these rapidly growing economies such as those of Brazil,
Mexico, Taiwan and South Korea increasingly were closing
the economic gap, most of the other Third World countries
remained on the side of the ever widening gulf between
the poor and rich nations. In the period between 1960
and 1978 over fifty percent of the population of Third
World countries lived in countries whose per capita GNP
growth only averaged 1.6 percent a year.22
The above statistics become even more depressing
when we consider the fact that most of the wealth produced
by this growth resided in the hands of only three percent
of the population of these countries. In effect it shows
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that while the three percent of these countries were
living in luxury, the rest of the ninety-seven percent
were living in abject poverty and could barely survive.
Relative growth performance of both the developed and
less developed world makes the story even more discourag
ing. According to the report, the gap between developed
and the less developed economies increased from $1,500
per capita in 1960 to almost $2,000 in 1967.23 Also the
World Bank estimated that in 1976, income per capita in
the industrialized countries was $6,414 as compared to
$538 in the non-oil developing countries.24
As the above statistics have clearly demonstrated,
increase in per capita income did not always translate
into development of economy as a whole. But above all,
this increase failed to lead to a sustaining growth in
the economy and more importantly social welfare.25
Consequent upon the above, the conventional definition of
the concept development will not be adopted for this study.
The concept development in this study will be defined
as a social process in which the majority of a nation
joins together to build economic and political institutions
that serve the interest of the majority of the people.
We contend that for development to be genuine it must not
only translate into sustaining growth and social welfare
but it must necessarily involve changes in relationship
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among people and power to control productive resources.
As Paul Baran puts it,
economic development has historically always
meant a far reaching transformation of
society's economic, social and political
structure, of dominant organization of
production, distribution and consumption.
Economic development has always been pro
pelled by classes or groups interested in
new economic and social order, has always
been opposed by those interested in the
preservation of status quo...it has never
been a smooth, harmonious process unfolding
placidly over time and space.26
It follows therefore from the above definition that
two things become inevitable if economic development of
the kind just stated is to take place. First, a "com
prehensive planning is indispensable" - a factor very
much lacking in the development plan of most LDCs today.
Paul Baran puts it in this way:
Small and gradual changes taking place...on
the margin may well be expected to come
about by a spontaneous process of trial and
error. A few percent increase of output of
any product already being produced can
usually be obtained without any major plan
ning effort,...However, if the increase in a
country's aggregate output is to attain,
if increase in the magnitude of say 8-10
percent per annum...then only a deliberate,
long range planning can assure the attain
ment of the goal.2/
Secondly, no economic development of this magnitude and
quality could be attained "in a society in which the
means of production resides (solely) under the control of
private interest" which administers them with the sole aim
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of making profit. For the Third World country therefore,
it may mean that "the pattern of allocation and utilization
of resources must be necessarily different from the
pattern prevailing under the status quo."28 Of course,
it may also mean a restructuring and transformation of
the political, economic and social institutions in these
countries.
As the above process develops, more and more people
could be expected to unite together to acquire the
knowledge and techniques required to develop their re
sources. This process of development will therefore
free people from needless hunger, disease, ignorance and
poverty. In other words, economic growth must coincide
with economic and social welfare for the majority of the
population in order to be termed economic development.
METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF STUDY
This study is a critical analysis of United States
foreign aid in Africa and more specifically in three
African countries - Egypt, Sudan and Zaire. It will
involve the investigation and evaluation of the economic
and social development consequences of American foreign
aid programs in countries under study.
The study begins with a general definition of the
major concepts to be employed in the research. Next a
general survey and analysis of the United States foreign
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aid program will be done. Under this section will be
considered such factors as the historical background of
the United States foreign aid program, the organization
of such a program, the form it has taken over the years,
the general terms and conditions of U.S. aid and finally
the process that aid goes through before it reaches the
reci pient.
There are two reasons for this general review of the
U.S. aid program. First, this review enables us to
understand the general mechanics of foreign aid and
particularly that of the United States program. Secondly,
it is the knowledge derived from this part of the study
that will enable us to conduct a proper critique of the
aid program to the African countries under study.
Following this general review, an indepth critical
analysis of the foreign aid activities in each of the
African nations under study will be done. This analysis
will cover the period between 1965 and 1982. The study
will be approached through the use of aggregate data on
projects sponsored by the United States Agency for Inter
national Development (USAID) in the countries.
On the basis of this indepth study of these countries
a general conclusion will be posited for Africa as a
whole.
Two primary questions will be considered in this
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study. First, what is the impact of American foreign aid
on socio-economic development in Africa? For example,
does aid contribute to a sustaining economic growth in
African countries under study? If so does such growth
translate into economic and social welfare for the majority
of the population? Specifically, what is the effect of
foreign aid on income distribution, trade and monetary
policies, employment and unemployment, technology and
agricultural development?
To answer these questions, two independent variables
shall be used, mainly 1) the terms and conditions of aid
and 2) the amount and type of aid. We shall examine the
relationship between these two independent variables and
such dependent variables as income distribution, trade
and monetary policies, employment and unemployment and
finally technology and agricultural development.
An attempt will be made to examine how, for instance,
the terms and conditions such as the rate of interest, aid
tying and amount of aid given to these countries enhance
or reduce the possibility for capital accumulation and
reinvestment into the economy. Secondly, how do these
affect income distribution, transfer of technology and
finally the overall monetary policies of countries con
cerned. Do they have negative or positive impacts on
these variables?
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The second question that will be considered is, what
effect does aid have on the policy decisions and more
importantly the economic policy decisions of the countries
under study. In examining this question we shall not
only look at the amount and terms of United States foreign
aid and the types of projects sponsored, but we shall also
examine the overall aid policies of the United States in
these countries. Specifically, we shall seek to answer
the question, does the United States participate in any
definitive way in the economic policy decisions of any or
all of the countries involved through its foreign aid
program? Do such factors as the overall aid policies,
the terms and conditions of aid and finally the amount
and type of aid affect the economic policy decisions of
the countries under study? If so, in what ways do these
factors affect these decisions?
It is the answer to the above questions that will be
used to evaluate the socio-economic impact of aid in the
countries.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
When the United States first started its development
assistance program in the 1950s, its focus was on a few
South Asian and Middle Eastern countries which were
regarded as strategic and therefore salient to American
interest. Africa in the beginning of the 1950s was seen
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as belonging to the European sphere of influence.
Consequently, the development assistance of Africa was
left to their former colonial masters.
In recent years, as a result of East-West competition
for spheres of influence, Africa is increasingly becoming
of strategic importance. As a result the United States
has gradually reversed its policy and channelled some of
its aid to African countries.
Also since the inception of the idea of foreign aid
in the 1950s, America has always in its foreign policy
rhetoric suggested, that among other things, development
was the primary aim for aid. For example, President
Truman in his famous "Point Four" of his Inaugural Address
of 1949 maintained that the United States "must embark on
a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific
advances and industrial progress available for the improve
ment and growth of underdeveloped countries."29 In the
International Development Act of 1950 which implemented
Point Four, it was suggested that development was the
major objective for channelling American aid to less
developed countries. As the act pointed out, "It is the
policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the people
of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their
resources and improve their living conditions."30
Whether it was the Alliance for Progress program
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initiated by President John F. Kennedy or the Caribbean
Basin Initiatives by President Ronald Reagan, the successors
of Truman and the U.S. Congress have always emphasized that
these aids are first and foremost for economic development.
To what extent the United States has succeeded in
accomplishing this goal in Africa cannot be known unless
an empirical study is conducted. Studies, it must be
admitted, have been conducted on the impact of United
States aid in Africa. But many of these studies seem to
focus mainly on the impact of aid on political develop
ment;31 very few studies deal with the socio-economic
impact of U.S. foreign aid in Africa. Therefore, the
debates continue - what is the socio-economic impact of
U.S. aid in Africa? Has the U.S. been able to accomplish
its goal of contributing to the economic development of
these countries or not? It is the primary aim of this
study to contribute to this dialogue.
It is hoped that this study will be helpful to policy
makers to both African countries and U.S. policymakers in
evaluating the impact of aid given in the past and also
to African policymakers to determine what contribution
aid has made, if any, in their endeavor to bring economic
development to their different societies.
It should be pointed out again that the primary task
of this study will be to determine the socio-economic
25
impact of United States foreign aid in the countries under
study. This is because we believe that there have been
extensive studies done on the political impact of aid to
Africa. For instance, in 1974, Virginia Anne McMurtry
did a very extensive study on the impact of aid on political
development in Africa.32 Previous to that, Joan Spero did
a study on France and Gabon. While many studies have been
done to determine the impact of aid on political develop
ment, very little or no studies have been done on the
impact of aid on socio-economic development.33 it is
this gap that this study intends to fill.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Before commencing this study, some relevant litera
ture were reviewed. The literature reviewed were on the
comparative theories of foreign aid. They included books,
journals and relevant government publications. The review
suggested that there are two main schools of thought
dealing with the issue of aid. These are the so-called
modernization school and the radical schools of thought.
As pointed out earlier in this study, the moderniza
tion school contends that foreign aid or economic assist
ance promotes development or at least has the potential of
doing so. This contention, of course, is premised on the
assumption that the growth of less developed nations is
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impaired and restricted primarily by insufficient capital
investment. This insufficient capital investment in turn,
according to the modernization school, is constrained by
insufficient savings and foreign exchange. External fi
nancial assistance, it is argued, will fill this resource
gap and consequently, make growth possible. According to
Martin (1971) such capital assistance in addition to
technical assistance will improve the use of both domestic
and external capital and thus enable the creation of
conditions for self-sustaining economic growth.
Milikin and Rostow (1957) echoing the same point of
view proposed that there are three stages of development -
namely, the so-called preconditions, take-off and self-
sustained growth. The so-called "preconditions stage" is
"the period in which preconditions" for economic progress
are established. During this period two obstacles stand
in the way of more rapid growth. The first is abject
poverty of these nations which makes "the margin of bare
subsistence small." These nations must learn how to
channel this small margin into productive investment
before they get off dead centre.34
The second obstacle is the low ability of these
nations to absorb any available capital in many sectors
of the economy. At this stage "skills and knowledge can
be provided from outside along with financial resources."35
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However, "the take off" into continuing growth cannot
occur until certain minimum preconditions of education,
skills and attitudes and basic transportation, communica
tion and powerful facilities have been established.36
The Take Off. According to Milikin and Rostow this
is a stage in which "a country makes complex transition
to a position where sustained growth becomes possible."37
Under the impact of certain forces - some political, some
technological and others economic, the economy launches
forward. Gradually, the economic forces which hitherto
have yielded limited bursts of activity expand and become
decisive factors. At this point the rate of savings
increases, the economy organizes itself so that a high
proportion of any increase in output is siphoned back
into further investment. New key industries spring up
yielding profits in which a large share is ploughed back
into investment. New techniques emerge in both agricultural
and industrial sectors as more and more people are prepared
to accept them, a new class of businessmen emerges who
take control of key decisions determining the use of
savings. According to Milikin and Rostow "this is the
stage which the need for foreign capital is at its peak."38
Self-Sustained Growth. A period of "regular" but
"sometimes fluctuating progress." Here the structure of
the economy changes continuously as techniques are improved;
28
the economy becomes more closely related to the inter
national economy.
As rapid growth provides the margin of resources
from which additional resources can be made, the need for
foreign investment slows down until it ultimately ceases.
At this point domestic servings become so abundant that
they begin to look for profitable employment abroad in
other less developed economies.
Essentially Martin, Milikan and Rostows1 assumption
in their theories is that underdevelopment in Third World
countries is a natural state which could be uprooted if
the Third World nations take the capitalist root of
development. Aid as they point out could act as a catalyst
to get this process in motion.
However, the radical or dependency school rejects
this argument. They instead contend that given the pre
sent state of development of the international capitalist
system, a broadly based, autonomous, internally directed
capitalist development in the less developed nations is
not only undesirable but virtually impossible.39 The
radicals further assert that contrary to the conventional
"modernization school" analysis "underdevelopment" in the
less developed countries is not a natural state. They
contend that prior to their incorporation into the world
capitalist system these socio-economic formations were
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never developed. They argue that underdevelopment in its
present form is a dynamic process, a process which began
with the Western European penetration into these under
developed economies.
Instead of seeing underdevelopment as a natural and
static state, the radicals rather see it as a dynamic
process - a process which keeps deepening with each
passing day. As Samir Amin puts it,
What is worse is that this definition
(modernization development theory) leads
straight away to an essential error: the
underdeveloped countries are seen as being
like the developed ones at an earlier stage
of their development. In other words, the
essential fact is left out, namely,
that the underdeveloped countries form
part of world system, that the history
of their integration into the system
forged their special structure - which
thenceforth has nothing in common with
what prevailed before their integration
into the modern world.40
Maintaining a similar position as Samir Amin, A.G. Frank
points out that, "economic development and underdevelopment
...are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation
of internal contradiction in the world capitalist system."41
According to the radicals, the only way in which
backwardness, stagnation and poverty in Third World
nations could be overcome is through socialist revolution
in which all but those absolutely necessary links with
existing international capitalist systems are severed.42
Based on the above theoretical argument the radical
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analysts reject the assertion of the modernization school
of thought concerning foreign aid. Essentially, the
radicals contend that rather than promote development,
foreign economic assistance leads to dependence on the
part of the recipient. Pointing to the experience of the
past two decades the radicals point out that "no concen
tration of aid by any donor has ever brought the recipient
to the point of "take off."43
Hayter (1971) maintains that rather than help the
Third World countries to develop, aid helps in "stunting
and distorting development in Third World states through
exploitation."44 She argues that "the Third World could
not develop until all imperialism was destroyed."45 Be
sides, according to her, aid is "a concession of the im
perialist powers to enable them to continue the exploit
ation of semi-colonial states,"46 a kind of superficial
act that does nothing to address the root of the problem
of the developing countries.
Lappe, Collins and Kinley (1980) argue that the
beneficiaries of aid programs, rather than being the poor
people of the less developed world, are large corporations
for which better roads help transport their goods from
cities and ports more efficiently. They further contend
that what the poor needs is not the sophisticated technical
programs but economic power that will enable them to
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participate in the process and thus get some benefits out
of it. This, according to Lappe, is essentially what
they have been denied.
Howe and Hunter (1973) concede that there is sometimes
an element of altruism when aid is given to a Third World
country. However, they point out that "this element has
been important only to a very insignificant segment of
the population"47 in the donor countries. Altruism, they
contend, has never been the dominant factor in giving aid.
Another criticism by the radicals is that aid is
often used to build a social system considered durable
and resistant to revolutionary changes. Arnold (1979)
points out that "aid is given in direct proportion to the
need for maintaining a system acceptable to the donor, it
is not given to enable recipients achieve economic inde
pendence."48 Arnold further contends that only a very
insignificant portion of aid is used for development
because for the most part "aid is often used to ensure
the political and economic survival of particular govern
ments. "«
Ake (1978) noted that the relationship between donor
and recipient is an "economic-imperial one" - the donors
do not aim in solving the problem of development, since
to do so will be, in the narrow sense, against their
political and economic interest.
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It is this pessimism that the radicals have about
aid in its present form that has caused them to conclude
that rather than help development aid leads to dependency.
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CHAPTER II
SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID PROGRAM, 1965-1982
The primary objective of this chapter will be to
establish the motives or objectives in the disbursement
of United States foreign aid. To be able to establish
the motives for American disbursement of foreign aid, it
will be necessary to examine the history of the disburse
ment of aid.
It should again be pointed out that this study will
be limited to the United States foreign aid program from
the second World War to the present. As it has already
been pointed out earlier in this study, foreign aid in
the present form is a recent phenomenon and it is the
implications of this recent phenomenon that will be
examined in this chapter.
Some writers on American foreign aid have maintained
that the evolution of the American program has substantial
ly affected its objectives causing them to change from
one period to another.1 In this chapter we shall seek to
establish the extent to which the observed changes have
been real and substantial and the extent to which they
are just procedural changes.
37
38
The American practice of helping friendly nations
goes very far back in the history of the republic.
However, until after the second World War, such attempts
were limited to alleviating the sufferings imposed by
famine and other forms of disaster.2 Foreign aid in the
present form is relatively a new phenomenon. It is the
more recent American post-World War II foreign aid program
and more specifically, their recent implications and
developments that will be the central focus of this
section of the study. To gain a clearer and more recent
picture, it will be necessary to go back to the roots of
some of these programs.
Since 1942 there have been several pieces of legisla
tion that could be classified as foreign aid bills. In
this part of the survey some of the landmarks will be
considered. As we proceed into this study it will become
clear that even though these programs once began as
temporary expedients they have become more or less perma
nent features of U.S. foreign policy. What at first
started as relief and rehabilitation measures based upon
altruistic impulses have over the years been redesigned to
meet new economic, diplomatic, and military challenges in
the Cold War crisis.
In this study foreign aid programs will be considered
from their three main roots: war relief and reconstruction,
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military defense and economic development.
WAR RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION
The United States emerged from the second World War
as a leader of the Western world since it was mainly its
military and economic power that was instrumental in
defeating the Axis. After the second World War the United
States' economy was reorganized to serve two distinct
purposes. First, it was organized to ensure the provision
of assistance so that the war devastated nations could
recover from war time damage. Secondly, it was the aim
of the United States to create agencies which would ensure
free international trade and monetary exchange than did
exist before and during the second World War. A major
concern was not to return to the protectionism and anarchy
that marked Western economies in the 1920s and 1930s.
Free trade and monetary policies, it was argued would
lead to economic recovery for the war devastated countries
and therefore reduce conditions that would ultimately
lead to another war.3 The formation of the Bretton Woods
system was based on this argument.
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminstration
(UNRRA). Through the Land-Lease Program during the second
World War, America provided both military and other
assistance to friendly countries. Many Latin American
countries benefitted from this program. However, such
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help, it was obvious, though it presented a temporary
solution, was not going to be the answer to the sufferings
of the civilian population in the war devastated areas.
Plans to fight this problem based on American initiatives
were therefore developed. One of the results of such
plans was the formation of the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). This program be
came a task force involving American wartime allies.4
The basic notion was that each country whose territory
was not overrun by enemy forces would contribute one
percent of its GNP into the (UNRRA) budget. The program
from its inception was intended to be humanitarian and
multilateral although the United States ultimately con
tributed over seventy percenty of the funds made avail
able for the program.5
UNRRA operations for the most part were concentrated
in the former Axis occupied countries of Southern and
Eastern Europe, China, Korea and the Phillipines. The
U.S. Congress, however, objected to the use of the funds in
helping countries that were becoming aligned with the
Soviet Union. By mid-1946, Congress decided not to
appropriate any more money to the UNRRA because of
complaints of mismanagement.6
International Economic Organizations. International
monetary cooperation after World War II was to find
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expression in three international agencies - namely, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank)
and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).
The International Monetary Fund was designed to
promote international trade and economic stability by
assisting member nations to overcome balance of payment
difficulties and foreign exchange restrictions.7 It was
to be the keeper of rules and the main instrument of
public international management. However, under the
weighted system of voting the United States was able to
exert a lot of influence in that body and all its decision-
makings.8 Not only could the United States control the
disbursement of aid through this organization but in
recent years it can exert considerable direct influence
on the economic and financial policies of recipient
countries through the complicated terms on which these
aids are disbursed. For instance, certain politial,
economic and monetary reforms must be made in many cases
before a country qualifies for a loan from the IMF.
Presently the IMF has about 140 members. It continues
to work to expand trade, monetary convertibility and
stability. It also continues to act as an international
financial auditor and "lender of last resort" which it
has always been. But even much more than ever before it
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yields considerable power over domestic economic policies
of member governments.
Michael Moffitt of the Institute of Policy Studies,
according to Lappe, Collins and Kinley (1981), notes that
the IMF has but very little or no impact over the economies
of developed countries.9 This is, of course, understable
since the IMF is a lender of last resort to Third World
countries who are deeply in debt to private international
banks.
Upon joining the IMF a member state is alloted a
certain amount of international money. The IMF has been
allowed to create currency called Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs). SDRs are non-traded reserve currency used only
for accounting purposes. The amount of SDRs alloted to
each country is based on its economic strength. When a
country needs foreign exchange it could borrow SDRs in
exchange for local currency to pay back within a specified
ti me.
Once a member has exhausted its quota it must accept
economic policy conditions set by the IMF. For instance,
to borrow twenty-five percent of quota the country must
produce an IMF-approved financial "stability program,"
including fiscal, exchange rate and trade policies to
improve deficit payment position over a particular period
of time. Under the special stand-by arrangement, if a
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country borrows over seventy-five percent above its quota
it will be demanded to adhere strictly to the economic
stabilization policies. Certain performance criteria must
be met by a country before each installment of the loan
is approved. Besides, strict controls over government
finance - revenues, expenditures, taxes, subsidies, debt
ceiling, etc. are stipulated.10
It should also be pointed out that while the IMF is
formerly controlled by the Board of Governors on which
each member government is represented, the decision-making
power within the IMF resides with twenty-one executive
directors. Five of the executive directors are appointed
by the five members with the largest quota - the United
States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and
Japan. The United States holds approximatley twenty-one
percent of the voting power. The other sixteen executive
directors are elected by 135 member states.11
The original agreement creating the International
Bank for Development and Reconstruction (IBDR) provided
that the bank disburse of finance for reconstruction of war
devastated Europe.12 During the 1950s the focus shifted to
the developing countries' projects. The IBDR is owned by
134 countries who contribute to the capital stock of the
bank. Member countries' subscriptions are partly in cash
and in part pledge. The paid-in and "callable capital"
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are then used to borrow money on commercial bond markets.
Theoretically, the control of the IBDR resides with
the Board of Governors with each of the 134 members
represented. However, control resides with twenty exe
cutive directors. The day to day management of operations
of the IBDR is controlled by the president who chairs the
meetings of the executive directors and who is appointed
by the President of the United States - the largest
shareholder in the bank.
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) is
a trade agreement that provides ground rules for making
subsidiary agreements effective. It could also be con
sidered as a forum for airing and settling trade disputes.
The contracting powers have no substantive power of
enforcement; however, GATT's sanction is the approbation
of its contracting parties - a sort of hearing and an
opportunity to form a judgment.
GATT actually became an international agreement by
default after the idea of an the International Trade
Organization died. GATT was originally drawn up in 1947
to provide a procedural base and to establish guiding
principles for tariff negotiations then being held in
Geneva.13 It was intended to be a temporary agreement.
But because the agreement of the Geneva Conference which
culminated in the Havana Charter was not ratified, GATT
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by default became an expression of consensus on interna
tional trade.
The essential principles of the GATT are: 1) restric
tions on trade should be only in the form of tariffs and
2) tariff concessions given to any country "shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
products originating in or destined for the territories
of all contracting parties."^
From a temporary treaty, GATT became not only an
established commercial code but an international organi
zation with a secretariat and director general to oversee
the implementation of GATT rules. GATT has also evolved
from a set of guidelines for trade negotiations to an
institutional forum within which trade negotiations take
place.15
Countries should consult with each other before
taking tariff actions which would be harmful to the
interest of others. The GATT; however, provides exceptions
which include: 1) that quotas though generally discouraged
for purely protective purposes are nevertheless permitted
in some cases such as balance of payments reasons and to
support domestic farm programs. 2) An escape clause
provision permits the withdrawal of concessions if in
creased imports cause or threaten serious injury.
3) Developing countries may impose restrictions on certain
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imports under certain conditions to encourage infant
industries.16
The Truman Doctrine. In the immediate post war
years many came to believe that a massive injection of
U.S. funds could provide the requisites for economic
reconstruction in Europe torn by grave economic problems,
social strife and political chaos.17 It became apparent
that the monetary and trade restrictions discussed earlier
could not on their own cope with the immediate situation.
Consequently, the United States in 1947 began to consider
other alternatives to assist its allies. The first of
such alternatives was the Truman Doctrine. The Truman
Doctrine stated that "it must be the foreign policy of
United States to support the 'free' people who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by
outside pressures."I8 It was occasioned by the Civil War
in Greece and the Soviet push for territorial concessions
from Turkey after the second World War.
Two very important facts are to be noted concerning
the Truman Doctrine. First, this was the first shift in
American post war aid policy from emphasis on humanitarian
considerations to emphasis on military considerations.
Secondly, it was the first time that the United States
resorted to using foreign aid programs to counter what it
considered to be an indirect Soviet threat to its national
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security.
In March 1947, President Truman requested $400
million for military aid to strengthen the Greek and
Turkish armed forces. In the same month Congress not
only appropriated the funds but also authorized the
sending of military equipment, technical and military
advisors to both countries.19
The Marshall Plan, another venture in aid policy,
in an attempt by the United States to help its allies
came in effect in 1948. It resulted from the failure of
industrial recovery in Europe despite the money invested
by the United States through the post-war institutions.
The inability of Europe to recover economically was
considered to have a tremendous effect on the larger
security interest of the United States. Therefore, the
then Secretary of State, George Marshall, proposed that
if European countries would unite in their economic
recovery plans and establish cooperative efforts to assist
themselves, then the United States would offer within its
means the types of assistance they could not provide.
The Marshall Plan was adopted by the U.S. Congress
in the Economic Development Acts of 1948. Congress
ultimately appropriated a total of $13.15 billion on annual
bases between 1948 and 1952. By the use of the Marshall
Plan, a great stride was made in the recovery efforts of
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European countries. It may be good to point out that
though the initial plan of the Marshall Plan did not
exclude the Soviet Union and its allies, the conditions
attached for participation were such that it made the
Soviet bloc decide not to participate in the plan. The
Marshall Plan was the ultimate in the post-war relief and
reconstruction economic assistance of the United States
to its allies.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The Truman Doctrine as pointed out earlier was the
first and earliest significant U.S. initiative aimed at
extending military assistance to Europe after the war.
Since it has already been discussed in the preceding
section we shall not spend any more time discussing it
here.
Mutual Defense Assistance Program. After the second
World War the Western suspicion of Soviet intentions
began to increase due partly to events in Eastern Europe,
Asia and particularly in the blockade of Berlin. In
response to this increasing fear and suspicion, the United
States took the lead in forming the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). This treaty, in effect, provided a
basis for the United States to provide assistance to the
other signatories in the case of external aggression.
Following the ratification of NATO by the United
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States Congress, in 1949, the Truman administration sub
mitted a bill with the bulk of $1.4 billion requested for
Fiscal Year 1950 to be used for the modernization of
armed forces of the European NATO members. The Greek-
Turkish military assistance was also incorporated into
this program - the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. However,
in spite of the increase in military aid the bill emphasized
that "clear priority" was to be given to the needs of
European economic recovery over rearmament.20
The Mutual Security Act. The Korean War of 1950
among other factors resulted in a direct reversal of the
priorities of United States foreign aid. The objectives
of U.S. assistance of Europe began to be modified due to
the still increased suspicion by the West of "communists'
intentions" in the world. By 1952 more dollars were
being spent to rearm European countries rather than in
their economic recovery. This change in priority became
manifested in the creation of the Mutual Security Agency
in 1951 to replace the earlier Economic Cooperation
Administration. From now on Western planners and the
United States in particular would make military consi
derations the prime factor in the disbursement of aid to
the non-communist world.
The rationale for this shift in emphasis was based
on the argument that money spent to help national forces
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at home grounds will go farther in discouraging the so-
called "communist aggression" than the same amount of
money spent in military expense in the United States. It
was also argued then, as it does now, that it is cheaper to
maintain deterence by supporting national soldiers than
having later to deploy a comparable number of American
soldiers, as such a venture would not only be politically
but financially prohibitive.
The shift described above finally became part of the
United States foreign aid law called the Mutual Security
Act of 1951. Under this law, all foreign aid activities
(except import-export bank loans) were incorporated into
one act in recognition that both military and economic
assistance were essential in the rearming of the so-called
free world.21 However, it should be pointed out that the
Truman administration did not intend this to be a permanent
feature in the aid policy.22 Consequently, Congress
provided that a major part of the bill be implemented in
1954. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was therefore
replaced by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 which was the
basic legal authorization for foreign aid of 1951. One
of the basic differences between the 1951 and 1954 acts
was the designation of military and development assistance.
The 1951 bill regarded all assistance as "defense support"
whereas the 1954 act moved defense support into a mutual
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defense category. A separate development assistance cate
gory was created to help the developing nations who were
not associated with the military program. It may be good
to note that at this point the economic aid part of the
assistance made up only one-tenth of the assistance
budget and most of the defense assistance went to the
United States established allies. By 1958, Congress
replaced the 1954 mutual defense heading, divided the act
into military and economic assistance categories and
removed the defense support into the military support
category.
Aid for Economic Development. American interest in
the disbursement of aid for economic development was very
minimal shortly after the second World War. Three reasons
could be cited as accounting for this lack of interest on
the part of the United States. One of the reasons was
that in the years shortly after World War II the United
States was preeminently occupied with the reconstruction
of Europe. Since Europe was regarded as top in the list
of priorities, it became difficult for either the President
or Congress to divert the much needed funds to any other
area of the world.23
Secondly, after World War II most Western nations,
particularly the United States, who were in a position to
transfer funds to LDCs rejected aid as a route to
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development.24 Not that the industrialized countries
were unconcerned with economic growth in the Third World;
indeed economic growth and development were considered a
major and integral part of post-war order. However, in
the opinion of the United States officials, economic
development did not require international capital. Rather
domestic efforts on the part of LDCs were to be the
primary means of economic development. Such domestic
efforts, it was argued, would be enhanced and the need
for external capital reduced by liberalization and expan
sion of trade. The liberalization of trade, it was be
lieved, would substitute for capital inflows.
While domestic efforts were to be the primary source
of financial resource, the United States and its allies
recognized that there would be need for external capital
in some limited cases. Such external assistance, it was
insisted, would be limited in amount and offered on
market and non-concessionary terms.25
Finally, the United States disinterest in aid for
economic development during the initial years after the
second World War derived from what J. Kaplan has described
as "a reluctance to accept responsibility."26 For in
stance, in the case of colonies the United States strongly
felt that any post-independence assistance that might be
required should properly be the responsibility of colonial
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powers.
The same reluctance to accept positive responsibility
was also characteristic of U.S. attitude towards LDCs
with longer histories of independence. In the opinion of
some U.S. officials strong societies in any of the poor
intrinsically weaker nations scarcely seemed attainable
and this dim prospect discouraged the inauguration of a
major effort to disburse aid for economic development.27
However, beginning in the 1950s as a result of
several changes in the international system, the United
States foreign policy objectives were modified rather
dramatically. There was a great shift in attitude of the
United States towards the aspirations of the LDCs.
The first factor that influenced the change in
attitude was the emergence of Third World nations as
increasingly active though weak participants in inter
national politics. In the two decades following World
War II, 19th century European empires disintegrated and
much of Asia and Africa gained political if not economic
independence. Besides, following a compromise between
the United States and the Soviet Union in 1955 new states
were admitted into the United Nations. By the end of the
second post war decade the United Nations had 122 members,
eighty-seven of which were Third World countries.28
Within the General Assembly the Third World nations
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began to form groups to make coordinate demands on the
developed nations. As a result, the less developed
countries from the 1950s became more and more outspoken
and somehow more united and more specific in their demands
for internal economic reforms. Because of these demands
and the increasing political importance of the LDCs to
the Western countries, it became inevitable that some
changes must be considered in U.S. treatment of LDCs.
Another factor that caused the change in attitude of
American policymakers was the communist takeover of main
land China in 1949 followed by the Korean conflict of
1950. Following the Korean conflict, American policy
makers extended U.S. security interests to certain parts
of the LDCs particularly those countries bordering the
Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China.29 The
fear of "communist subversion" in the LDCs led to the
considertion of aid for economic development. Important
official and unofficial reports began to link economic
development of LDCs with American security.30 As a
result a significant assistance program for aid to these
countries was initiated. Previously, most of the aid was
of the military type to bolster local armed forces.
However, some money was also given for economic develop
ment . 31
The third factor that led to the United States change
towards LDCs was the increasing direct threat posed by the
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Soviet Union to United States interests in the Third
World during the 1950s. Before 1953 and particularly
during the Stalinist era the Soviet Union expressed very
little or no interest at all in the Third World. However,
following Stalin's death, in 1953, there was a major
shift in Soviet foreign policy. In 1953 the Soviet Union
announced a desire to reverse its former position and
contribute to the United Nations Expanded Program of
Technical Assistance (EPTA). At about the same time the
Soviets started to negotiate arrangements with the LDCs
to develop both political and commercial relations.
In 1955 the Soviet Union concluded an arms deal with
Egypt and began negotiating for financing the Aswan High
Dam. In the same year the Russians announced that they
would build a steelmill in India. Indonesia and Afghanistan
in the same year also became recipients of Soviet aid.32
In a major speech in 1956, Nikitia Krushchev announced
a new Soviet policy towards the LDCs which stated that:
These countries, although they do not belong
to the Socialist World System can draw on its
achievements in building an independent
national economy and in raising their peoples
living standards. They can get it in the
Socialist countries free from any political
or military obligations.33
Kruschchev in the above statement was in effect
announcing that the socialist bloc's competition with the
West was to be extended to the LDCs. Following therefore
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this new Soviet interest and initiatives in the LDCs,
Third World demand for development took on greater im
portance. Consequently, the emerging LDC states became
a sphere of competition in the Cold War.34 The United
States therefore in order to be a viable competitor had
no alternative but to take a hard look at its policies.
It was this reassessment that finally led to a change in
attitude.
The above factor did not only change the economic
military mixture of the United States foreign aid program
but also changed the chief recipients, substituting the
Far East for Europe. The Far Eastern countries, which in
the past received only a very small fraction of the aid,
alloted to Europe in 1950 thereafter began to receive
more than any other region. This shift resulted in the
perception of a military threat as seen in the U.S. from
such events as the Korean War, the struggle in Indo-China,
the communist victory in mainland China, the Huk Insurrect
ion in the Phillipines and the communist guerrilla activi
ties in Malaya and Burma.35
There was another characteristic of U.S. foreign aid
programs during this period. This was its tie-in with
military alliances. Beginning from 1950 with the formation
of NATO with U.S. initiative, U.S. military aid to the
Middle East and Asia became connected with a series of
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bilateral "mutual defense treaties" intended to form a
belt of containment around the communist bloc.36 Such
military aid was used to maintain the military establish
ments of contractual allies. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan
and the Phillipines, for example, received military aid
under the bilateral arrangements.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The developmental assistance program of the United
States to LDCs started with "Point Four" legislation.
The initial program of "Point Four" was proposed by
President Harry Truman in his inaugural address of 1949.
The presidential address contained a four point statement,
the fourth of which stated that, "we must embark on a bold
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances
and industrial progress available for the improvement and
growth of underdeveloped areas."37
In June 1950, Congress passed the Act for International
Development which authorized the so-called Point Four pro
gram. The act suggested that development assistance would
become a major part of American foreign policy. Section
403 of the act stated that the U.S. policy would be
to aid the efforts of the people of
economically cally undeveloped areas to
develop their resources and improve the
working and living conditions by encourag
ing the exchange of technical knowledge
and skills and the flow of investment
capital to countries which provide
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conditions under which such technical
assistance and capital can effectively and
constructively contribute to raising standards
of living, creating new sources of wealth,
increasing productivity and expanding purchas
ing power.38
The act authorized the creation of the Technical Coopera
tion Administration to administer technical assistance
programs in some developing countries.3^
The initial development assistance program of the
United States was strictly confined to technical assistance,
The reason, as already pointed out, being that the United
States at the time believed that the initiative of private
enterprise plus loans available from the World Bank would
suffice for this purpose. As Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson explained during congressional hearings on "Point
Four":
By its very nature, this is not and never
will be a big money enterprise...It involves
salaries and expenses of people, not vast
purchases of machinery and raw materials.
Its objective is to show other people how
to meet their own needs, not to attempt to
meet those needs ourselves. For this reason
the cost of technical cooperation will
always be modest, compared with the cost of
other types of foreign aid programs.40
DEVELOPMENTAL FINANCING
Because of the new Soviet interest in the LDCs
coupled with pressure from the South LDCs demand for
economic development took on greater importance. In 1956
and 1957, U.S. policymakers turned their attention to
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actively considering the disbursement of foreign aid to
developing countries. The result was the determination
that economic assistance to the LDCs could be a powerful
tool in the Cold War. As one study puts it:
A comprehensive and sustained program of
American economic assistance aimed at
helping free underdeveloped countries...
can, in short run materially reduce the
danger of conflicts triggered by aggressive
minor powers and can...result in overwhelm
ing preponderance of...stable, effective
and democratic societies (giving) the best
promise of a favorable settlement of cold
war and a peaceful, progressive world en-
vi ronment.41
Responding therefore to the pressure of making more public
capital available the Eisenhower admininstration turned
to developmental financing, though the trend was wery far
from being an outright grant aid. The credits that the
World Bank had been extending to LDCs were "hard loans,"
repayable in the currency borrowed since the World Bank
to some extent operated as a profitmaking venture. The
loan that the Eisenhower administration proposed was to
be different and in two categories. First, it included
soft loans (repayable in borrowers currency) called Public
Law 480 or the Food for Peace Program. The agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act was passed in 1954
under the Eisenhower administration.
Under the Food for Peace Program, the Department of
Agriculture sells surplus farm commodities abroad for
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foreign currencies. These proceeds are then used by the
United States government for various purposes, notably as
loans for economic development.42
The second category of loan was the Development Loan
Fund (DLF). The DLF was a loan designed to meet the
demands for loans on lower terms than were availabe in
existing international lending agencies. It was proposed
in 1957 under the Eisenhower administration that the DLF
was established to provide capital for long range economic
development to nations who could not qualify at the World
Bank. The capital was to be concentrated on projects
such as highways, chemical plants, agricultural machinery,
steelmills, railroads, power plants and the like. All
projects were to be closely supervised by American engi
neers.43 Also the Eisenhower administration insisted in
1959 that all capital goods and technical services for
U.S. underwritten projects must be purchased in the United
States.
There is a need to update the foreign aid programs
as they evolved in the 1960s under Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson before we conclude this review of the history of
American foreign aid.
During the past three decades the United States
foreign aid program has continued to bear three characteris
tics as developed during the Eisenhower administration.
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First, there has been an increase in effort to separate
development from military assistance - the amount in each
category fluctuating from one administration to another.45
Secondly, there has been a shift towards loans rather
than outright grant-in-aids.46 Thirdly, the United States
continues to coordinate its own program with that of other
developed countries who extend economic aid.4?
In addition to these, other new trends have been
either achieved or have been advanced. Such trends
include the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act
created the Agency for International Development (AID) by
combining all previous economic assistance programs -
grants, loans and technical cooperation - into a single
administrative agency. AID also is responsible for coor
dinating of military and economic assistance and for
overseas operation of Public Law 480.
Secondly, there has been an increased recognition of
the need for economic and social development. As a re
sult of this trend President John F. Kennedy in March
1961 called on all people in the Western hemisphere to
join the United States in a new Alliance for Progress.
Like the earlier Marshal Plan the Alliance for Progress
was a response to the fear of so-called communist expan
sion.48 It was a United States alternative to the so-called
"Cuban revolutionary approach" to social reforms.
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The objectives of the alliance were "to bring a
better life to all the peoples of the continent" by
working through "democratice institutions."453 "To bring
the benefit of economic progress available to all citizens
of economic and social groups."50 This was to be achieved
by encouraging
programs of comprehensive agrarian reform
leading to effective transformation, where
required, of unjust structures and systems
of land tenure and use with a view to re
placing latifundia and dwarf holdings by an
equitable sytem of land tenure so that...the
land may become for the man who works
it the basis for his economic stability,
the foundation for his increasing welfare
and the guarantee of his freedom and
di gnity.51
The United States participation in the alliance was
assigned to and carried out by the AID Latin American
Bureau. As indicated above, the Alliance for Progress
inaugurated a program of "social development in Latin
America concentrating in the field of land reform, edu
cation, health and housing."52
During the past several years, criticism of total
foreign aid has continued to grow in both Congress and
the country as a whole. Some Congress members, of course,
have always been critical of foreign aid. However, the
continuing mounting deficit of the U.S. government together
with the increasing debts of Third World countries seem
to add substance to a need for a more critical examination
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of the U.S. foreign aid program.
Another event that seems to add more credence to the
need for examination of the aid program has been the Clay
Report issued in 1963 by the Presidential Advisory Com
mittee appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1962. The
committee headed by General Lucius Clay was appointed to
examine the entire overseas assistance program and to
determine how it could be redefined to do a better job.53
The report was brief and recognized that foreign aid
programs serve United States interest. However, the
report criticized the dispersion of aid to an excessive
number of countries. Specifically, it recommended that
United States aid to African countries should be limited
in view of the colonial powers' responsibilities there.
The committee also claimed that economic assistance to
some non-allied countries in Asia was "beyond that ne
cessary for our interest."54 It found the U.S. technical
assistance program too large to be adequately staffed
with qualified personnel. The committee was emphatic on
the need for other industrialized countries to increase
their aid effort. It strongly believed immediate reduction
in U.S. programs to be in order because "it was convinced
that the burden of sustaining foreign assistance is
falling unfairly upon the U.S."55
Also the Clay Report especially urged the
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improvement of lending terms by other
donors; otherwise international consortia
and coordinating groups for (recipient
countries) will saddle these countries
with impossible debt service requirements
and U.S. funds would pay for these short-
term and shortsighted debts.56
Finally, the report anticipated in the long run
further reductions in U.S. assistance programs. It also
expected that repayment of old loans would speed up and
provide an increasing share of necessary funds. The
committee favored a gradual shift towards multilateral
administration of aid which would make aid "more coordi
nated than aid by many independent donors.'57 The Clay
Report could be described actually as a "brief and qualif
ied endorsement of a policy which over the years has been
restated and reviewed repeatedly."58 It is these policies
which have been articulated in AID doctrine in recent
years. Self-help has become a predominant theme in the
disbursement of aid and the first criterion in allocating
aid is said to be the effectiveness with which availabe
resources are utilized by the recipient.59
Closely related to the issue of spending is that of
reforms. In his foreign aid message to the Congress,
President Johnson advocated "basic changes" in the pro
gram.60 Stressing that education, health and population
control be put at the top of the list of priorities.
Also he indicated that the U.S. aid programs "must
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concentrate on countries not hostile to U.S that give
solid evidence that they are determined to help themselves.61
There is no doubt therefore that by examining the
above evidence one cannot but come to the conclusion that
the evolution of aid programs has affected its objectives.
However, it is also very clear from the above evidence
that there has never been any essential change in the
foreign aid policy objectives of the United States since
World War II. There has, undoubtedly, been changes over
the past thirty years in the tactics by which American
objectives have been pursued. But these changes have
been procedural rather than substantial. The aim of the
next section of this paper will be to spell out what are
believed to have always been the essential objectives of
the United States in giving aid and to see how these
objectives differ from the ones always maintained by many
writers.
OBJECTIVES OF U.S. DISBURSEMENT OF AID
So far in this chapter we have seen how the objectives
of aid appeared to have shifted from war relief to
reconstruction aid, military defense and to economic
development. A careful examination of the above evidence
would seem to lead to a different conclusion concerning
the essential objectives of the U.S. government in the
disbursement of aid. It seems very much from the above
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study that the essential objectives of sending foreign
aid to various countries remain the same even though the
tactics of pursuing these objectives have been constantly
modified over the years.
As one examines the above record of the U.S. dis
bursement of aid since the end of the second World War,
one cannot but come to the conclusion that in spite of
the official rhetoric, foreign aid is first and foremost
an instrument of foreign policy. As the official direct
ives of the AID Program Guidance Manual62 clearly puts it:
aid is an instrument of foreign policy
an instrument necessary to create a commu
nity of 'free' nations cooperating on
matters of mutual concern, basing their
political system on consent and progress
ing in economic welfare and social justice
...(because)... such a world offers the
best prospect of security and peace for
the United States.63
The specific role of economic aid in furthering the
objectives of American foreign policy could be said to be
fourfold. First, foreign aid is given to maintain poli
tical security and economic stability in countries which
are thought to be threatened by external aggression. In
this role economic aid is complementary to military
assistance and may indeed be an alternative to direct
American intervention or presence in a country.64 In
other words, it is the national strategic interest rather
than altruism or desire for development per se that have
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many times been the determining factor in the disbursement
of the United States foreign aid. Though humanitarian
considerations or need for development sometimes play a
part in the allocation of foreign aid, their roles have
always been minimal and have increasingly diminished as
the function of aid has been redefined over the years.
As James Howe and Robert Hunter put it, "economic aid has
never been popular in the United States except as an
adjunct of some larger purpose of U.S. foreign policy."65
Howe and Hunter indeed go further to insist that
even the Marshall Plan, which set a record for popularity
and which was sold primarily as a measure to benefit the
recipient countries, was in fact "a measure directly
benefiting the United States national interest and a
means of avoiding one day sending large U.S. troops to
defend Europe."66
Howe and Hunter also noted that there is sometimes
the element of altruism when aid is allocated, but this
element has been important only to a very insignificant
element of the population; it has never been the dominant
purpose for the allocation of aid. In the case of
economic aid to Third World countries in particular, Howe
and Hunter observed that economic aid has been accepted
over the years by many supporters in the United States
as a "covert method of carrying out political intervention
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in Third World countries."67
The strategic objective in the United States is
perhaps most clearly reflected by the huge allocations in
the 1960s and 1970s to South Vietnam, South Korea,
Thailand, Taiwan and the Persian Gulf states in the late
1970s to strengthen the ability of these countries to
withstand the so-called spread of communism.6^ These
aids reflect more of change in strategic interest than in
evaluation of economic needs. The same conclusion could
be drawn from the allocation in recent years to Israel,
Egypt, Sudan and El Salvador.
Indeed most aid programs to developing countries
from the 1960s to the present were oriented more towards
purchasing the recipients' secuirty and propping up their
sometimes shaky regimes (Vietnam, Sudan and Zaire) than
promoting their long term social and economic develop
ment.69 Even the Alliance for Progress program presented
in the 1960s as aiming at promoting Latin American economic
development was in fact primarily formulated to be a
direct response to the rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba.
Once the perceived threat of communist takeover subsided
and the security issue lost its importance the Alliance
for Progress efforts came to a standstill and gradually
began to fizzle out.70
Aid disbursed shortly after the second World War,
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the Marshall Plan and also aid allocated to different
countries by the United States in exchange for the use of
military bases, air rights and adherence to alliance are
other examples of foreign aid disbursed to enhance United
States national strategic interests.7*
Finally, that American national strategic interests
plays a major part in the allocation of foreign aid
is illustrated by the fact that many of the congressional
hearings on aid, committee reports and presidential ad
dresses link the security of the United States with the
disbursement of aid.72 At the time of this study there
is a debate going on in the U.S. Congress concerning the
disbursement of aid to El Salvador. Most of the arguments
of those favoring aid to El Salvador center on the fact
that if President Reagan loses El Salvador he will lose a
very strategic country, thus the need to aid the Salva-
dorians to preserve U.S. strategic interest against po
tential aggressors. As President Reagan once put it,
"El Salvador will demonstrate whether we can stand up to
defend our interest in the hemisphere or not."73
The second conclusion that becomes obvious as the
history of United States foreign aid is examined is that
Cold War, especially since after the second World War, has
become a major factor in the redefinition and allocation
of United States foreign aid. As Judith Hart has pointed
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out, "the major characteristic of United States aid is
that it has inextricably linked economic and military
assistance in a program primarily determined by cold war
strategies."74 Foreign aid gains support in the United
States in so far as it is seen as a potent anti-communist
weapon, raising the living standards of others to make
them less susceptible to communism and as an inducement
or reward for nations allying themselves with the United
States against immediate or potential communist aggression
The support for the Marshall Plan for the most part can
be traced to the widespread feeling that not only American
help to Europe would help prevent communism by external
aggression, but also that in absence of aid some of the
domestic politics of countries would probably become
dominated by communists. Harold Wilson, former British
Prime Minister noticed this trend in American aid as far
back as 1953 when he observed that:
Economic aid is becoming more and more what
Springfellow Berr has called a 'gimmick in
the cold war;' it is granted now not so
much on grounds of need...but on the grounds
of military reliability. The Pentagon is to
be the judge. It was the fear that the
acceptance of U.S. aid means joining the
American strategic bloc that caused not only
Ireland but Burma and Indonesia to refuse
much needed aid under the Military Security
Assistance (MSA) program.75
It has already been noted that the U.S. did not seriously
consider allocating aid to Third World countries that
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desperately needed it until the Soviet Union made a move
into this area of the world. Serious consideration to
allocate aid to the Third World countries only took place
after the Soviet Union had decided to venture into this
area of the world. This is yet another evidence demon
strating how the United States foreign aid program is
very greatly influenced by cold war considerations.
Finally, it is important to note that the bulk of
the United States aid, especially after the second World
War, went to the United States closest allies. As
previously noted, the Marshall Plan was initiated to
counter the effect of communist movements in Europe.
The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the plan
only because it was known from the outset that it would
not participate due to the conditions laid down for
participation.76 During the Eisenhower years, with the
John Forster Dulles' military containment policy, a network
of military bases stretching across the globe was esta
blished in which over forty-two nations became closely
involved in an anti-communist alliance. As a result of
the important role that the Cold War plays in determining
who receives the United States aid, the greatest benefi
ciaries of U.S. aid since World War II have been such
close allies as Western European countries, Israel, South
Korea, Japan and Taiwan and now mainland China.77
72
A third conclusion that could be reached as one
examines the history of United States foreign aid programs
is that foreign aid has increasingly become a "weapon of
control" for the United States government. The case of
the Marshall Plan and Soviet participation has been
already cited.78 In other words, foreign aid has become
a tool which the United States has used to try to influence
the decision-making in the recipient nation. Through
aid, political, economic and monetary policies of nations
are either directly or indirectly influenced. For in
stance, countries who support the United States positions
in international fora often end up being rewarded with the
allocation of aid. Others who take a different position
often end up being ignored despite their need or in some
instances have their aid cut off or threatened to be cut
off. The case of Nigeria's complaint to the head of the
U.S. Mission in the United Nations is a typical example
of how aid is often used to influence decision-making in
recipient countries.7^ There is a report that a member
of the Nigerian delegation to the United Nations called
the late American Ambassador, Stephenson to complain that
a member of the American delegation had threatened with
drawal of United States aid to Nigeria unless Nigeria
voted in favor of certain proposals. Ambassador Stephenson
is reported to have disavowed any such threat and the
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Nigerian vote was cast according to previous instructions
from Lagos.
The above incident by no means is an isolated one.
There are numerous other cases similar to the above that
could be cited. For example, when Zimbabwe became inde
pendent in 1980, the United States quickly moved to esta
blish a bilateral aid program in this country. In 1981
and 1982, United States aid to Zimbabwe reached $75
million per year.80 jne United States expectd that the aid
would facilitate the relations between the two countries.
As most other foreign aid programs the aid for Zimbabwe
was meant to serve both political and economic purposes.81
The Reagan administration recently decided to reduce
U.S. aid to Zimbabwe from $64 million in 1983 to $40 million
in 1984 and $30 million in 1985. The official explanation
for the decrease was federal budget constraints. However,
as Lancaster clearly pointed out:
It is rare for U.S. foreign aid to be cut
by as much as Zimbabwe's programs were
without the purpose of signalling the
dissatisfaction or punishing the recipient
government for policies the U.S. does not
like. In Zimbabwe's case, the U.S. dis
approved both that country's abstention on
the U.N. Security Council's resolution
condemning the Soviet Union for shooting
Korean Airline Flight 007 and the active
support that country lent to the Security
Council resolution criticizing U.S.
invasion of Grenada.82
The above example demonstrates in part the truth of
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what this paper has already pointed out. There is the
tendency on the part of the U.S. to "raise, lower, change,
free or at times scrap off aid based on the behavior
of countries"*^ -jn issues that are salient to the interests
of the United States.
Ghana provides another case of a growing pattern of
United States use of its foreign aid as a weapon to modify
the behavior of recipients. The United States disbursement
to Ghana was frozen in 1983 when a Ghanian official
accused U.S. officials of supporting coup plotters. The
United States demanded a public apology which Ghana
refused to give. Despite the fact that since then Ghana
has undertaken stringent economic reforms along lines
required by the United States, only $3 million out of the
$13 million package has been unfrozen. Besides, no
bilateral aid has since been proposed to aid the recovering
process.
But Africa is not the only victim of this aid policy
of the United States. We have previously mentioned the
Marshall Plan which could only benefit those countries who
supported the United States plan for Europe. In addition,
we cited the case of the U.S. decision to withdraw support
from UNRRA because recipient nations were leaning towards
the Soviet Union. Also in 1963 the U.S. actually suspended
foreign aid to Panama to pressure it to accept its terms
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in the negotiations that were going on between the two
countries.84
Cases like the above clearly show that though the
humanitarian factor may be considered in the disbursement
of U.S. foreign aid it is never an overriding factor. In
contrast, more or less the need to control the behavior
of recipients is becoming a very important factor in the
disbursement of U.S. foreign aid.
Finally, the need to create stability and thereby
diffuse potential revolutionary situations in recipient
countries is another factor that induces the disbursement
of the United States foreign aid. Numerous examples
could be cited to support this point. The Marshall Plan,
for instance, serves as a good example to illustrate
this point. After the second World War there was a need
to revitalize the economies of Western Europe. The
fundamental aim was to prevent the politics of these
countries from being overtaken by "communists" or for
that matter being dominated by the so-called radicals
who might work for revolutionary changes as was going to
take place in Eastern Europe.85 Greek-Turkish aid under
the Truman Doctrine is another example of aid allocated
for the purpose of maintaining stability. In this case
the aid was given to the governments in power to enable
them to crush rebellions by those who were seeking to
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overthrow the status quo in order to be able to carry out
desired changes.86
In the 1950s and 1960s a large portion of the United
States aid went to both South Korea and South Vietnam for
the same purpose.87 in recent years, American foreign
aid has gone mostly to friendly countries as Israel,
Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, Sudan, Zaire and El Salvador
to strengthen these countries and thus make them capable
of crushing any resistance movements that may rise to
seek to overthrow the status quo.88
A number of conclusions become apparent as the
history of the United States foreign aid is examined.
One of which, of course, is the most important is that
foreign aid has always been and is increasingly becoming
an instrument of foreign policy. Since after the second
World War there have always been foreign policy implica
tions both in the allocation and administration of the
United States foreign aid. Because of foreign policy
considerations, foreign aid has become greatly influenced
by Cold War, strategic national interests and the need to
create stability in recipient countries.
As a corollary of the above conclusion, United States
foreign aid does not often go to countries that most need
it but to countries that support the United States foreign
policy objectives.
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Secondly, the need for development sometimes plays a
role in determining where aid goes to, but for the most
part the need for development is a subsidiary reason for
the allocation of aid. United States aid very often is
given to the United States strongest allies. That is
why, for instance, Israel and Egypt have been the largest
beneficiaries of the United States foreign aid today.89
AFRICA IN THE UNITED STATES EQUATION
Having therefore done a general survey of the history
of the United States foreign aid, it may be good to
examine briefly the evolution of United States foreign
aid programs in Africa. As this is being discussed, two
questions in particular will be kept in focus. First of
all, we shall endeavor to answer the question, what has
been the United States foreign aid philosophy as it
pertains to Africa? The second question is, how was
Africa incorporated into the United States political
arithmetic?
Needless to say, the United States aid philosophy
in Africa has not been different than in most other Third
World countries that have already been discussed.
Basically, whether it is in Africa or in Europe, aid for
the United States has always been an instrument of foreign
policy and a tool with which the United States has sought
to bid for the favor of countries not yet committed to
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either the socialist or the capitalist system.
The emergence of new nations in Africa in the 1950s
and 1960s and the Soviet entry into the foreign aid arena
led aid proponents in the United States to return to
earlier Marshall Plan goals, mainly to provide economic
and political stability while integrating these newly
emerging nations into the so-called "democratic" and free
enterprise oriented world order. It was this philosophy
that prompted the United States to disburse economic aid
to the beneficiary countries in Africa during the 1960s.
Max Millikan and W.W. Rostow pointed this out in 1958
when they maintained that the United States was facing a
major communist effort "to exploit the weakness, confusions
and temptations of new nations...to clamp communism down
firmly on them."90 According to Millikan and Rostow,
American foreign policy should
use whatever influence we can bring to bear
to focus the local energies, talents and
resources on the constructive task of
modernization...Diplomatically, our stance
should put a greater premium on the posi
tion of governments towards the moderniza
tion of their poeple than on the day-to-day
position in the politics of cold war.91
It probably should be pointed out that Rostow's
position expressed above in no way depicts unconcern for
the so-called spread of the communist movement. On the
other hand, Rostow and his colleagues were suggesting
that the best way to fight the communist movement was by
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giving aid to the new governments to enable them to create
a stable condition in the recipient countries as a way of
combating communists. Millikan and Rostow, in fact, went
on to contend that the overall goal of the American
development aid program should be to create a context of
global interdependence favorable to American national
interests, one in which
most men and governments in the world come
to perceive that private capitalism,
domestic and foreign has an expanding role
to play in the new nations capable of rein
forcing their larger political and social
objectives.92
When John F. Kennedy became president he took up
this development theme with the same characteristic vigor.
In a major policy address in May 1961, Kennedy's Acting
Secretary of State, Chester Bowles stated that the United
States should
use American skills and resources to help
build a world partnership in which all
nations interested in freedom, security
and progress can cooperate...the fate of
America is intimately and inextricably
bound up with the fate of the billion and
half people living in the developed area
of the world. Our survival no longer
depends on guns, and tanks and bombs alone.93
As can be derived from the above statements, after
the second World War, probably more than ever before, the
United States was determined to make foreign aid an
instrument of foreign policy. As a consequence of the
above philosophy, Africa initially received little or no
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foreign aid at all from the United States. This was
because it really was not regarded as being strategically
salient to the interests of the United States. However,
as the cold war intensified, African nations and many
other Third World nations, were perceived as arenas of
conflict between the two superpowers. Consequently, they
became increasingly important strategically. The result
of this perception was increased foreign aid to some
nations in Africa.
Shortly after the war, Britain, France and to a
lesser extent, Portugal, extended economic assistance to
the colonies. Although Britain and France were recipients
of aid under the Marshall Plan, they used about $600
million of acquired capital for development in their
colonies in Africa. Five hundred million dollars were
allocated to North Africa and $100 million to Africa
"South of the Sahara".94 Later in the 1950s, the United
States, Germany and Italy established bilateral agreements
with Africa.95
As previously pointed out earlier in this paper the
early extension of United States foreign aid to Africa
coincided with the cold war which in fact provided
justification for the technical assistance programs.
Ideological and irreconci1iable differences between the
East and West dominated the international scene after
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the second World War. The hostile attitude of the
superpowers towards each other was coupled with rival in
trade and aid in the developing world.
After the war the Soviet Union established educational
facilities and a sports arena in Guinea. They also tried
to reach out with millions of dollars to Algeria, Egypt,
Ghana and Mali. The United States, of course, was not
going to sit back and see the Soviet Union claim dominance
in this part of the world. Therefore, it started its own
aid program. Between 1946 and 1977, United States economic
assistance to Africa, though very concentrated, amounted
to about $6,287 billion. Of the amount, $2 billion
consisted of loans and the remaining $4,062 billion of
grants. During that period, United States military assis
tance to Africa amounted to $831.6 million. Of the
military assistance, $401.9 million dollars were in loans
and the remaining $429.7 million in military grants.96
Overall the United States financial commitments to
Africa between the end of the second World War and 1979
amounted to approximately $7„119 billion.97 During this
period, economic assistance was disbursed to countries
that claimed allegiance or leaned towards the capitalist
system. Such countries include Nigeria, Zaire, Morocco,
Ethiopia and Kenya. However, when in the 1970s there
were changes of governments like Egypt, Sudan, Somalia
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and Ethiopia, the United States made some changes to
respond to these changes. For instance, the United States
after the death of Adul Nasser wooed Egypt to its camp.
Today Egypt is the largest recipient of United States aid
in Africa.
When Ethiopia went socialist it lost its favor with
the United States and therefore lost most of its aid.
Somalia switched to the capitalist camp and started
receiving enormous amounts of aid. Sudan turned capitalist
and was given enormous amounts of aid, but when in 1985
Nimeri, who was pro-West was overthrown in a coup, Sudan
lost its aid. Mozambique and Angola, two socialst govern
ments in southern Africa which are desperately in need of
help, receive little or no foreign aid from the United
States because of their ideological stands. Zimbabwe as
previously pointed out started receiving some aid from the
United States shortly after its independence but when it
was discovered that it could not be wooed into the Western
camp its aid was drastically cut down. Nigeria still
- receives some aid due to its pro-Western stand.
On the whole it could be said that for the most part
the United States foreign aid to Africa has been based
upon U.S. national strategic and economic interests. The
various countries' ideological stands and whether or not
countries are willing to modify their behavior to
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accommodate U.S. national strategic and economic interests
determine who gets or does not get U.S. aid. African
countries which are willing to do this are often rewarded
with aid. Those that are unwilling most often than not
are punished for not being willing to modify their
behavior.98 of course, but for the cold war and the
increasing strategic significance of Africa, African
nations would not have been incorporated into the U.S.
aid arithmetic at all.
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CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF AID
The focus of this chapter will be on the organization
and administration of the United States foreign aid. It
is here that the general mechanics of U.S. aid programs
will be discussed. For instance, a distinction will be
made between bilateral and multilateral aid. Furthermore,
the different forms of aid such as economic assistance,
technical and military assistance will be discussed.
In this chapter also will be examined the terms of
the United States foreign aid, particularly as they relate
to Africa. Such terms as grants and loans will be
discussed in addition to the conditions of U.S. foreign
aid to LDCs. Such conditions as project as opposed to
program or plan aid will be considered. Also to be
considered in this section will be such a condition as
tying aid to domestic procurement and its effects on the
overall result of aid.
The specific objectives of this chapter will be
threefold. First, it is hoped that the discussion arti
culated here will enable us to better understand how the
U.S. foreign aid program works in actual practice.
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Secondly, it is hoped that this chapter will provide some
framework which could be utilized in the next chapters in
analyzing the United States foreign aid disbursement to
African countries under study. Thirdly, we hope that
these discussions will enable us to make some suggestions
on how some aid problems that derive from administration
could be solved so that aid could be of more benefit to
the recipients.
THE UNITED STATES AS THE LARGEST FOREIGN AID DONOR
As it has been pointed out in the previous chapter
the study of the United States foreign aid program is
very important since the United States presently still
remains the largest donor of foreign aid in terms of the
overall percentage of aid given annually. According to
the Development Assistance Committee Review published in
1980, the United States ranked as the number one largest
bilateral aid donor in 1960, 1970 and 1979.* However, it
can be seen from Table 1 that its netflow of aid has been
going down since 1960. Examining the magnitude of aid
only in terms of volume could be very deceiving. For
instance, while the U.S. ranked first when the volume of
its disbursement is compared to those of other nations
(see Table 2), the United States does not rank among the
first ten largest donors if the volume of aid is considered
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TABLE 1
FLOW OF UNITED STATES AID IN TERMS OF GNP





















































































































4.6 5.9 6.8 13.6 14.7
.51 .45 .34 .35 .33
12.2 13.1 12.7 15.2 14.8
.9 1.3 2.0 3.8 4.2

























































































































14.7 15.8 16.6 17.5 18.4
4.7 5.6 6.4 7.1 7.9
1.00 1.16 1.27 1.36 1.45
Source
♦estimated
McNeil, Desmond, The Contradictions of Aid
(London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 107.
**see below
Note: **It can be see from the above statistics that the
net flow of U.S. aid in terms of GNP fell drastically
from 1960-1979 when it leveled down. Note also that most
of the donor countries including the U.S. failed to reach
the target of 0.7% of GNP per year set for the United
Nations Development Decade.
96
in terms of donors GNPs. In other words, whereas, the
United States has for a number of years remained the
largerst bilateral aid donor, it is not the most generous
aid donor, (see Table 3).
TABLE 2
















































































Source: McNeil, Contradictions of Aid, p. 107.
not in top ten.
n.a. figures not available.
Note: a = These figures relate only to official development
assistance by OECD and OPEC members. According to
the DAC Review 1980 (Table VIII-7 ) the total net
disbursements from USSR were as follows: 1970,
US$783m, of which US$606m were to Cuba, Korea PDR
and Vietnam; 1979, US$1432m, of which US$1150m
were to Cuba, Korea PDR and Vietnam.
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TABLE 3
THE MOST GENEROUS BILATERAL AID DONORS





















Country Official development assistance











Source: McNeil, Contradictions of Aid, p. 108.
Another point that has been made before about the
United States foreign aid but needs restating is that it
often does not go to countries that most need it but to
\/ery close allies. As can be seen from the following
statistics, forty percent of the United States bilateral
aid in 1978-79 went to only two countries, Israel and
Egypt while the remaining sixty percent went to the
remaining countries put together who received foreign aid
from the United States in 1978-79 (see Table 4).
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TABLE 4




















40 percent to Egypt and Israel
60 percent technical assistance,
mainly to current and former
dependencies
widely distributed
primarily to Asia, especially
Indonesia
widespread, largely to former
colonies
75 percent to Arab
mainly to about 15
widely distributed
poorest countries




c. 60 percent to Papua New Guinea
20 percent to other SE Asian and
Pacific countries
half to Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi
especially to Bangladesh, India,
Kenya and Tanzania









Source: McNeil, Contradictions of Aid, p. 107.
Note: *Forty percent of the foreign aid disbursed by the
United States in 1978-79 went to two allies Israel
and Egypt and sixty percent to the rest of the
countries put together.
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BILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL AID
Foreign aid disbursed by the United States could be
put into two categories - bilateral and multilateral aid.
Bilateral aid are those in which the actual disburse
ment takes place between an agency of the United States
government and the recipient country. It could be in
different forms such as economic assistance, military
assistance, technical assistance and what has now come to
be known as Food for Peace Program or PL 480. These we
shall discuss in more detail in the later part of this
chapter.
Most bilateral aids are tied. This means that the
recipient countries are often compelled to spend the aid
dollars they receive in purchases from the donor countries.
However, bilateralism does not always involve tied con
ditions. In the early post war period the largest
proportion of the United States aid was bilateral but was
untied. In actual fact, however, those aid dollars were
used to procure commodities in the United States where
they were available.2
"Bilateral aid is often tied at both ends. This
means that the aid given is specified for particular
projects and involves the purchase of goods and services
in the donor country."3
The objectives of tied aid are mostly political and
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economic. The latter permits the donor country to make
fuller use of idle domestic resources, including industrial
capacity, thus expanding domestic employment opportunities.
Tied aid can also be used to expand exports and alleviate
pressures on the balance of payments of the donor country.4
The political objectives involve the desire
by the donor nations to be recognized as
the initiator of particular projects and to
receive credit which generates spilovers into
political alignment or UN voting patterns
that support the donor country.5
As K.B. Griffin and J.L. Enos put it,
economic aid from the powerful to the
powerless, from metropole to the satellites
is an instrument of power politics. How
much a country lends to another country
will not be determined by its needs or
its potential or its past economic perfor
mance, good or bad or its virtue but by
benefit it yields in terms of political
support.6
Finally, under tied aid, appropriations can be easily
justified by legislators.
There are a number of objections to tied aid which
will be discussed later. For now three objectives relating
to bilateral aid are going to be discussed. First,
bilateral aid can become a subsidy for domestic products
that cannot compete in the world market, especially when
prices in the donor countries cannot compete international
ly. Tying in a situation like this reduces the value of
aid in comparison to the amount that would have been
received in normal conditions.7
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Secondly, tied bilateral aid may restrict the
expansion of trade among developing nations by forcing
them to buy aid-financed goods and services only from the
country disbursing the aid. Thirdly, both bilateral and
tied aid are objected to by developing nations because
they are apt to exert undue political influence on the
recipient.8
In addition to bilateral aid, the United States
disburses mulitilateral aid. This is aid given through
the contributions to the international aid organizations.
Basically, there are three groups of multilateral organi
zations that the United States supports. These include
the World Bank group, the Regional Development Banks and
Funds and various United Nations agencies, the IMF and
International Development Agency (IDA).9 It is the
Treasury Department of the United States which is re
sponsible for the United States contributions to inter
national financial institutions.
Multilateral aid has become very popular among aid
recipients in recent years for several reasons. Of great
importance is the desire by the LDCs to channel both
political and economic decisions into international bodies
where each country is represented and can take position
and vote. Furthermore, multilateral programs are preferred
by smaller donors who cannot by themselves put together
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comprehensive bilateral programs.10 These donors usually
contribute the higher percentage of their aid through
international organizations. Thirdly, multilateral aid
has been advocated by many intellectuals who contend that
it contributes to building an international community and
consequently world peace.H Finally, multilateral aid
appeals especially to the recipient nations in that, even
though it sometimes has some strings attached to it, it
gives the recipient a large room for maneuver in that they
can use aid money to procure aid commodities from anywhere
they desire. However, it does not in any way mean that
the political and economic pressures are altogether re
moved from these organizations. The fact as we have al
ready pointed out is that the administrative arms of many
international institutions are often tightly controlled
and dominated by donor countries who therefore have the
power to pressure the recipient countries to submit to
political demands of their various governments in exchange
for aid money.
The United States disburses its foreign aid to deve
loping countries in different forms. In this discussion
we shall consider specifically three forms in which the
United States aid to developing states take. This will
include economic assistance, military assistance and
technical assistance.
103
During this discussion, we shall seek to examine the
various forms of aid; which government agency administers
it and the process in which they are administered.
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Within the heading "economic assistance1 are included
many different kinds of ecnomic aid. Some of these include
development loans or grants, supporting assistance, and
the so-called Food for Peace or PL 480.12
A loan is different from a grant - the country that
receives a loan promises to pay back. A loan can be long
term, medium term or short term. It can be interest free
or interest bearing.13 Repayment of principal can begin
promptly or after a period of grace. Finally, to either
a grant or loan special conditions concerning receipt and
use may be attached.14 These conditions are called
"tying." A grant does not create external indebtedness
or recipient country payable in convertible currency.
The lenders or aid donors differ in the terms they
attach to the financial capital disbursed. For the most
part the terms are often related to the purpose or project
for which the aid or grant is intended. Grants are often
reserved for technical assistance and soft term loans for
capital improvement like roads and habors and infra
structure projects which do not yield any direct revenue.
Hard term loans are often given for projects of greater
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financial profitability.15 The United States has a rich
spectrum of hard and soft loans. However, ordinary
repayable loans seem to fall into either of the two
categories namely - development loans (AID loans) or hard
loans (mostly Export-Import Bank loans).16
Development loans are of two varieties, namely
project loans and program loans. Project loans are made
available for goods and services needed by the recipient
countries for rather specific purposes and investments
such as factories, irrigation ditches, power dams and
electrical systems. Program loans, on the other hand,
have a much broader function. They are often designed to
promote general development in the recipient country.
For instance, programs loans could be used for reduction
of inflation, to reform tax structure and improve revenues
and for balance of payment purposes.*7
Recipients of aid are often encouraged by donors to
produce plans. Such plans should set out the main problem
and objectives in quantitative terms and should relate
the means - coherent projects and their expenditures - to
these problems and ends and explain in detail the need
for external assistance.18 in an ideal situation the
donor would study the situation closely, consider the
urgency of the problem and finally decide whether it is
appropriate to sponsor such a program. In consultation
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with the recipient they would decide which level of
support the donor can give over the plan period. If
donor decides to give money for this plan or program it
would be termed a plan or program aid. If the donor wants
to give aid for specific projects within the plan or pro
gram it would be considered a project aid. Incidentally,
it is sometimes not very easy to distinguish between
these two types of aid.19
The above notion, of course, is rather an idealized
version of how aid is given. If indeed aid was given in
reality in this way it probably would be the best way to
assist developing countries. But the reality is that
when aid is considered both economic and political factors
come to bear. Consequently, many donors often choose to
fund projects perceived as politically more expedient.
They prefer to fund those projects that are not only big
but simple, which will not only be viable administratively,
but will leave a monument behind when they leave. The
result is that financial aid has only found its way into
such things as power hydroelectricity, development of
ports, building of airports and hard toppings of roads
most of which are only beneficial to the big corporations
and the very rich and of very little relationship at all
as far as development is concerned. Not only are these
projects big in the sense that they absorb so much aid at
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once but they also make few administrative demands on the
donor governments.
African countries are in many ways beginning to pay
for such mistakes that were made in the past as just
pointed out. In the past, money was spent on building huge
conglomerates to the negligence of development in agri
culture. Today, the countries that in the past exported
food are devoting a huge portion of their budgets for
importation of food. Population has grown immensely in
these countries and fewer and fewer people practice
farming, resulting in shortage of food and in some cases,
famine.
Another reason why donors often choose big projects
is that the risk of obvious failure in such projects is
small. Thus, for instance, problems of construction in
some projects are well known before hand and there is not
much difference between developed and non-developed areas
in this respect. Even if different methods ought to be
used, there is often very little or no attempt to do so.
For instance, there is usually no special attempt made in
using labor intensive methods. Furthermore, either demand
is relatively easy to forecast or it does not seem to
matter as in the case of roads which have no commercial
value or university colleges that do not have lecturers
to teach or students to fill the buildings. Similarly,
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infrastructure projects are fairly easy to manage. For
example, running dynamos or filling roads is somewhat
a routine thing which calls for little or no competence
at all. So also are the running of social infrastructure
such as school buildings and hospitals.
It is therefore no surprise that at the early stages
of independence of African countries the only new industries
that seemed to have been popular were the dam projects.
Thus, we had the Kariba, Owen, Volta, Niger, Aswan dams,
many of which, some believe, produced excess power that
never were effectively utilized.20 These so-called great
dams used a high proportion of the aid given to Africa in
the 1960s and 1970s. Some of them, no doubt, had to be
built but a lot of them were built too soon.
Turning to the communications sector, a similar
argument could be made. There was and indeed still is a
tendency to build hard-top main roads well before the den
sity of traffic warranted it. Similarly, capital was
wasted in the construction of excessive numbers of airports
with long runways and expensive electronic equipment with
no competent staff to manage. Today, in Nigeria we have,
for instance, the Murtala Mohammed airport equipped with
the most up-to-date sophisticated equipment which are
neither used nor properly maintained. The only useful
purpose that this equipment and long runways serve is the
108
memory of foreign engineers and technicians who con
structed them.
As already pointed out, in education there is ob
viously the tendency for buildings to out run the supply
of competent staff and possible students. Thus, we have
endless numbers of universities in Nigeria which are very
poorly staffed and whose students are on strike for half
of the school year in protest for lack of teaching staff
and equipment to work with in the classrooms.
All these add up to the conclusion that project aid
has its built-in flaws. First, it encourages the recipient
to limit its development plan not to the area of needs as
in the case of agriculture and some industrial sectors
but to plans that include projects that will appeal to
the donors. Secondly, projects aid, so far as we have
seen in the African situation, encourages waste in that
it only caters for big and expensive projects which may
benefit the big corporations but have no bearing at all
with development as we understand it.
A third potential disadvantage of project aid is
that most donors avoid small projects in favor of large
economic and glamorous social infrastructure projects.
Lastly, project aid as describerd above is limited in the
sense that it does not encourage the development of
projects which will involve recurrent expenditure.21 For
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example, such projects as agricultural extension, research
and education are often not given the kind of attention
they deserve. The reason again is obvious. These are
not the type of projects that easily leave the footmarks
of the donors behind. Besides, they take a considerable
length of time to yield results and neither the government
in power nor the donor countries are often willing to
wait so long for the result of their investments.
Program loans are often given to support certain
policies of the recipient nations. For instance, it
could be in the form of food aid to developing nations.
Several different conditions make it necessary for this
kind of aid to be given to recipients. The first is the
food deficits in many less developed nations. In 1967,
for instance, 18.6 percent of all bilateral commitments
consist of food aid from Australia, Canada and the United
States.2
Secondly, the concentration on investments on projects
sometimes does not take into consideration future require
ments for spare parts and imported materials. As a result,
further assistance in the form of imports become necessary
in order for the new plants to operate more efficiently.
Thirdly, program aid has also been provided where
the limited taxing power of a nation makes it difficult
for the government to meet all local cost of its develop-
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ment program. In a situation like this, a country may
import and sell some goods locally to use the local
currency for development purposes.
In other cases, as previously mentioned, assistance
can go strictly for budget support. For many years, the
colonial powers gave such assistance to the former colo
nies. The United States has included a separate item in
its aid program called the Security Supporting Assistance
which we shall discuss in detail later in this study.
This assistance is often provided primarily to build the
defensive strength of LDCs on the socialist or progressive
perimeter. This, of course, is a different form of aid
from military assistance.
As can be obvious, this kind of support does not go
to all countries. For the most part, in the case of the
United States, it goes to its closet allies. In the past
South Korea, Taiwan and Israel used to be the greatest
beneficiaries. In recent years Egypt, Sudan and Zaire
have become some of the participants in the program. The
. intention of this kind of aid is obvious, too. For the
most part, it is to help meet the defense costs beyond
a country's immediate capacity. There is often much
greater flexibility in the use of such funds. For this
reason such funds are often not available except for
close allies.23
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In the case of former colonial powers, program aid often
goes to a former colony.
Program aid often comes under attack because of its
political implications and side effects. It is often
pointed out that the countries who receive this aid
sometimes do not need them whereas countries that need
the funds badly may not be able to have them because of
the political alignmemt.24
Program aid is also criticized on economic grounds.
For instance, pressure is often put upon recipients to
produce results. Consequently, recipients are often
forced to limit themselves to programs that yield quick
results and not those that may necessarily be needed.2^
In addition to the official bilateral disbursement
or development assistance, the United States and other
donors disburse what is normally referred to as security
supporting assistance. The objective of this program is
to promote economic and political stability in regions
where the U.S. and other donors have special security
interest and have determined that economic assistance
will be useful in helping promote peace and avert major
economic or political crises. As President Jimmy Carter
put it in his budget proposal for this program for Fiscal
Year 1981,
By assisting these nations to acquire and
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maintain the capability to defend them
selves we serve our worldwide interest in
collective security and peace. By provid
ing economic support in regions beset by
serious conflict we promote the peaceful
resolutions of disputes, encourage economic
and political stability in selected countries
and regions and support activities that
further the national security interest
of the United States.26
The Security Supporting Assistance program has
financed capital projects, provided balance of payments
support and could also augment bilateral programs supposed
ly directed at benefitting the poor.27 in the case of the
United States, the program policies are set by the
Secretary of State with the assistance of the Director of
International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). The
policies are administered by the Agency for International
Development.
As it has already been demonstrated in this study,
political factors enter so much into the donor's objectives
in disbursing aid. With this in mind, the developing
nations have also often attempted to exploit this situation
by, for instance, trying to play the Eastern bloc countries
against the Western donors. India and Ghana, for instance,
played this game very successfully in the 1960s. In re
cent years, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, the Phillipines,
Pakistan and indirectly South Africa (during the Reagan
administration) have been the beneficiaries of a large
amount of United States aid supposedly meant to stave off
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alleged invasion communist countries. Also in recent
years, countries like Egypt and Israel, have been very
successful in obtaining large amounts of aid from the
United States just by threatening to go or offering not
to go to war with each other. In 1979, the total economic
assistance provided by the U.S. to foreign countries was
$6,918 billion. Of this total, $1,982 billion were in
security supporting assistance. During the same year,
Egypt received $884.8 million in economic assistance,
including $835 million in security supporting assistance.
At the same time, Israel received $790.1 million in
economic aid of which $785 million were in security
supporting assistance.28
The Food for Peace Program (PL 480) was formed for
the purpose of helping alleviate world hunger and create
new markets for U.S. agricultural products. Approximately
six million tons of food and agricultural products are
given annually to developing nations at concessionary terms
and as grants. Guidelines for the programs are established
jointly by the Department of Agriculture and IDCA. The
administration is managed by AID.29 Payment made to the
U.S. for the agricultural commodities are then used by
the U.S. in recipient countries for several purposes.
The Food for Peace Program has been under very heavy
criticism for a number of reasons. For instance, some
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have pointed out that the program has been more of a
means of "disposing of U.S. surpluses generated by price
support program" than it is an aid.30
Like many permanent features of society, PL 480 was
intended as a temporary measure that would last for three
years only when the American agricultural surplus would
be exhausted. However, within about a year of its creation
its initial authorization was increased from one billion
dollars to 1.8 billion dollars and to 3.5 billion dollars
by the following year as the surplus grew larger and
larger.31 By 1975, $24.25 billion worth of agricultural
commodities were disbursed, an equivalent of sixteen per
cent of U.S. agricultural exports during the same period.
Initially, PL 480 was divided into three parts.32
The first part consisted of the sale of surplus agricultural
commodities for payment in local currency. This could,
therefore, be used either for U.S. purposes or for mutually
agreed economic development projects in recipient countries,
tries. This part was the most important and in fact in time
accumulated counterpart funds in local currencies faster
than they could be used. Partly because of this, sales
in local currencies have been replaced by sale in dollars.
This change was initially authorized in 1966 and since
1971 no new local currency sales agreement has been
reached.33
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In 1966, PL 480 was revised drastically. The require
ment that a commodity must be in "surplus" to be used was
modified to being "available." Although the new terms
were accompanied with some restrictions, the change has
resulted in some flexibi1ity.34 Furthermore, the U.S.
decided to produce agricultural commodities specifically
for this purpose.
The second part of this program covered grants of
emergency relief. The third part of the program covered
authorized domestic donations of surplus commodities as
well as overseas donations through U.S. voluntary agencies
and multilateral organizations. It also covered exports
to finance barter trade.
In 1977, further changes were introduced by AID and
the Food Assistance Act of 1977. Part one of this program
was amended so that seventy-five percent of sales were to
be made to countries which met the poverty criteria
established by IDA. Besides, it is now possible for the
U.S. government to cut off aid to countries that are
determined to have violated human rights.35 The act also
created the "Food for Development Program" under which
funds realized from the local sales of commodities supplied
from the first part need not be repaid if they are used
for agricultural and rural development projects. However,
there are all kinds of stringent strings attached to
116
participation in this program such as that a country must
take steps to improve its food production, marketing,
distribution and storage systems. The act specified that
a minimum of five percent of part one funds be set aside
for food in development in 1978 and fifteen percent from
1980 on.36
How does Africa fare in this program? Unfortunately,
not very well. As Table 5 demonstrates, figures for part
TABLE 5
US PUBLIC LAW 480 TITLE II - TOTAL COMMODITIES SHIPPED
FROM 1 JULY 1954 to 30 JUNE 1975 (by region of
destination, weight and Commodity Credit
Corporation dollar value)
Region* Quantity Value Value as %

























(Washington, 1977), Table 18.
Note - *Sixty percent of the total aid disbursement from
July 1954 to June 1975 went to the Near East and
Asia. The rest of the regions had only thirty-
nine percent. Africa had only seven percent of
the total aid during this period despite its
grave need.
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two of the program in 1975 shows that Africa received less
amount of aid than other regions of the world. Africa
only accounted for seven percent of the whole program
signed in Fiscal Year 1975.37 This in no way is surprising
since until recently Africa had not been regarded as an
important strategic area to the United States. The fact
that the disbursement of this food is determined, despite
the offficial rhetoric, by strategic considerations is
demonstrated by the fact that in 1975 sixty-one percent
of the disbursement went to the Near East and Asia whereas
the rest of the regions together had only thirty-nine
percent of the disbursement, (see Table 5).
Aid tying, as mentioned earlier, means that certain
conditions are imposed upon the aid recipient on how the
aid money may be spent. Aid can be tied to the source.39
In this case, aid has to be spent on the purchase of
goods and services from a particular source. The standard
practice is to tie aid to purchase in the donor country.
One former United States aid official once portrayed the
. situation very vividly when he said:
The biggest single misconception about
this foreign aid program is that we send
money abroad. We don't...foreign aid
consists of American equipment, raw
materials, expert services, and food -
all provided for specific development
projects which we ourselves review and
approve ...ninety-three percent of AID
funds are spent directly in the United
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States to pay for these things. Just last
year some 4,000 American firms in fifty
states received $1.3 billion in AID funds
for products supplied as part of the
foreign aid program.40
However, there are other variations of aid tying. For
instance, the United States has for some years, under
Policy 31, enabled some LDCs to tender for AID financed
contracts .4*
Tying aid to a source can affect the worth of aid in
that it can impose a number of costs on the LDCs aid
recipient thus reducing its worth. Excess cost may be
imposed because the specified source is an expensive
supplier. This is because for the most part the donor
countries impose aid tying so that they can secure
contracts which they fear could otherwise accrue to lower-
cost suppliers from other countries. Due to tying re
strictions and elimination of competition, there is mono
polistic pricing by suppliers from the designated source.42
Aid tying to a source also could impose other costs
because goods and services needed by recipients may not
be available in the most desired form from the designated
source. For instance, the kinds of machinery which can
be bought from the sources may be unsuited to the recipients
country's economic needs. Thus machines bought from the
United States often designed to minimize use of labor is
often inappropriate for labor-surplus countries such as
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most African countries are. However, if the United States
funds such projects, the machines would have to be bought
anyway from the United States even though machines from
Japan, for instance, could have been more suitable for
the African situation. To this excess cost of machines
and equipment could be added the costs of spare parts,
inputs and raw materials which may follow.43
Aid as we have seen could be tied to a project, in
which case the money is prevented from being spent on raw
materials and intermediaries. The damage which tied aid
causes both to the effectiveness of aid as a means of
development and political impact of aid was in a sense
partly discussed in the section that dealt with project
versus plan aid. However, it may be appropriate to point
out again some of the effects of tied aid, especially in
terms of its impact on political and economic decisions
on the part of recipients.
As previously pointed out, one of the effects of
tying aid to certain projects is that the recipient is
forced to neglect projects which though maybe needed
do not appeal to the donor. An example is the case of
research and agricultural extension as pointed out earlier
in this discussion. Consequently, rather than lead to
development, aid in such situations leads to dependency
both economically and politically, since the decisions
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made by the recipients are conditioned by the pressure
brought to bear on them by donor countries.
Another harmful effect of tying aid to a project is
that it may result in serious delays. Detailed project
agreements are very time consuming and where there are
serious delays the aid money cannot be switched to other
projects.45
In conclusion, therefore, it could be said that aid
tying by source of project does great damage to the
concept of aid and its purpose. First, it imposes excess
cost on the recipient thus reducing any benefits that
could have resulted in receiving the aid. Secondly, aid
tying causes the dependence of the recipient of the aid
on the donor, since economic and political decisions of
recipient countries are often greatly influenced by fac
tors on the part of the donor. Thirdly, aid tying en
courages incoherency in the recipients development pro
grams, since for the most part the choice of projects does
not depend on what will be good for the overall development
strategy of recipient nations, but what will be acceptable
to the donor. In most cases, the recipient is forced to
neglect projects, which though it would contribute to the
general development of the the nation, do not appeal to
donors. Finally, tying aid to a particular project may
cause delays as it takes a considerable length of time
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to work out detailed agreements on projects and aid tying
makes it difficult to switch the funds from one project
to another.
It would seem from the above that the logical ideal
solution would be to eliminate entirely the practice of
aid tying. However, it is difficult to foresee this
happening in the near future as long as aid remains an
instrument of foreign policy for most donors and as long
as there remains the problem of balance of payment in the
donor countries. If therefore aid is to fulfill its
functions as a tool for development, one area that has to
be strongly examined is the area just discussed - that of
aid tying.
From the beginning of the Marshall Plan in 1948 to
1959, the total United States aid bill amounted to about
fifty-five billion dollars for both economic and military
support to aid recipients. Of this total amount about
twenty-six billion dollars went to Western European
nations, 1.2 billion dollars went to Latin American
countries, 1.9 billion dollars went to Southeast Asia,
the Middle East, India and Africa. About three-fifths of
this aid was in the form of grants, one-fifth in loans
and another one-fifth in food grants through the PL 480
program.46
By and large foreign aid in this period was untied
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to domestic procurement. In the early post-war period,
however, most of the recipients of U.S. aid spent the
money in U.S. procuring capital equipment required for
the post-war recovery. By the mid-fifties, the European
and Japanese economies were well on their feet and began
to compete with that of the United States. Consequently,
a growing portion of U.S. foreign aid was not used for
the purchase of goods and services in the United States
but elsewhere. Also with increased deficits in the U.S.
balance of payment and with employment opportunities
dwindling in the domestic economy, there was increased
pressure from Congress to tie United States foreign aid
to domestic procurement.
The period between 1960 to 1969 differed from the
preceding one in that greater emphasis was placed on
loans rather than grants. Long terms loans became es
pecially important. These were usually given at low
interest rates to be repaid in hard currency. From 1960
with President Eisenhower's directives, U.S. foreign
assistance was progressively tied to U.S. purchases so
that procurement in the United States increased from
forty percent AID-financed commodities in 1959 to ninety-
nine percent in 1969. It was the Eisenhower policy which
was adopted for most of the 1960s and throughout four
presidents.47 The Eisenhower policy was actually a move
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to strengthen the United States economy by easing pressures
on balance of payment and helping slow down the trend
towards further disequilibrium in the U.S. trade balance.
As a result of Eisenhower's policy, there was a steady rise
of procurement in the United States during the 1960-1969
decade in relation to procurement in third world countries.
Table 6 shows a breakdown, by standard industrial trade
classification (STIC) of total U.S. aid and proportion
expended in the United States in 1960-1969 period. Over
this period, eighty-one percent of the United States aid
funds were used to purchase commodities in the United States.
The percentage ranged from a low fifty-three percent
for stone, clay and glass products to ninety-seven percent
for miscellaneous manufactures. Over the entire period,
8.2 billion dollars or approximately three percent of
annual U.S. exports were a result of the Eisenhower
procurement policy. If the observation is limited to
1965-1971 data after tied procurement had been fully
implemented, the picture is more dramatic with more than
. ninety-six percent of AID dollars tied to domestic procure
ment. Table 7 shows a yearly breakdown of the percentage
of Aid dollars used by LDCs to purchase commodites from
the U.S. market.
In 1964 at the first United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD),48 the Eisenhower procurement
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TABLE 6
PROPORTION OF AID LOANS SPENT IN THE UNITED STATES
BY MAJOR INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, 1960-1969
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♦From 1960 to 1969 eighty-one percent of aid funds disbursed
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♦Between 1965-1971 an average of ninety-six percent of aid
disbursed to LDCs were used for purchase in the U.S. Note
that only 4.5 percent of U.S aid during this period was
spent in LDCs.
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policy was heavily criticized. One recommendation that
emerged from the conference was that donor nations should
progressively channel their aid through multilateral or
ganizations. At home in the United States, some economists
argued that aid recipients should be allowed to spend
their aid money where they would have maximum benefit in
the light of opposition to aid package by Congress and
also its shrinking package. Consequently, there was
increased pressure for foreign aid dollars to be stretched
to allow purchase of goods and services at lowest world
prices, regardless of source or nationality of contractor.
Richard Nixon, in his speech titled, "Foreign
Assistance Program for the Seventies," to the Congress on
September 16, 1970, stated that the United States would
untie its aid program provided other Western industrialized
nations would follow suit. This new policy would make it
possible for AID money to be spent in any country.49
Nixon's new policy was based, for the most part, on four
foreign aid policy recommendations. The first was the so-
called Rockefeller Report on Latin America (1969) which
states that:
The United States program has become
increasingly encumbered with conditions
which seriously reduce the effectiveness
of the assistance. These include require
ment to ship half of the goods purchased
on assistance loans on United States
freighters, provision that all imports
be purchased in the U.S. no matter how
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U.S. no matter how much more expensive.50
The second recommendation was by a U.S. government
sponsored study titled "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the
1970s: A New Approach." This study was directed by
Rudolph Peterson and stated that:
the United States proposes that all
industrialized countries agree to untie
their bilateral development lending,
permitting the developing countries to
use these loans for procurement from
cheapest sources on competitive bid basis.51
Similarly, as a result of the meeting in Tokyo in the
summer of 1970, the members of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of OECD in which the United States is a
member, recommended that aid be untied. Finally, the so-
called Pearson Report52 sponsored by the World Bank in
1969 made recommendations along the same line.
At first the process of untying aid began with great
momentum. However, it later slowed down as implementation
of legislation became more difficult and other members of
the DAC, especially those with huge balance of payment
problems, refused to untie substantially their foreign
aid programs. On November 11, 1970 the United States
acted unilaterally by untying AID loans to Latin American
states. On September 15, 1971, the untying process was
expanded to include some lower income countries which
were closely aligned with the United States.53 This
effort was to enable some LDCs who received United States
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foreign aid to procure commodities in any country in the
world except the recipients's country, the socialists
countries and countries which were directly in competition
with the U.S.54 Legislation allowing procurement in any
of these countries would follow as industrialized countries
also untied their foreign aid programs.
Three things should quickly be pointed out as we
consider this episode of aid untying. First, the list of
countries that U.S. money could be used for purchase kept
changing as the international political climate changed.
Secondly, the untying legislations only covered the AID
grants since aid disbursed through the PL 480 is already
covered by untying regulation.55 Lastly, since important
Western aid donors as Japan and Western European countries
refused to untie their aid, commodities could not be
purchased from those countries with U.S. dollars.56 This
in effect, therefore, meant that even though on the
surface U.S. aid was supposed to be untied, in actual
fact it is still as strictly tied as ever.
There has been tremendous opposition to the untying
of aid dollars disbursed by the United States. At the
forefront of the criticism is the American Labor Movement.
For instance, a research memorandum of the Maritime Trade
Department of the AFL-CIO on this subject stated in 1979
that, "When we look at jobs...specific industries...our
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balance of trade, we are left with one conclusion. There
should be no "untying" of United States aid, now or in
the immediate future."57
Furthermore, an empirical study undertaken by the
same group pointed out that over 169,700 jobs would be
lost per year if the United States totally untied its aid
program. Table 8 shows a breakdown of the institutes
estimates of U.S. jobs loss per year with untied aid. It
is important to note one of the assumptions used to reach
this conclusion. It is the assumption that U.S. aid-
generated exports would came to zero under untied con
ditions. While it is unrealistic that aid-generated
exports would cease in the U.S., this assumption clearly
shows how aid donor countries make use of aid to improve
their trade and exports and thus their overall economic
conditions. But what is even more important is that all
these are done despite the effect the actions are expected
to have on the overall result of aid.
In addition to labor and other groups who benefit
from untied aid conditions such as American industries
are adamantly opposed to aid untying. The issue of untied
aid becomes important to the American industries in the
context of indirect subsidies. Consequently, the American
industries are greatly opposed to channelling U.S. aid
through multinational institutions. At the forefront of
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED U.S. JOB LOSS PER YEAR WITH UNTIED AID
(by major industry groups)
Major Industry Direct Job Loss Total Job Loss -
Group in Each Industry Direct and Indirect
(SITC Category) per Year in Each Industry
per Year
Machinery (excluding 16,000 48,000
electrical ) (35)
Primary Metal - Fab. & 13,000 29,000
Metal Products (33-34)
Chemicals (28) 6,300 19,000
Transportation Equip.
(37) 6,400 21,000
Petroleum Refining (29) 1,400 4,300
Electrical Machinery (36) 4,200 13,000
Food Products (20) 3,100 9,300
Rubber Products (30) 1,600 5,500
Textile Mill Products 2,800 8,400
(22)
Paper (26) 1,800 5,500
Stone, Clay, Glass (32) 650 2,000
Misc. Manufactures (39) 1,100 3,400
Prof. Scientific (38) 430 1,300
TOTAL 58,780 169,700
Source: Transportation Institute, 1971.
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this opposition by industries is the American maritime
industries which perhaps is the most subsidized industry
of the United States.58 Many years ago it became obvious
that without asistance from the government the industry
would go bankrupt. Therefore, the subsidy program was
administered by two important acts of Congress - the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and of 1970. Both acts
provided that subsidies would have to be applied to make
the maritime industry competitive in the international
economy. These subsidies could take either two forms -
operation and construction subsidies which are direct
subsidies or an indirect form such as the Cargo Preference
Regulations, part of which states that:
Whenever the U.S. shall procure contract
for or otherwise obtain for its own
account or shall furnish to any foreign
nation...,any equipment, materials or
commodities within or without the United
States or shall advance funds for...,
the appropriate agency shall take steps
as may be necessary and practicable
to assure that at least 50 percent of the
gross of such equipment, materials or
commodities... (is) transported on
privately owned United States flag
commercial vessels.59
As can be seen from the above legislation, no less
than fifty percent of U.S. government-generated cargo
could be transported on U.S. flag vessels. It is there
fore, ^ery obvious what impact aid untying would have on
this industry. For one thing there is no guarantee that
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an aid recipient would expand aid money in the United
States. This in effect would mean that there would be no
guarantee that cargo would be available to the merchant
man" ne.
Another industry that is opposed to aid untying is
the fertilizer industry. In 1973, the U.S. was the
largest producer of fertilizer with total output of about
$4 billion.60 During this period, 11.7 percent of domestic
output of fertilizer was exported. In recent years, AID
has begun large scale financing of U.S. fertilizer exports.
Table 9 presents U.S. exports of selected fertilizer in
1973 and their relative proportions financed by AID. In
1972, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Report, 14.42 percent of total U.S. fertilizer exports
was financed by AID loans. In 1973 this percentage rose
to nineteen percent. In 1972, AID funds provided one
hundred percent of the exports of mixed fertilizer and
sixty-nine percent of the exports of Urea. In 1973,
these percentages rose to one hundred percent of the
exports. As was pointed out earlier, present untying
regulations do not permit AID dollars to procure commodities
in other Western industrialized or socialist countries.
Therefore, the untying proposals which have so far been
implemented have had little or no effect at all on the
fertilizer industry. It is therefore not surprising that
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TABLE 9
TOTAL FERTILIZER EXPORTS AND PROPORTIONS
FINANCED BY AID

























































Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1974.
Note: *Ninety-three percent of fertilizer exports by the
U.S. in 1973 was AID financed as compared to
48.87 percent in 1972, an increase of forty-four
percent over a one year period.
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this industry is opposed to further untying measures by
the U.S. government. To make the matter worse, this
situation is most likely not going to change until either
aid becomes totally untied or the LDCs become exporters
of fertilizers. So far none of these has happened and
there is no prospect that this is going to happen in the
foreseeable future.
What conclusion could therefore be drawn from the
above assessments? One of them, very obviously, is that
maximum benefit cannot be derived from aid by recipients
as long as tying conditions remain. If the United States
sincerely desires to match actions with rhetoric, in
respect to aid, some new regulations in the form of
congressional acts will have to be passed to give more
leverage in the use of aid by the aid recipients. Whether
this could be done now in light of the national debate on
how to cut down the deficit remains to be seen.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The whole concept of foreign aid is based upon the
argument that the developed nations who are rich not only
in terms of dollars but also in terms of skills and
experience should use their resources to help the LDCs to
move on the path to development. One way of helping the
LDCs to move on this path is to provide funds for required
commodities in the form of economic aid. The other way
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is through the transmission of knowledge and skills from
the developed nations to the LDCs. Indeed, there is a
sense in which it could be argued that the greatest
contribution that the IDCs can make to the LDCs is to
pass along its knowledge and experience. Whereas, ma
chinery could be replaced, the knowledge of how to
build or even maintain a machine is a product of a long
period of trial and error. Not only are the skills of
engineers required in this case but also the common
knowledge of an unskilled worker.
Unfortunately, most children in the LDCs do not grow
up with wheels and mechanical toys. They rarely have the
opportunity to play with nuts or bolts, nor do they grow
up in an environment where complicated toys are common
place. Consequently, it becomes necessary that not only
are the machines needed to enhance development, but also
transmission of that knowledge of machines.
The transmission of knowledge from the developed to
the developing nations is usually referred to as "technical
assistance." Technical assistance is not necessarily a
matter of technology, in the narrow sense, but it includes
managerial and administrative skills and arrangements.61
For instance, the technical knowledge needed to operate a
particular manufacturing factory may be specific, but
related problems of manpower training, appropriate methods
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of compensation and efficient marketing, leave more room
for judgment. Besides, knowledge and experience may have
to be adapted to a particular culture - for example, the
most skilled census taker in the United States or France
will still have to adapt to the African culture to be
able to use his skills in Nigeria or Cameroon.
A very large proportion of foreign aid is disbursed
in the form of technical assistance. Some of the advisors
and consultants financed by aid funds often work on
preparation and appraisal of projects or their actual
implementation.62 Others are often attached to the reci
pient governments as teachers, nurses or advisors in dif
ferent ministries - for example, treasury or agriculture.
But it would be wrong to assume that the transmission
of knowledge only takes place by sending experts from the
IDCs to the LDCs. The transmission of knowledge also
takes place by students being sent from the LDCs to train
in the developed countries. Aid is often provided in the
form of grants and scholarships to make it possible for
such students to train in particular fields and return
home to utilize the knowledge and experience gained during
their studies. In addition, knowledge is transmitted by
observers being sent to developed countries from LDCs.
In this way, they can observe first hand how a particular
knowledge is being utilized in practice so that on
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returning the observer will gain better knowledge of how
such knowledge could be used in the home country.63
Nor is knowledge transmitted only through human
beings. In many LDCs the shortage of books and magazines
creates equal if not more problems than the shortage of
experts. Therefore, in some cases, technical assistance
funds are provided for setting up of libraries and the
acquisition of books and equipment for such libraries.
A number of steps are involved in the process of
providing technical assistance to less developed countries
First, it involves agreeing on the projects to be financed.
The next step involves finding competent personnel to
carry it out; and finally, making sure, through on-the-
spot arrangements, that actual transfer does take place.
There are times when technical assistance may be an
essential part of some large project as in the case of
building a new agricultural research station. In the
1940s and 1950s, technical assistance was disbursed in
the form of unrelated projects resulting from requests by
recipient governments. In recent years, there have been
concerted efforts to substitute for such a scattered
collection of projects a large scale and more continous
operation in the form of a regional program which usually
combines both capital and technical assistance.64 For
example, instead of providing teachers here and there,
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the emphasis may be in building a whole school system
which may include teacher training school buildings and
equipment and administrative machinery. A public health
center, a new road and a factory might be associated with
educational efforts. This consolidation, therefore, helps
to reduce the complexity in administration and also per
mits economy of scale. Besides, the cumulative process
of several developmental projects in a community or region
is usually geared towards minimizing various resistance
which could result from efforts fragmented over a wider
area.
As far as the United States is concerned, transmission
of knowledge and skills has always been an important part
of developing assistance programs. Indeed, as it was
pointed out in Chapter Two, it was a major element of the
Point Four Proposal by President Harry Truman in the 1949
foreign aid proposal. Initially, the United States tech
nical aid program only involved sending experts from the
United States to foreign countries as either advisers
or teachers. Later on, it was expanded to include the
bringing over of students from recipient countries to
train in several universities and colleges in the United
States. It also included the sponsoring of several
nationals in the universities and colleges in their home
countries.
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Several universities have shared the responsibility
for assisting specific educational institutions in less
developed countries. With AID support these universities
and technical schools have helped create institutes of
technology and agricultural universities in some developing
countries.65 With such funds the Agricultural University
of West Pakistan was at one time being assisted through
Washington State University. Southern Illinois University
was also very active in Afghanistan before the Soviet
invasion a few years ago. Also Hampton University in
Sierra Leone was assisted through the same university by
use of AID funds. In all, several American universities
and colleges, at one time or another, had AID contracts
to carry out various projects in less developed countries
though not all in educational fields, per se.66
As already stated, student training received major
emphasis during the initial stage of the technical assis
tance program. For example, in 1968, the U.S. financed
in whole or in part 11,027 foreign students who came to
the United States for studies - one-third each from
Africa and Asia, twenty-four percent from the Americas
and six percent from Europe - mainly Turkey. At the same
time, 1,484 persons were given scholarships to study in
other countries.67 In addition, 6,406 trainees came to
the U.S. and 1,809 were helped to go to other countries.
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In recent years, this trend has dramatically changed due
mostly to the diminishing interest and in some cases
opposition by both the United States Congress and the
American people to foreign aid. While there have been
dramatic decreases in the number of students brought over
to study, there seems to be an increase in the law enforce
ment officers being sponsored to come for studies in the
United States. The reason for this is obvious. As
pointed out earlier in Chapter Two, one of the major
objectives of the United States foreign aid program is to
create stability abroad thereby reducing potential revo
lutionary conditions in recipient countries. It is there
fore not surprising that so much emphasis in recent years
has been placed in the training of law enforcement and
security personnel who, it is hoped, would help carry
out this objective of the U.S. when they return home.
But the question that many keep asking is stability for
what and for whom? Is it to help a corrupt and elitist
few to continue to exploit the masses? If so, then the
whole aim of foreign aid is misdirected.
When the technical assistance program of the United
States was initiated in 1950 through Point Four, there
was a high expectation of what that program could accom
plish. It was indeed thought that the program would
serve as a prototype for a more sophisticated development
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scheme later in the decade. In the 1950s, it was suggest
ed that relatively small sums of money invested in this
program would yield dramatic results. By means of tech
nical assistance the political, social and economic frame
work would be created which would allow the funding of
large capital projects mainly from public and private
sectors with loans to be repaid by recipients.69
The above concept is reflected in the statement by
Henry Bennett, the administrator of the Technical Coopera
tion Administration at that time. In his statement
Bennett pointed out that:
whenever possible the project has been
geared to have impact through a dramatic
demonstration or pilot operation... it is
hoped that in the course of few years
there would be less need for outside
technical experts...As Point IV is
successful the popular understanding and
support of people for government will be
increased which will make for stability
and be effective deterrant to communist
propaganda...It is believed that the
benefits of pilot projects...wi11 result
in improved earnings of governments so
that to a maximum extent the large scale
project may be financed from loans,
either private or public.70
The above quotation demonstrates the high hopes and
expectations characteristic of the early American approach
to technical assistance programs. It is obvious from the
above quotation that one of the expectations was that
technical assistance given for a few years would result
142
in the reduction of the need for foreign aid programs.
Well, we do not need to look very far to find out that so
far this objective has not been accomplished. Indeed,
instead of reducing the need for aid there seems to be
more need for aid in all and every country that has so
far depended on aid. Debt services for all LDCs keep
mounting with every passing day. More and more money is
being borrowed everyday not for new projects but to pay
interest on past debts. Despite all the past technical
aid, most of the LDCs still remain unindustrialized;
agriculture in particular in most of the Third World
countries remains in worse shape than it was before the
independence of these countries and the need for technical
assistance keeps mounting instead of diminishing. The
question then remains, what went wrong? Why did this aid
not yield the kind of expected results?
Obviously, there could be a thousand different
answers to the above question depending on who answers
it. Be that as it may, it probably would be good to
carefully examine the situation and make some suggestions
on why the program failed to yield the expected results.
One of the major factors that has contributed so
much to the failed expectations about aid was the funda
mental assumption that foreign aid was "the solution"
to the underdevelopment of LDCs. It was this assumption
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that led the early designers of the U.S. aid program to
think that not only will aid lead to economic growth and
political development in the LDCs, but also to a much more
significant claim that aid can lead to the establishment
of politically stable, "democratic societies." This
developmental model for U.S. aid was fully articulated in
the work of Max Mi 1 ikan and Walt Rostow71 referred to
earlier in this study. This notion was subsequently
reinforced in a collection of studies prepared for the
Special Senate Committee to study foreign aid programs.72
Indeed, it was these and other studies that led to the
formation of AID in 1961. Walters has observed that:
This approach to development effects
of aid reflects a highly complex view
of the nature of society in which the
economic and political spheres are
clearly distinguishable and intercon
nected in manner such that primary,
secondary and even tertiary effects of
a new stimulus (aid) to the society of
an LDC became predictable.73
As Robert S. Walters goes on to point out, this type
of reasoning leads to
an expectation of semi-automatic develop
ment process in which a relatively U.S.
aid input generates a series of inter
actions within economy and polity of
recipients ultimately resulting in a
self-sustained economic growth with help
of temporary U.S. economic aid before
and after the take off.7*
Because of the above assumption, AID makes a practice
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of linking the type and quantity of aid to the level of
development.75 The underlying reasoning here is that
virtually every less developed country can successfully
achieve self-sustained economic growth. Of course, this
reasoning is based on the assumption that the LDCs are
like the IDCs at the earlier stage of their development.
The essential fact, as Samir Amin pointed out, is left
out, mainly that the LDCs form a part of the world
capitalist system and that the history of their integration
into this system forged their special structure which
places them in a unique and different situation from what
the IDCs were when they started.76
Since no consideration is given to the dependent
state of the LDCs economy, equally no efforts have been
made to adapt the technology to the needs of the LDCs.
Similarly, no attempt has been made to adapt the training
to the needs of the LDCs. All along it is assumed that
the length of time required for each LDC to complete this
almost automatic development cycle depends a great deal
upon each country's initial stage of development and the
vigor of its own efforts.77 Nowhere is the possibility
addressed at length that self-sustained growth will not
be possible in some countries until the dependent condition
is removed.
AID has ^ery often cited countries like Israel,
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Taiwan and South Korea as recipients which are now self-
sufficient and require no more aid from the U.S. The
implication has always been that these countries are
representative of what the U.S. expects or hopes to
accomplish through economic assistance to LDCs. What
AID has often failed to point out is that these countries
are certainly exceptions to the rule for several reasons.
First of all, untypically large amounts of per capita
assistance given to these countries put them in a separate
category of U.S. aid recipients. Secondly, though some
aid funds have been terminated, U.S. assistance is still
flowing into these countries through export-import long
term bank loans, Food for Peace and other sources.
Lastly, some of these countries still receive aid. For
example, Israel is the recipient of the largest amount of
U.S. aid.
Also, in relation to technical assistance is a topic
that has only recently come to the forefront of the aid
discussion - the fact of what some refer to as the "brain
.drain." This, of course, refers to the fact that a good
proportion of those either trained in the United States
or in the LDCs end up working in the United States
instead of their home countries due to the economic
opportunities in the West.
In conclusion, therefore, we could say that, the
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reason that the technical assistance program has not been
very successful, among other things, is that the knowledge
and skills are often given in a package and not adapted to
meet the needs of LDCs. Secondly, training is very often
inadequate because they are never adapted to suit the
needs of LDCs and finally, a host of those who benefit
from this training end up working in the West due to the
economic opportunities available in these countries.
MILITARY ASSSISTANCE
In addition to disbursing aid to LDCs for economic
development, the United States spends billions of dollars
every year in arming its friends and allies. We have
already mentioned the United States military aid to Greece
and Turkey shortly after the second World War. Immediately
after that, followed the spending of millions of dollars to
establish and support the NATO alliance. At the same time,
a huge sum of money was spent in Southeast Asia and the
South Pacific to enable the United States allies to build
and maintain modern up-to-date military forces. Indeed,
there is evidence that the United States, on the whole,
spends more money on military assistance per year than on
economic and technical assistance put together.
For what purpose does the United States spend so
much money in military aid? The major purpose of military
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assistance is not different than that of economic assis
tance mentioned earlier in this study. The major purpose
for military assistance to LDCs is that the United States
hopes that by helping its friends and allies to build up
modern military forces, they in turn, will help the United
States maintain immediate security and political interests.
For instance, since the British withdrawal from the
Persian Gulf area in the 1960s and early 1970s, the
United States has spent billions of dollars on military
hardware on Israel to enable it to maintain the most
up-to-date military force in the Middle East. The under
lining purpose for this has been, as Under-secretary of
State in presenting the economic and military proposal
for fiscal year 1970 put it, "strengthening internal and
external security of friendly nations."78 Similarly, then
the Secretary of Defense, Meloin Haird argued that one
beneficial effect of United States military aid program
was the potential opportunity it afforded to discourage
military coups.79 Related statements and discussions of
intentions of United States military assistance can be
found in other sources.80
In recent years, the United States has either given
or sold billions of dollars in military hardware to Saudi
Arabia and until 1979 to Iran to enable these two countries
to maintain status quo in the Persian Gulf and to prevent
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any radical Arab government from gaining control of oil
transportation routes. Similarly, billions of dollars
have been given in aid to both Sudan and Egypt to enable
them to build modern forces not only to strengthen their
security, but also to act as a deterrence to Libya,
regarded as the number one enemy of the United States in
that area. In short, military aid is often used "to
create local power balances and preponderances"81 to
reduce the likelihood that the donor will have to station
or send troops abroad to conduct a military operation to
protect its interests.82
In addition to disbursing military aid to help deter
external aggression, the United States has often used its
aid to establish special military forces trained to put
down internal opposition. By the use of the Military
Assistant Program (MAP), thousands of army personnel and
soldiers are brought over to train in the United States
on counterinsurgency tactics. Besides advisers sent to
the local police force, others like Green Berets attached
to local armies, assist governments in putting down local
insurgent movements in many parts of the LDCs.82 In
1978, during the Shaba crisis in Zaire, the United States,
even though it did not want to get directly involved,
strongly encouraged its allies, France and Belgium, to
send in military aid to enable Mobutu's regime to crush
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that rebellion. At the time of this study the United
States through its military aid program is supporting the
government in El Salvador in order to crush the resistance
movement. In Nicargua, it is supporting the opposition
movement that is attempting to overthrow the government.
One of the official claims of the United States has
always been that its military aid is often disbursed to
help to maintain "democracy" in recipient nations. As
the above evidence and many other cases that could be
cited show, there is no evidence to support this assertion.
On the contrary, evidence has shown that many of the
countries supported by United States military aid are
dictatorships and many of them could not survive without
the military support they receive from the United States.
For instance, the dictatorial regimes of South Korea, the
Phillipines, Zaire (for the most part) and Egypt could
have been long gone if they were not strongly backed by
United States military assistance. Indeed, there is
evidence to show that some democratically elected govern
ments have been overthrown as a result of the United
States.84
Obviously, it could be said that the United States
organization and administration of aid in African countries
has not differed in any significant manner from what takes
place in other countries. The United States foreign aid
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to Africa has basically been in two categories, namely,
bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral aid is most often
disbursed through AID which, of course, is the official
government agency responsible for this. Multilateral aid
is often distributed through multilateral organizations
such as the different organs of the United Nations.
Aid to Africa also, for the most part, is often
disbursed in three forms; namely, economic assistance,
technical assistance and military assistance. In terms
of the amount of aid it has already been pointed out that
Africa as a whole receives a very insignificant amount of
economic aid from the United States. Also as it was noted
earlier in this chapter, between 1954 and 1965, Africa
(excluding Egypt) received only seven percent of the
total aid disbursed by the United States. It should also
be pointed out that most of the aid disbursed to Africa
during this period went to only a handful of very key
countries like Nigeria, Morocco and Ethiopia. In recent
years, most of the aid disbursed to Africa has gone to
allies like Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Zaire.
The United States, as a matter of fact, is a member
of the Development Assistance Commission, a committee
which coordinates and promotes aid policies for Western
nations. As a result, all aid disbursements, whether to
Africa or other parts of the world, follow the same
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general rules. However, there are some unique aspects of
United States disbursement to Africa which may be worth
noting in brief. These aspects will be discussed in
detail as we later examine the different countries under
study.
For example, military assistance has always been a
part and parcel of American aid to Africa. But in recent
years, there has been a great increase in the amount of
this form of aid to Africa and a subsequent cut in the
amount of economic aid. The reason as will be discussed,
particularly in the case of Sudan, is that the United
States has come to believe that military assistance
provides a more viable tool for achieving its foreign
policy objectives than either economic or technical aid.
In the past a good portion of United States aid to
Africa was devoted to bringing nationals from African
countries for training in the United States. Recently,
that approach has been gradually phased out. The new
approach has been to send more technical experts who are
supposed to train the nationals on the job as technicians.
There is nothing basically wrong with the training of
technicians, but two things happen when there is over
emphasis on this approach. One of them is that there is
bound to be a neglect of strong local training and research
facilities. Secondly, that reservoir of wel1-trained,
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indigenous manpower adequate for managing current and
future developments is cut off. The result is that some
AID projects, as will be seen in the case of some projects
in Zaire, seem to do well while the technical experts are
there.85 But when they are gone the projects begin to
deteriorate and finally die down. Besides, it costs in
many cases about three or four times to more bring an
expert to Africa than it would to bring a national over
for graduate work.86 This in effect increase the cost of
aid and puts more burden on the recipient countries.
In general, we could say this about the organization
and administration of United States foreign aid to Africa.
Aid given is very little and very concentrated. It does
not address the needs of African nations but is geared
toward the fulfillment of United States foreign policy
objectives. While it may address the short term needs of
reaching the poor, it has neglected the long term needs
of adequate, well-trained indigenous manpower which would
be used for managing future development projects. As we
go into the discussions of the different countries under
study in the following chapters, we are going to see how
these points are firmly illustrated.
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CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID TO EGYPT, 1965-1982
Though still a less developed country, Egypt has
many characteristics not generally associated with a LDC.
For example, it is highly productive in its agricultural
system, it is self-sufficient in energy, and it retains a
strong human resource base in terms of education and
skills. Also, oil export, Suez Canal tolls, remittance
from Egyptian workers abroad and tourism bring annually
substantial foreign exchange earnings into Egypt.1 For
the first five years, beginning in 1977, real economic
growth ranged between eight and nine percent, up from
three percent in the 1970s.2
However, despite the above positive characteristics,
Egypt still remains one of a number of LDCs which is very
heavily dependent on foreign aid for its economic survival.
Through the 1980s, Egypt received billions of dollars in
both bilateral and multilateral grants and loans - mostly
from Western nations - to enable it to cope with its
budget deficits, feed its population, and augment available
capital and technology for its industries, agricultural
and social services sectors.3 One of the countries on
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which Egypt has become heavily dependent for economic as
well as military assistance in recent years has been the
United States. In this chapter, we shall examine very
closely the United States foreign aid to Egypt and the
impact that such aid has had on the nation as a whole.
Specifically, we shall examine the magnitude of United
States foreign aid to Egypt from 1965 to 1982. In
addition, we shall examine the impact that such aid has
made on the nation in terms of its political decisions,
economic development and social development.
As it has already been discussed, Egypt and Israel
are the largest recipients of U.S. bilateral aid at the
present time. The Camp David agreement signed by Egypt
and Israel, with the help of the United States in 1979,
assured that these two nations would be recipients of the
most massive American assistance after the Marshall Plan.
Egypt did not receive American military aid until
1977. The economic aid it received before then was almost
negligible as compared to that received by Israel, for
instance. Table 10 shows U.S. military and economic aid
to Egypt and Israel between 1946 and 1980. Through 1977,
Israel had received 10.1 billion dollars in aid from the
United States. Of that amount only 1.4 billion was paid
back by 1977. By 1979 the United States had given Israel
13.7 billion dollars, Egypt by then had only received
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5.4 billion dollars.4 Most of the aid to Egypt was given
after the 1973 war. Between 1973 to 1979, Israel received
about 11.4 billion dollars in aid from the U.S., Egypt had
only then received aid valued at 275 million dollars which
made Egypt by far the largest recipient as it captured
thirty-seven percent of PL 480 funding for the entire
world.5
The United States foreign aid program to Egypt from
the beginning has been multifaceted and broad gauged. It
included community transfer of consumer goods, raw materi-
ials and finished goods as well as development aid for
capital projects, technical assistance and recently mili
tary assistance. The program has always involved e^ery
sector of the Egyptian economy mainly industry, commerce
and agriculture and also basic human services and local
government financing.6 Funds often go to the public
sector though support for the private sector has gained
increased support especially since President Ronald Rea
gan took office in 1980.7
Funding of U.S. aid to Egypt is often in the form of
grants or loans or both, with the balance shifting towards
outright grants in recent years. Food aid in concessional
terms remains one of the few categories still covered by
loans, (see Table 11). Foreign aid to Egypt is often
channelled through a government agency which then has the
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TABLE 11
U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT, FY 1975-81
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responsibility of contracting for imports, engaging in
technical services and distributing loans. The program
often reflects conflicting values and goals within the
official American community in Cairo, the Washington
bureaucracy and the United States Congress. For example,
in 1973, Congress enacted the so-called "New Directions"
legislation aimed at redirecting the U.S. bilateral fo
reign aid program towards projects designed to benefit
directly the poorest majority in developing countries and
away from large development projects. These large projects
emphasized growth oriented development strategies which
assumed that economic benefits would trickle down to the
poor masses. While in office, President Carter tried to
apply the basic human needs concept, but as soon as the
Reagan administration came to office the "New Directions"
basic human needs policies in U.S. foreign aid program
were abandoned.8 In its place the Reagan administration
has promoted "short term security and politically oriented
foreign policy goals."9
But not only is the aid program to Egypt affected by
these conflicting values, it is also, to a great extent,
affected by the development ideas, procedures and regula
tions which have resulted from forty years experience of
disbursing foreign aid to poor nations. The economic
course as envisioned by foreign aid framers presupposed a
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large, vigorous private sector, a stabilized and improved
public sector and a greater decentralization of decisions.
Domestic interests in the U.S. have also helped to
shape the nature of U.S. assistance to Africa as a whole
and Egypt in particular.10 For example, the familiar
constraint imposed by the desire to find markets for
American commodities together with support for U.S.
industries and farmers influence, to a great extent, the
nature of foreign aid Egypt receives. It is not surprising
then that U.S. millers of wheat flour count Egypt as their
largest foreign customer. Also, it is estimated that over
four hundred U.S firms have benefited directly from the
Commodity Import Program in the U.S. aid package to
Egypt.11 About forty percent of the agricultural sales
to Egypt during the early 1980s were on strictly commercial
bases. Also, due to the fact that contracts going to
U.S. firms and procurement from U.S. exporters are very
important in the U.S. balance of payment, "aid legislations
contain specific provisions to avoid or lessen foreign
competition."12 This in effect means that Egypt is often
charged for goods far in excess than it would have paid
had there existed such competition.
Predictably, officials in charge of managing U.S.
foreign policy have tended to emphasize the political
significance of aid, particularly at the time when it was
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seen as strengthening Sadat at home to enable him to
pursue risky and unpopular foreign politics abroad. This
approach has tended to emphasize the need for transfer
of quickly consumed food items and supplies intended to
overcome immediate shortages and relieve foreign exchange
problems.13 It goes without saying that this kind of
approach while it may be good politics creates a number
of problems. In other words, while the Commodity Import
Program may help to pacify the population in the short
run, it does not at all address the problem of food
shortages in the long run.
Some U.S. aid officials are concerend that the long
term effects of American financed imports may only bring
temporary benefits. For instance, Herman Eilts, U.S
Ambassador to Egypt from 1974 to 1979, insisted that part
of the Commodity Import Program component of U.S. aid be
set aside for capital equipment (a tangible form of aid
more likely to influence Egyptian public opinion).1*
Others, however, have argued that too much pressure on
the Egyptians to introduce economic reforms or alter
development priorities, though it may be good economic
advice, may backfire in that it may work to undermine
larger U.S. political goals.^
Finally, there are other aid officials in Cairo and
Washington who disparage relatively short term/high impact
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programs. For example, Donald Brown, AID administrator
in Egypt for six years until 1982, defended grants for
major capital projects which though they may not yield
immediate returns, nevertheless, have the potential to
rehabilitate and modernize the Egyptian infrastructure.
Brown and others with this point of view also favored, as
part of the overall strategy, a diversified aid package
designed to raise productivity in industry, agriculture
and other sectors of the economy in association with
structural reforms in the Egyptian economy. 16
Before closing this section, it may be good to examine
the nature of United States technical assistance to Egypt.
Responding to competing pressures, AID has deemphasized
two most effective tools: strong local training and
research facilities and the supply of well-trained indi
genous manpower adequate for managing current and future
development projects. The symptoms of this practice
are clearly seen in Africa. For example, a page-by-page
review of budgets for 219 separate African projects in
the AID's congressional presentation for Fiscal Year 1979
shows that only 12.2 percent of AID funds spent in Africa
was devoted to training. Of this, just over half ($18
million) was allocated for long term higher level education.
By contrast nearly ninety percent of AID's African program
money went for AID technicians ($88 million or 32.3
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percent), commodity purchase ($60 million or 22.8 percent).
Stanley Reed, a freelance journalist specializing in
Near East Affairs, conducted a study in Egypt between
1979 and 1982. He pointed out that
each year hundreds of so-called American
experts often (with little or no experience
abroad) arrive in Egypt and spend most of
their time arranging for office space and
telephones and haggling with their Egyptian
counterparts. 17
He further noted that in spite of the fact that some AID
programs had been operating for five years, AID was only
able to complete two of its major programs. Besides,
these so-called "experts" and specialists often charge
two hundred percent overhead on top of salaries.18
Also, there is an additional problem of American
experts disparaging their Egyptian counterparts even
though they might have gone through the same kind of
training in the same school, most probably the United
States. Furthermore, there is always the growing feeling
among the Egyptians that the American embassy is running
the country. Ismail Sabri Abdullah, an economist, who in
the 1970s served as President Sadat's Minister of Finance,
called AID "a second government in the country."!9 Such
problems, as have been pointed out also plagued American
efforts to re-equip and retrain the Egyptian armed forces.
For instance, a hundred man air force team sent to train
Egyptians on F-4 Phantom fighters ran into problems when
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their equipment was impounded by the Egyptian custom
services. This early inconvenience contributed as Reed
noted, to a bad working relationship between Americans
and Egyptians.
Therefore, we note here that not only is technical
assistance too costly, but it is not at all geared towards
the long term developmental needs of Egypt.20 Too much
emphasis is placed on seeking short term solutions and
very little is devoted to research to discover long term
solutions to problems that plague the Egyptian economy.
For example, AID believed that investment would come from
private sectors, both domestic and foreign, as soon as
infrastructural problems were overcome. However, experi
ence shows that the Egyptians prefer to invest in sectors
such as construction, spinning and weaving, tourism and
Pharmaceuticals, while foreign capital remains heavily
concentrated in the oil and tourism industries. yery
little investment is made in research and manufacturing
sectors and without heavy investment in them "there seems
little possibility of taking up the economic slack."21
Also as Weinbaun points out, rather than a process of
building slowly over several years, AID decided to disburse
funds mainly for consumable goods, spare parts and raw
materials. This choice was made, according to Weinbaun,
because AID was "unprepared to identify worthy development
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projects."22 Consequently, questionable investment deci
sions were made, unrealizable expectations were created
and bureaucratic patterns that turned out to be regrettable
were established.23
OBJECTIVES AND GOALS
As it has now been clearly established, Egypt is not
just another friendly country among the LDCs to the U.S.
If it were, overall economic assistance would probably
not have exceeded several millions of dollars yearly.
Successive U.S. presidents - Democrats and Republicans -
have concluded that strategic objectives, primarily the
cessation of Egypt's hostility with Israel and securing
American interest in a wider regional political stability,24
would be served through the use of massive economic aid.
If Egypt's cooperation was to be gained, the U.S. had "to
show positive and tangible commitment"2^ to a vigorous
and expanding Egyptian economy. Thus, Henry Kissenger,
in 1975, during the Sinai II Disengagement negotiation,
committed to Egypt $750 million yearly (excluding PL 480
funding) as a weakly disguised political statement. No
serious thought was given by either the U.S. or Egypt as
to the most appropriate level or form of assistance
required. As far as the U.S. was concerned, aid was to
be substantial enough to address Egypt's grave economic
problems. The level of support on the United States part
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was essentially contrived to satisfy President Sadat's
demand that Egypt be treated on the same level as Israel.
Also grants and loans were given as a reward for Egypt's
plans to reconstruct its economy away from the socially
oriented policies embarked upon since the 1952 revolution.26
The loans granted Egypt by the United States for the
clearing of the Suez Canal and the reconstruction of
Egypt war torn cities were, more or less, meant to be a
signal that the peace initiative between Egypt and Israel
mediated by the United States would stand.27
Funding for U.S. assistance programs to Egypt were
authorized in the amended Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and under the Security Assistance Legislation replaced in
1978 by the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which explicitly
recognized U.S. objectives and security interests in
foreign aid. U.S. officials undoubtedly, are encouraged
in the later legislation to seek out economically worth
while projects and to promote development goals. However,
the allocations were less restricted by the "New Directions"
mandate which was initiated by Congress to avoid disguised
ineffective uses of economic aid. A separate accounting
for ESF funds from other foreign aid funds has discouraged
criticisms of higher level funding and disproportionate
shares of foreign aid to a few nations.28 Consequently,
Israel and Egypt were able to carry away the bulk of
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allocations, almost two-thirds of the ESF in FY 1982.
Realizing that without political stability in Egypt
there could be no long term assistance role for the U.S.,
AID officials cooperated in pushing specific politically
symbolic policies such as the Commodity Import Program
proposal, a Peace Fellowship progam as - "quick repackaging
of funds to increase commodity and food assistance at the
wake of 1977 food riots."29 The need for "quick fixes"
through commodity financing and budgetary support started
to diminish with improvement in the Egyptian economy in
the late 1970s. This made it possible to put increased
emphasis on larger capital projects as well as efforts to
assist agriculture, small business, science and technology.30
Egypt under Abdul Nasser had a socialist oriented
economy set up between the 1950s and 1960s. To the United
States this, therefore, was a good place to test how an
American assisted reorientatiion towards private enterprise
could work. It was hoped that Egypt would act as a model
to LDCs seeking to reorganize an economy dominated by the
public sector.31 The expansion of private industry in
Egypt was meant to aid in implementing policies whereby
the market system was utilized to allocate resources and
to set up domestic priorities. Private U.S firms and
other private investors, it was hoped, would join in
turning around the Egyptian economy.
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Unfortunately, Egypt turned out not to be a good
test ground for this experiment; therefore, the result
came far short of the expectations of policymakers both
in Washington and in Cairo. It was not very long before
U.S policymakers and administrators realized how much
they had underestimated the depth of structural problems
in the Egyptian economy and how much the Egyptian people
were determined to retain the economic gains that they
made as a result of the 1952 revolution. The 1977 food
crisis marked off the limits of policy reforms the people
were willing to allow.32 Sadat, himself by 1981, was
particularly disappointed by foreign firms, which though
legally favored, did very little to invest in the area of
basic production enterprises that could employ the large
numbers of Egyptians.33 Instead, these firms concentrated
their investments in consumption-oriented industries which
did \/ery little to help the unemployment situation in
Egypt and if anything did a great deal to help American
industries and employment situation.3^
Furthermore, the Egyptians often complained about
American advice that fails to take into consideration
social costs, political risks and the national aspirations
in Egypt's policies. The Egyptian leadership often cau
tions about how much the urban peace depends upon a num
ber of circumstances and societal values that must be
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preserved.35 For example, uppermost, in the minds of the
leadership is a commitment to the equal distribution of
wealth. As a result of this, they often come at odds
with U.S and IMF advisors who employ strictly economic
criteria to determine what projects to finance. Egyptians
find it so difficult to understand why these criteria are
often employed in the assessment or determination of the
aid which is supposed to be political, anyway.
The USAID officials insist that they do not intend
to impose any particular sets of economic goals or divert
from the schedule set by Egyptians. However, it is very
obvious that the U.S. government only funds those programs
it views as economically sound and feasible. It is such
projects that are often selected from the list submitted
by the Egyptians. Because of this subtle and far reaching
influence, the Egyptian bureaucracy presents only those
projects that it feels will gain U.S. approval. Thus,
the Egyptians are pushed into accepting programs they
would not have opted for alone or forced to proceed more
cautiously with favored programs.36
President Anwar Sadat's abrupt departure from the
Egyptian political scene due to his assassination brought
about some changes in Egyptian-American relations, parti
cularly in aid relations. Whereas, Sadat believed that
aid donors should determine how they wanted their money
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spent, Mubarak "instituted a centralization of contacts
with aid donors through strengthened economic management
structure."37 He encouraged ministries to become more
closely involved in monitoring the details of projects
and to be sensitive to how funds were used.38 in addition,
Mubarak's government became increasingly dissatisfied with
with the length of time it took to start and finish U.S.
projects. He also became uncomfortable with some aspects
of Sadat's "open door policy", aimed at expanding the
private sector with the help of foreign investments. His
principal objection to "infitah" (open door policy) was
its emphasis on consumption. In his speech to the Peoples
Assembly on October 14, 1981, he indicated his intention
to crack down on "those who had made their fortunes
overnight through infitah speculation."39
Shortly before President Sadat's death, he jailed
about 1,500 political rivals and religious extremists,
banned religious and political publications and sought to
silence those who did not support him.40 But as soon as
Mubarak came to office, in the spirit of national recon
ciliation, he released from jail thirty political oppo
nents imprisoned by Sadat, allowing them to return to
their posts to resume their opposition roles. In addition,
bans on opposition publications were lifted and they were
allowed to resume publication. Also with the disappearance
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of Sadat, his decisive style which involved a high
personal stake in the maintenance of success of American
aid connection also disappeared.
As a result of the limited freedom granted to the
press, they started to express concern over the huge
salaries paid to U.S. aid consultants and the high cost
of administrative overheads. Besides, AID policies which
made it possible for foreign expertise to be employed
rather than local skills also came under heavy attack by
the Egyptians.41 Furthermore, the Mubarak government
insisted that as much as possible AID's programs and
strategies be made to coincide with Egypt's development
plan. He demanded flexibility with funds already committed
and asked that he be allowed control over the direction
of aid and to transfer funds more freely among projects.
In other words, he did everything possible to bring the
assistance program more in line with his priorities.42
Finally, Mubarak called for incremental budgeting in aid
programs which would allow allocations to be made on a
yearly basis rather than on a long term basis which
created a lengthy pipeline of unspent but committed funds.
Mubarak's requests were granted in principle in a
memorandum of understanding after he personally pressed
for it in 1982. While Mubarak is to be commended for
some of the actions taken, it should be remembered that
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he still had to operate in the same inept and corrupt
political and economic system under which Sadat operated.
Therefore, it has been almost impossible to change much
in the system. For instance, even though Mubarak remained
convinced that corruption was the main cause of Sadat's
assassination, "only the more severe cases of corruption
were prosecuted."43
Another factor that affected the course and nature
of aid to Egypt, was the change that took place in
Washington. It took almost a year for the Reagan admini
stration to formulate its aid policy. It was therefore
difficult to make any alterations in the short run with
so much money already put into programs already in pro
gress in Egypt. When the change finally came in 1982, it
was not surprising at all. Predictably, the philosophy
of facilitating growth among already productive sectors
replaced the attempt to make aid beneficial to the poor.
For instance, according to Weinbaum, USAID officials were
encouraged to seek and support so-called, "worthy" pro
jects. As a consequence of the "opportunist" choices and
haste to spend money, projects with long term effects were
neglected. Instead funds were invested in projects that
led to unrealizeable expectations and bureaucratic pat
terns which are now difficult to shake off.44
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EGYPT'S AGRICULTURE
Agriculture continues to be the dominant economic
activity employing about 44.4 percent of the population
as compared to 14.3 percent of the work force engaged in
the industrial sector. Less than four percent of the
land - about six million acres is under cultivation.45
Egypt's principal agricultural products include cotton,
wheat, rice, sugar and corn. Food imports running at
about 2.6 billion in 1981 accounted for the greater
proportion of Egypt's total food requirement. Food defi
cits have existed since 1974 and growing demands for food
keeps creating greater food dependency.
The total agricultural purchases from the United
States along with FY 1981 came to $950 million dollars.
Forty-eight percent was purchased through some kind of
credit program principally under PL 480 (the Food for
Peace Program). The total of $2.2 billion dollars in
1981 rose to about $2.5 billion dollars in 1982. Most of
the chicken, bread and tobacco for that matter, consumed
in Egypt between 1980 and 1983 came from the United
States. Egypt was the recipient of thirty-three percent
of all commodities shipped to all countries under Title I
of PL 480 in FY 1981. In spite of this, it is surprising
that more attention is not given to aid for the development
of the agricultural sector in Egypt.46
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In order that a correct assessment of United States
foreign aid to Egypt be properly made some questions
would have to be answered. One of the first questions to
be asked is, have the billions of dollars loaned from the
United States actually helped to bring development in
Egypt or not? To what extent has Egypt received its
money's worth in the different categories that aid money
was spent in? In other words, what was the economic impact
of United States foreign aid to Egypt? Another question
would be as to what is the political and social impact of
U.S. aid on Egypt? Did aid affect the overall poilitical
atmosphere in Egypt? Finally, what was the effect of aid
on employment and other aspects of Egypt's social life?
The answer to these questions may give us an idea as to
the overall impact of United States aid in Egypt.
According to AID reports, both the Consumer Import
Program (CIP) and PL 480 accounted for fifty-seven percent
of United States foreign economic assistance to Egypt
between 1975 and 1981. The remaining forty-three percent
went into industrial and agricultural sectors.47 What
does this therefore mean? As it was pointed out earlier,
concentrating so mouch aid on the Consumer Import Program,
while it may be good for the short term does not, in any
way, help in the need for development in Egypt. All it
does is create a dependency which later on becomes
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difficult to break.
A second objection to concentrating so much money on
the CIP is that it is not the people who are in need for
the most part who benefit from it. For instance, there
is no use for there to be bread on the counter in the
supermarket in Cairo if an average Egyptian cannot affort
it because he does not have a job. What it therefore
means is that those who need the help do not have it and
those who do not need the help get it by subsidy.
Thirdly, since CIP creates no income that could be
recycled into the economy, a huge deficit is built into
the Egyptian budget every year through the import of
these luxury goods. In 1982, there was a two billion
deficit created by food imports as compared to a $1.3
billion deficit in 1980.48 As it was pointed out earlier,
food deficits have existed in Egypt since 1974. Even AID
admits when assessing CIP that:
While these programs have achieved social
improvements, they also have produced a
heavy drain on the economy. The food sub
sidies have cut deeply into the national
budget. By 1980, the subsidy program costs
$1.7 billion - an amount equal to Egypt's
1979 budget deficit or over 10 percent of
GNP.49
To AID it may be good to point out that African countries
need more than just "social improvements." What Africa
needs now is the kind of development that is radical in
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nature and reaches out to benefit most of the population
in the continent. Africa needs the kind of development
that will lead to a fair distribution of the wealth of
its nations.
The point that CIP creates both political and economic
dependency could not be overemphasized. Due to the
conditions for disbursing the aid, it is not possible for
Egyptians to have freedom in the use of the money loaned
to them. They have to use the money in the United States
and they have to take what they are given irrespective of
whether there are better quality products in European,
Japanese or LDCs markets.
Furthermore, though it may be an unfortunate con
clusion to reach, it is obvious that those who benefit
from these programs are the U.S. farmers and companies
who are given contracts to supply these consumer and
agricultural products. Again, even AID in many of its
publications, admits that the ultimate beneficiary of
these programs are the U.S. farmers and firms. As James
Bednar of AID again puts it in explaining how CIP works:
Over 400 firms throughout the United
States have directly benefited from CIP.
In addition, U.S. trade with Egypt has
increased, surpassing $2 billion from 1975
to 1980. The United States has become
Egypt's major trading partner followed by
Italy and West Germany. The opportunities
offered by Egyptian market are just begin
ning for U.S business.50
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As far as creating new jobs is concerned, CIP does very
little to help. Jobs that may be created by the CIP most
likely are going to be temporary, which leaves the worker,
often Egyptian labor, to wonder what is going to happen
after a particular contract is terminated.
Finally, Stanley Reed in his report makes an
observation which, though it does specifically pertain to
CIP, nevertheless could be applied in the context. He
points out that:
AID's size, combined with lack of Egyptian
expertise, takes the process of development
out of the hands of Egyptians. Because
Egyptian government policy requires major
projects to be funded with concessional ,
loans i.e. foreign financing, AID decisions
strongly shape the agendas of the Egyptian
ministries.51
Reed in a sense is pointing out that the U.S. either
directly or indirectly interferes with both the political
and economic decision-making process in Egypt. In other
words, he is confirming the points that the radical school
has emphasized about aid, that it encourages political and
economic dependency.
SUEZ CANAL AND ALEXANDRIA PORT PROJECTS AND DEVELOPMENT
Initial aid projects focus on the reparation of the
war torn Suez Canal Zone. The U.S, together with France
and Britain, helped Egypt clear the canal which opened in
1975. Later a program to deepen the waterway for
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supertankers was carried out. While the Suez Canal was
closed during the war with Israel, the Alexandria port
was the only exit out of Egypt. But the port was becoming
too congested because it was increasingly burdened with
"piled up cargoes," bags of grain, flour, fertilizer,
cement, etc.52
In April 1975, AID brought Eirnie Bell of PRC Harris
Inc. to Alexandria to recommend ways to solve the port's
congestion. His recommendation resulted in a U.S.-World
Bank-Japanese project. Japan supplied twenty-five million
dollars worth of marine equipment, the World Bank provided
fifty-five million dollars for improving the dock and ship
baths and AID financed a thirty million dollar cargo-
handling equipment project. With these projects, the
port of Alexandria was improved to handle more goods more
efficiently.53
To what extent do these two projects contribute to
the development process in Egypt? This is indeed not a
simple question as it may seem when we first look at it.
Probably the question to be asked here would be, what was
the underlining motive for Britain, France and the United
States teaming together to help open the Suez Canal? Was
it out of concern and desire to improve Egypt's economy?
To answer that question we have to go back to 1956 when
the canal was nationalized by President Addul Nasser of
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Egypt. It will be recalled that it was France and Britain
who went to war with Egypt to have the canal reopened.
The reason is that the Suez Canal is the most important
waterway serving as an outlet for ships going from the
Persian Gulf to Europe. To have the Suez Canal opened
does not only mean that ships going to Europe would take
shorter time but also means that the canal, which is
strategic for European powers, would be opened for use at
any time. Therefore, it is no surprise that these three
allies teamed together to have this waterway opened.
Certainly, there have been some economic benefits that
have accrued to Egypt as a result of opening and deepening
the waterway. But to say that these aids were given for
altruistic reasons is entirely missing the point.
The above argument could be applied to the aid given
for improvement of the Alexandria port. It is very
obvious that the widening and improvement of the port was
crucial in the smooth delivery of consumer goods which
were to be exported from Japan, the United States and
Germany. Is it therefore any surprise that the funds for
improving these came from these countries who would make
most use of it? The question is who benefits from these
millions of dollars invested in these projects? The
answer is simple - it is the multinational corporations
who would use the port to transport the goods to and from
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Egypt; it is the American consultant who charges two
hundred percent overhead to give advice on these projects.
It is the Egyptian contractor who will charge for goods
he may never deliver and it is the corrupt politicians
who act as middlemen between contractors and companies.
These are the people who benefit from very costly projects
that are funded by aid money.54
AID FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Aid for infrastructure development is the aid given
for the development of all forms of means of communication
such as the Suez Canal project, just discussed, roads,
telephone communications, the development of power plants,
etc. Between 1975 and 1982, with the help of other Western
nations and the World Bank, the United States spent
millions of dollars to help improve the infrastructure
system in Egypt. We have already cited the Suez Canal
and Alexandria port projects. In additon to these,
millions of dollars were spent on projects like the
Shoubrah Power Plant a 900MW thermal power plant which is
the largest power plant in Egypt. As a joint project
between the United States and the World Bank it cost
about $640 million to complete. Another U.S. based firm,
Westinghouse, supplies the turbine generators which are
powered by natural gas.
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The questions to be asked of the projects is who
benefits from them? The answer is not difficult to come
by. It is obvious that the average Egyptian does not
benefit much from these amenities. Most members of the
Egyptian population who live outside of the urban centers
spend most of their time seeking to make enough money for
food.55 So who benefits from these infrastructural pro
jects? First, it is the American companies who will be
able to conduct business more successfully using these
infrastructural systems. Also, it is the American con
sultants who earn so much for very little or no jobs that
have been done.
As pointed out earlier, AID depends so much on
American consultancy for the oversight of its projects.
According to an Egyptian specialist estimates in 1980,
there were at least 1,116 U.S. so-called experts working
in Egypt directing and supervising the different mini
stries. In contrast, AID had not more than three experts
in Israel, although the USAID package to Israel was larger
and more varied.56 Moreover, the consultancy which absorbs
such a large amount of the aid to Egypt is very often
given to low level experts.57 But putting all that has
been said aside, some think that U.S. technical expertise
has been of a very low level. According to a GAO report,
consultants paid from AID funded agricultural development
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projects only paid a brief visit to Egypt. Seven of the
nine consultants who came to Egypt between September 1979
and January 1980, averaged not more than a thirteen day
stay.58
Even the Egyptian government admits that large and
sometimes inflated consultancy fees paid to American
experts use up a large portion of grants and leave very
little funds for actual project implementation, including
the purchase of equipment. According to a report by the
Agency for Accounting (an Egyptian counterpart of GAO)
sixteen percent of a twenty-five million grant allocated
to the Greater Cairo Sewage Project was paid out in
consultancy fees and 24.9 percent of the energy develop
ment grant was similarly disposed.59
ARMS TRANSFER
One of the criticisms of U.S. foreign aid to LDCs
has been the strong leaning towards military aid. This
has been the case in almost all American administrations
during the past two decades, but much more so with the
Reagan administration. For instance, in 1984 the Reagan
administration proposed $9.2 billion of foreign military
sales (FMS) credit, military aid grants and security
related economic support. This exceeded the 1981 budget
by seventy percent.6^
The boost in security related assistance stood in
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contrast to $3.5 billion in the bilateral assistance
program. As Harry Shaw has pointed out, this large
disbursement for the purchase of arms and services may
even present more danger than it does to give military
security to the recipients.61
Between 1950 and 1975, the United States supplied no
more than $37,000 worth of military hardware to Egypt and
whatever was supplied was on a cash sale basis.62 This
was because the U.S. government refused to extend military
aid as long as the Nasser regime refused certain conditions
dictated by the United States.63
The period 1970 to 1974 witnessed a step-by-step
development of appropriate conditions for the disbursement
of foreign aid by Western nations to Egypt under President
Sadat. This went on until the Camp David Treaty of 1980.64
Since the Camp David Treaty, U.S. military aid has in
creased many more times than it has before. The political
and strategic importance of Egypt is indicated by the
very large amount of aid it receives. For example, in
1980, Egypt and its partner received $1.5 billion out of
the two billion package of Economic Security Fund -
economic assistance given to countries that were defined
as crucial to U.S. political and strategic interest.65
Under Sadat, Egypt accepted conditions for U.S.
military aid previously rejected by Nasser. Within the
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framework of the Security Assistance Program, Egypt has
become the second largest recipient of U.S. military aid,
next to Israel. Foreign military sales to Egypt totalled
$900 million in 1982, in addition to over three billion
in U.S. military aid extended to Egypt during the past
preceding years.66 In 1984, whereas the U.S. disbursed
to Egypt $300 million in CIP, $250 million in PL 480 and
$450 million in project and sector assistance, it sent
over two billion in military and security related aid.
This included $750 million in Economic Security Fund and
$1.3 billion in foreign military sales (FMS).6?
A close examination of U.S. military aid to Egypt
reveals that it is anything but aid to Egypt. Indeed, if
it is aid, it is to the donor country the U.S. For
example, the interest charges on military aid is very
exhorbitant. According to a U.S. government report on
U.S. military aid in 1982, Egypt will pay the equivalent
of the full amount on the loan in interest payment before
the grace period of ten years is over.68 It should also
be pointed out that military aid which consists of loans
at Treasury Department interest rates has been used by
Egypt to buy a variety of military equipment at higly
inflated prices. At one time Egypt found out that it
could purchase TOW launchers from a commercial dealer for
only $67,000 each whereas the same equipment was quoted
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by the U.S. Army at a cost of $103,000 each.69 According
to a memorandum of understanding, the U.S. signed an agree
ment in 1979 to develop Egypt's domestic arms industry.
But according to the GAO report in 1982, U.S. assistance
"has produced studies but little else...virtually no jobs
have been created in Egypt and no new manufacturing were
underway."70 Indeed, according to the same report
"Egyptian officials cited cases of U.S. charging Egypt to
train U.S. personnel who will in turn train Egyptians."71
One wonders why Egyptians could at least not be trained
to train other Egyptians.
What conclusions then do we draw from the above
studies? Does U.S. foreign aid help in Egypt's development
or not? According to Weinbaum, "if judged by the propor
tion of promised dollars, the projected completed and the
popular image of U.S. aid in Egypt then the program could
hardly be labelled a success."72 Morsy in his study
points out that:
In the light of direct experience with
U.S. foreign aid programs an increasing
number of Egyptians are beginning to
realize that the promise of prosperity
and development as a companion to U.S.
is nothing but a mirage.'3
He noted that Egyptian opposition to U.S. aid mounts as
the priorities and disbursement conditions of aid become
public.74 Besides, many Egyptians continue to raise
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questions about the conditions and terms of U.S. aid to
Egypt. A representative of the assembly from Alexandria,
Abu al Hariri once said that "Egypt is ruled by AID and
not by the Egyptian government."75
Yet, members of the opposition are not the only ones
who criticize aid. During the People's Assembly session
in January 1984, a member of the ruling National Democratic
Party (NDP) described the conditions of aid as an affront
to Egyptian sovereignty. He demanded renegotiation with
AID in order to relocate a grant originally earmarked for
private sector infrastructural development to what he
termed "productive sectors." In his words:
It is not reasonable that we receive
grants for the purpose of transferring
technology to 130 business men. It would
have been more appropriate to direct
this grant to the public sector because
it is not acceptable that we give to the
rich and to the owners of private busi
ness while the people are poor.76
It seems from the above evidence presented that
rather than help with development, U.S. aid to Egypt
helps to develop more the condition of dependency.
Furthermore, if the above evidence is examined closely we
cannot but come to the following conclusions.
First, the United States foreign aid to Egypt is
first and foremost for geostrategic purposes. The aid,
though it may have had some economic consequences was
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meant to neutralize Egypt, the most populous and strong
est Arab state. In this case, United States foreign aid
has been extremely successful. Secondly, aid was meant
to bring stability in a country that was beginning to be
friendly towards the United States. In this case, so far
it has been successful. Thirdly, aid was meant to cause
Egypt to make peace with Israel and to cease its hostility
towards it. So far it has succeeded to do just that.
Fourthly, aid was meant to enable the U.S. to enhance its
exporting capability. To a great extent that objective
has been accomplished. Whether aid will lead to develop
ment in Egypt is a fact that is yet to be established.
So far that does not seem to be the case. Therefore,
from the above study we can only conclude that so far
U.S. aid in Egypt has led to a greater dependency on the
U.S. in every area rather than development.
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UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID TO SUDAN AND ZAIRE,
1965-1982
SUDAN
As it has been outlined in Chapter Two of this paper,
the United States foreign aid program to African countries
is of fairly recent origin. Just as in other parts of
the world, for three decades, since the end of the second
World War, particularly in the 1960s and 1980s, aid has
been an instrument of United States foreign policy.
Realizing its enormous technical, military and economic
capabilities, the United States adopted a foreign policy
that responded to a series of external challenges. It is
these responses that have clearly defined the crucial
United States intentions as far as its role as world
leader is concerned.
The early extension of the United States foreign aid
to African countries coincided with the cold war. In
fact, the cold war provided, and in some ways still
provides, justification for United States technical and
economic assistance to many African countries. Sudan has
been no exception to this rule. In Sudan, as in most other
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countries in Africa, the United States foreign aid over
the years has been guided by considerations of U.S. na
tional interests and was influenced by cold war rivalries.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States
foreign aid to Sudan was very minimal and almost negligible.
However, by the late 1970s, Sudan had tackled some of its
internal political problems scoring a measure of success
in some areas such as resettling the desert nomads and
increasing agricultural productivity. As a result, the
investment potential in Sudan increased, thus encouraging
the United States to begin warming up its relations with
this country. But even this early move was not without
strategic, security and economic considerations.1
As a result, the U.S. assistance to Sudan was already
on the rise by 1979 totalling almost forty-three million
dollars. Of this, five million dollars was for military
credits. In 1977, the Carter administration extended
credits to Sudan for the purchase of the twelve F-5
fighter aircrafts and six C-130 transport aircrafts, which
as the administration put it "will provide that nation
with air defense and troop transport capabilities against
potential threats."2 However, following Sudan's decision
to support Egypt's separate peace with Israel, U.S.
foreign aid to Sudan increased even more. For FY 1981,
the Carter administration requested a total of 135.5 million
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dollars for Sudan. That figure included thirty million
dollars in military credits or two-thirds of all military
credits to sub-Saharan Africa.3
The Subcommittee on Africa in the House of Representa
tives, in fact, added another sixty-five million dollars
to the proposal to enable Sudan to purchase some more F-5
fighter aircrafts which up until then no other country in
sub-Saharan Africa had been able to purchase.
For President Jafar Nimeri, support of the United
States initiative for peace in the Middle East and of
U.S. actions in the Iran and Afghan crises in 1979, Sudan
was awarded fifty million dollars in Economic Support
Fund (ESF) in 1980. The ESF, which took the form of
financing "commodity imports vital to development" was to
enable Sudan to "overcome a major development constraint -
a severe and continuing balance of payment shortage."4
Part of the fifty million dollars was also designed to
compliment and support "our project and PL 480 assistance
...to support the economic reforms suggested by IMF."5
For FY 1981, the Carter administration proposed a
Foreign Military Sales program of thirty million dollars
and an International Military Education Training (IMET)
program of $746,000 for Sudan. One may wonder why Sudan
was singled out like this for such aid. The answer was
partially provided by the Assistant Secretary of State
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for African Affairs, Richard M. Moose, when he said:
We believe very strongly that it is in
our national interest to support the
government of Sudan. The proposed IMET
program, which would provide some fifty
officers with professional/technical
training in U.S. military schools in
Fiscal Year 1981 compliments the acqui
sition of U.S. weapons and provides
training in the essentials of modern
military management.6
The point to note in the above statement is the
emphasis on the strategic and economic benefits that the
above aid brings to the United States. The money is used
to acquire equipment from the United States and for
training the Sudanese in the United States so that they
could return home to protect the national and security
interest of the United States.
The Reagan administration set down new criteria for
giving foreign aid to any developing country. Unlike
President Jimmy Carter, who for the most part premised the
disbursement of foreign aid on three issues: United States
security and national interests, strategic considerations,
and a country's human rights record, Ronald Reagan, when
he came to office, defined the criteria for disbursing
foreign aid slightly differently. Speaking during the
Foreign Assistance Legislation for FY 1982 hearings, the
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Lennon Walker outlined the Reagan administrations "policy
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as it applies to Africa."7 During this testimony, Walker
outlined, four criteria upon which aid for African coun
tries would be considered. First, he pointed out that
"U.S. national security interest will be a major determi
nant in assistance."8 Second, the secretary noted, "con
cern over the interplay, on the one hand, of trouble
making by the Soviet Union and its surrogates and on the
other hand of growing economic and related political
instability in various parts of the world."9 Third, the
secretary emphasized that the United States would "demon
strate that it pays to be America's friend."10 Finally,
it would be the "U.S. tradition of helping the world's
most needy" that would determine who gets what.11
It should be noted that Lennon Walker was actually
repeating statements made previously by Alexander Haig,
the then Secretary of State for the Reagan administrtion
during his testimony to the same committee on March 18,
1981.12
When we consider the above criteria for disbursement
of foreign aid, it is not surprising that during the 1981
proposal for FY 1982 security assistance doubled while
development assistance only increased by twenty-eight
percent over the previous year.1^
The consideration of national strategic interest of
the United States in the disbursement of foreign aid was
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clearly demonstrated in the FY 1982 Reagan administration's
proposal . Looking at the country totals in all categories,
it was obvious that only seven countries benefited from
one half of the United States foreign aid to the African
continent. These included Sudan which was to receive $206.6
million dollars, Kenya $116.2 million dollars, Somalia
$78.5 million dollars, Zimbabwe $116.2 million dollars,
Senegal 35 million dollars and Zaire 32 million dollars.
During the hearing for this aid, Walker was careful
to emphasize the strategic importance of Sudan. Sudan,
he pointed out, was one of the countries the U.S. needed
in order to build a "strategic framework to protect our
interest in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Africa."14
It is also important to point out that of the total
package of $206.6 million given to Sudan, about $101.3
million was in military aid. According to Walker, $100
million for FMS and $1.3 million for IMET were proposed
for Sudan "at a reduced rate of interest to accelerate its
military modernization program."15 This money was to be
used for the purchase of tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft
weapons and spare parts. Also the money was expected to
help deal with "increased tensions in the region and
potential threats from Libya."16
On March 17, 1982, during a presentation before the
Subcommittee of the House of Appropriations Committee,
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the Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for African
Affairs, James Bishop pointed out again the aim of the
United States, namely
the establishment of economic stability in
such countries as Sudan, Kenya and Somalia
(as) vital to development of ability to
resist increasing threats from countries
such as Ethiopia and Libya.17
Bishop went on to point out that in West Africa, the
United States has strategic interest to protect which
involves the gaining of access to the region's mineral
resources and key military and communications facilities,
citing for example, the need to be able to have access to
the oil in Nigeria. Sudan also, he pointed out, was vital
as the U.S. sought to "achieve objectives corresponding
to a wide range of U.S. interests including "ensuring con
tinued Western access to key strategic minerals and reduc
ing opportunities for Cuban and Soviet adventurism."18
FY 1983 was no exception at all from the previous
years. When an examination is done on the figures of the
appropriation request made by the Reagan administration
for Sudan, the same pattern is noticed. During this
year, military related assistance outweighed other forms
of aid by one to two. In 1983, the administration
requested only twenty-five million dollars as development
assistance for Sudan and thirty million dollars in PL 480.
In contrast, $101.5 million for foreign military sales
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credit and $1.5 million for International Military
Education Training (IMET).19
TABLE 12
FY 1983 U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN
(figures in mill ions )
Development Assistance $ 25
Foreign Military Sales $100
PL 480 $ 30
International Military $ 1.5
Education Training
Source: Department of State Bulletin 82:2064
(April 1983): 62-63.
Again, from the above statements and data there is
no doubt what the objectives of the United States are in
the disbursement of aid to Sudan. There is no doubt
after examining the statements and data that the United
States foreign aid to Sudan and to the few other African
countries who receive it is first and foremost for the
support of United States national, economic and strategic
interests. Whether the aid contributes to the develop
ment of Sudan, Zaire or any other country is really not
the uppermost concern of the United States. The primary
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objective of disbursing aid to Sudan is to protect the
interst of the United States. That is why Sudan was
given more aid as it took each new step in the support of
the United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The
strategic importance of Sudan to the United States is
further demonstrated by the Rapid Deployment Forces exer
cises that took place between Sudanese troops and U.S.
forces every year until 1985.
As it has been noted before, the United States
foreign aid to Sudan has been mainly military. This has
been the case throughout all administrations both Democra
tic and Republican. However, more than ever before, there
has been a greater emphasis on military aid during the
Reagan administration than under any other president.
The cost, notwithstanding, the Reagan administration
has continued to press for increases in security assistance
for example. Also, under this administration, FMS
financing for Egypt has increased to $1.3 billion in
1984, a 136 percent increase over $550 billion in 1981.
Military assistance to Sudan increased in 1984 to 220
percent from the previous year.20
How can we explain the fact that the United States
aid to many African states like Sudan has been military.
One answer is that most administrations in the White
House often perceive the threat to the United States in
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military terms. Consequently, they respond by increasing
military strength both at home and abroad. These admini
strations often justify increased security assistance by
vague reference, as in the case of Sudan, to Soviet
threats. Rhetoric is often designed to hide security
assistance expenditures under defense cover.
The United States bias against economic aid to
African countries, most especially in recent years, de
rives from its overriding preoccupation with strategic
and security threats. It has come to believe that
development aid is less effective than security assistance
in achieving United States objectives. Besides, many of
the administrations consider the resources required for
economic development too large for U.S. aid to have any
considerable impact. Security assistance, on the other
hand, could be concentrated on a few key states like
Sudan, Zaire, Egypt and Somalia. Just as in other areas
of the world, the administrations over the years have
come to believe that strong pro-U.S. local forces in
Africa can uniquely serve American interest. For them,
security assistance is especially suited as an alternative
to military bases abroad.
The second answer to the above question has to do
with the economic benefits and advantages that arms
transfer brings to the exporter. Arms sales have come
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to be viewed as important earners of foreign exchange and
contributors to balance of payment. It becomes even more
important to the United States, with its current deficit
and balance of payment problems. Besides arms sales
provide employment in the defense industries of producers.
In addition, the export of arms is an excellent way to
create an economy of scale, thereby reducing the per unit
cost of production of arms for arms forces of producer
countries. Exports are also a way of spreading out or
recapturing some of the research and development ex
penses.21 Therefore, it is no surprise, that the United
States places so much emphasis on military assistance
rather than on economic assistance which increasingly has
been deemed not as useful as military aid.
A third advantage that accrues to the United States
through military aid is in the area of security and
stability. The supply of arms is supposed to help fulfill
the security requirements of its allies and friends.22
From the early postwar period until now, this has been
one of the reasons for the United States disbursement of
aid to NATO and the Japanese and certainly one of the
foremost reasons for the disbursement of aid to Sudan and
Egypt. As the danger posed by both external and internal
subversion is perceived, the increased transfer of arms
for the purpose of counterinsurgence becomes increasingly
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important. This reasoning applies more so in the case of
Sudan fighting the rebels in the south and supposedly
constantly under the threat of invasion by the Libyans in
the north.
Finally, there is the question of influence and
leverage in the transfer of arms or disbursement of
military. Arms or military assistance could be an impor
tant symbol of support or a tool of control of the aid
recipient. For example, in 1975 the United States with
held seventy-five million dollars of the Economic Support
Fund appropriated to Sudan in the 1984 fiscal year budget.
The reason was to force Sudan to carry out certain economic
reforms, which included "exchange rate adjustments, elimi
nation of subsidies and limitation of budget deficit."23
It was not until the demands were met that the aid money
was released in 1985.
But it is one thing for foreign aid to find its way
to the recipient country and another thing for it to be
properly applied to meet the needs of the people. Even
USAID admits that in many cases the assistance that found
its way to Sudan ended up not being adequately utilized.
For example, USAID sponsored a study to evaluate a special
integrated rural program (IRD), the Abyei development
project showed that the project was inadequately designed,
poorly managed and the project very poorly implemented.24
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The report went on to show that the project failed
because the implementor did not accept full responsibility
for implementation and adequate direction of the project;
no adequate attention was given to designing a time table
also or coordinating the project. Because of the projects
overall failure the project was cancelled and the money
put into it wasted.25
Indeed, there was a case in which a project was
started and was on the way without anybody being able to
determine whether the project was needed or not. The
case in point was that of the Wadi Haifa Community
Development Project - an integrated rural project in Wadi
Haifa, Sudan. According to an AID sponsored report which
was carried out between November 1978 and December 1979,
there were a number of questions raised when the project
was evaluated. For example, there was question as to
whether the nutrition education/preschool program which
was a part of the project was needed.26 For six weeks no
Title II food arrived for the program and no nutrition
education was provided due to lack of personnel.27 It
should be pointed out that even the report points out
that if an adequate feasible study had been done before
the project was started some of the unnecessary waste
would have been avoided.2^
When the above data are examined a number of
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conclusions become obvious. First, it is evident from
the data examined that the U.S. foreign assistance is
really not the free lunch that is often portrayed to be.
As in the other countries, U.S. aid to Sudan is first
and foremost for political and strategic reasons. Aid to
Sudan is given or withheld depending on whether it serves
the U.S. strategic interest or not. In fact, that was
why the United States moved in to suspend foreign aid to
Sudan after President Nimeri, a friend of the United
States, was overthrown in 1986.
The second conclusion that we can reach from
examination of the data is that aid rarely serves the
needs of the people, since there is often no adequate
study of the needs of the people to see whether they do
need a particular service or not.
Thirdly, a good part of aid is often wasted because
of the above reason - lack of a proper feasible study of
a situation before a problem is attacked. As we see from
the delay of aid in 1985, the people who are supposed to
be helped often end up suffering. It is obvious who gets
hurt when food or educational subsidies get cut off or
eliminated. Mery often the person who ends up hurt is the
poor farmer or student in secondary school or college.
Therefore, we find out that rather than help develop
ment in Sudan it seems that aid tends to perpetuate more
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the dependent state of Sudan on the U.S.
ZAIRE
United States interest in Zaire went back to a period
even beore Zaire's political independence in 1960. In
particular, the United States had a vested economic and
strategic interest in Zaire since the end of the second
World War and probably beyond then. Access and investment
interests have since the second World War been the most
important material incentive for United States involvement
in Zaire.
Zaire can be characterized as a country with vast
human and economic potential. It is a country whose vast
size, large population, important geographical position,
strategic mineral wealth and support of the United States
in international fora makes it one of the most important
states to the United States in Africa.29 In 1959, the
then Congo, produced nine percent of the "free world's"
copper, forty-nine percent of its cobalt, sixty-nine
percent of its industrial diamonds, and 6.5 percent of
its tin as well as a number of specialized metals used in
nuclear and electrical industries.30
Three quarters of the mining production, in the then
Congo, came from Katanga. Another important mining area
was neighboring South Kasai from which came the industrial
215
diamonds.31 Just across Katanga's southern border, the
copperbelt stretched into the then Northern Rhodesia
which contributed an additional fifteen percent of the
"free world's" copper and twelve percent of its cobalt.32
From 1956 to 1960 all electric power for the Rhodesian
mines came from dams in Katanga. In fact, even after the
commissioning of the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River
between the then Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Katanga
continued to be an important source of power.33 Because
of the above reason American officials considered Zaire
and Katanga in particular as particularly important and
salient to the interest of the United States.
In 1960, three quarters of the cobalt imported into
the United States and one half of the metal tantalum,
both of which had important strategic uses in aerospace
production and were mined only in wery small quantities
in the United States, were produced in Katanga. The two
sides of the copperbelt accounted for ten percent of the
United States copper imports in 1950.34 The strategic
importance of these metals became even greater when the
mineral requirement of the Korean War had prompted the
United States to loan sixty million dollars to the
Rhodesian Congo Power Corporation. The loan payments
were for the most part made by deliveries of copper and
cobalt to the United States stockpi1es.35
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Besides the invested American interests in the copper-
belt mines, Western European countries were also heavily
dependent upon the Katangan and Rhodesian mines for these
strategic minerals. This gave America direct interest in
the stability of those mines since the economic health of
the Western European countries was one of the main concerns
of the United States at this time. As some of the business
journals in the United States observed in the summer of
1960, any protracted closing of the Katangan mine would
seriously affect the United States market, causing short
ages and thus raising prices throughout the Western
world.36 it was therefore no surprise that officials in
the United States raised concerns that with its massive
and rapidly growing investment in NATO, the United States
had a strategic stake in resources "essential to the
industrial life of Western Europe."37
Besides the strategic interest that the United
States had in Zaire, it also had what could be described
as an investment interest. Actually, the United States
controlled investment in sub-Saharan Africa was relatively
small. It only amounted to three percent of the total
U.S. investment abroad in 1960. However, it is important
to note that most of this investment was concentrated in
southern Africa, especially South Africa, Rhodesia and
Angola. This accounted for more than half of American
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investments in Africa.38 The fact that U.S. direct
investment in the Congo amounted to only twenty million
dollars was less important since in the minds of U.S.
officials, any instability in the Congo had the potential
of spreading to other parts of the region.39 But U.S.
investment was not only direct, the most engaged and
powerful business interest in the Congo, but must be traced
by way of indirect investment in the Congo through European
companies or governments doing business in southern Africa
including Southern Kasai and Katanga. With the economic
and strategic stake that the United States had in the
Congo, particularly in the Katangan region, it becomes
clear why it would be important that governments in that
region have deference to her. It also becomes clear why
the United States advocated for and threw its support
behind Belgium in 1960 during Belgian military intervention
in the Congo, killing Congolese citizens during a domestic
situation.40
Despite the strategic and economic interests of the
U.S. in the Congo, it had endeavored to be careful not to
offend Belgium in Belgian Congo.41 In fact, in 1957,
the U.S. barred black Americans from the Congo for fear
that they might instigate the Congolese to push for
independence. The U.S. Consul-General in Leopoldville
was so cautious that in January 1960, when the Belgians
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announced for independence in six months, there was almost
no American intelligence in the Congo.42 Also in 1960,
when a handful of Congolese leaders were invited to the
United States it was the Belgians who composed the list.43
At the time of independence, American officials still
considered the Congo to be an exclusive territory of Bel
gium. In fact since Belgium had major interests in the
Congo, the United States decided that Belgium would take
care of any problems that would develop in the Congo while
it would play the role of an understanding friend. Thus
the United States plans for economic assistance for the
new independent nation were indeed pushed by the American
embassy in Brussels only in response to Belgian request
for help. The proposal was worked out in close cooperation
with the Belgian government and the program was essentially
one of technical assistance designed to augment Belgian
budgetary assitance.44
By July 20, 1960, the Belgian troops had left Leopold-
ville and were being replaced by U.N. troops. By August 7,
1960, Belgium troops had departed from five of the Congo's
six provinces and a week later they began to withdraw
from Katanga. i'e problem of the Katangan secession by
now had caused trie Americans to reconsider and to choose
between their two stands of policy; namely, the conser
vative deferences to the Belgians and the hardline
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anti-communism which had become a policy by now. It
finally became obvious that the U.S. could not, in view
of its interests in the region, afford to continue with
the so-called conservative stand. Eventually, the United
States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) took up the task
of resolving the problem. After a protracted period of
civil war and shuffle for power in the Congo, Patrice
Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the Congo after indepen
dence, was eliminated from the scene when Joseph Mobutu
came to power in 1960 in a coup believed by many to have
been sponsored by the American CIA.45
For over two decades, Mobutu has ruled the country
either directly or indirectly with the help of the United
States. He has followed a so-called anti-communist route
since he took over the presidency in 1965.
For the most part U.S. bilateral assistance to Zaire
has been in two components; namely, so-called development
aid and security assistance. The total 1960 to 1980
economic assistance from the United States to Zaire amount
ed to $562.9 million. The United States security assis
tance from the time period 1962 to 1980 totalled $156.9
million with eight million allocated in 1981. For FY1982
$24.2 million was programmed for economic assistance.
In addtion to economic assistance, the president
proposed in 1982 $10.5 million to Zaire for FMS and
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$1.56 million for IMET. The FMS program as pointed out
before is normally allocated for the purchase of arms and
military equipment from the U.S. and the IMET for personnel
training for the use of the equipment.46
Furthermore, Zaire was expected to request, in 1982,
FMS financing for maintenance and support of previously
supplied C-130 aircraft as well as spare parts for U.S.
supplied ground transport, patrol boats, communications
equipment and additional jeeps and trucks. Finally, the
Reagan administration, in addition to all of the above,
proposed an ESF of $32 million for Zaire.47
Since the independence of Zaire in 1960, different
U.S. administrations have taken different approaches to
Zaire. These approaches, for the most part, have deter
mined the amount and nature of foreign aid that the U.S.
gives to Zaire. For instance, during the 1960s the U.S.
perceived Zaire as a Belgian sphere of influence. Conse
quently, it made very little effort in helping it with
economic or military aid. In fact, the U.S. only extended
economic help to Zaire when it absolutely could not avoid
doing so.
The United States made no secret of the fact that as
far as economic aid was concerned in the 1960s, it
considered Zaire as the responsibility of Belgium. For
example, addressing the Ford Hall Forum in Boston on
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April 25, 1965, the then Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Mennen G. Williams, pointed out that:
The United States as its contribution
to nation building, conducts a program
of aid in the Congo. We believe, however,
that Belgium as a former metropole is in
the best position to contribute to the
economic recovery and prosperity.48
As it has been previously stated, as far as the
United States was concerend in the late fifties and early
sixties, Africa ranked near the bottom of its foreign
policy priorities. However, as the cold war was inten
sified in Africa as a whole, some countries in particular
became important to the U.S. because of geopolitical and
strategic reasons. Zaire is one of those countries.
President Jimmy Carter in a statement during a news
conference in Chicago, May 25, 1978, put it this way:
U.S. interest over the long term -
Zaire's geopolitical and economic
weight in Africa's scales of power is
significant. When Zaire is at peace,
the major region breathes easier. When
Zaire's significant mineral resources
move to market under stable conditions
the world breathes easier.49
As Africa became relatively important in the cold
war equation, the amount of aid and the nations that
benefited from it kept increasing. Zaire received a
steady and increasing amount of aid from the United States
until 1977 when President Jimmy Carter took over as
president. The Carter administration in Zaire's case as
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well as elsewhere, resisted the notion of supporting right
wing military dictatorships. Consequently, it distanced
itself as much as possible from Mobutu and his regime.
However, when the exiles from Zaire's Shaba province
invaded Shaba for the second time in a little over one
year, threatening the destruction of the mining installa
tions that produced most of the wealth of the nation, the
Carter administration decided to change its approach.
The United States decided to provide logistical support
for the French and Belgian paratroopers who swiftly moved
in and pushed the rebels out. Then the administration
continued to provide Mobutu with limited military aid
while pressing for political reforms. Cyrus Vance, the
Secretary of State in Carter's administration, put clearly
the administrations' position when he said:
We are prepared, along with others to help
Zaire get back on its feet. But the econo
mic and security assistance we provide must
be followed by a genuine effort on Zaire's
part to solve its long term problems. In
creased economic aid without economic
reforms would be fruitless.50
Vance went on to point out that Western assistance
must be accompanied by the cooperation of Zaire in
strengthening the management and organization of its
armed forces. He also insisted that there must be a
genuine attempt on Mobutu's part to allow a wider parti
cipation in political life in Zaire. Until that was done,
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Vance pointed out, it would be difficult to achieve real
stability which in effect would enable the United States
to give the Mobutu regime an active support.
Of course, Carter's reaction could only be judged in
the light of the conditions in Zaire then. Unfortunately,
the same condition has continued until this present time.
As it has formerly been stated, Zaire is one of the
richest countries in Africa. It is the world's largest
exporter of industrial diamonds and it supplies seventy
percent of the world's cobalt and nearly nine percent of
its copper. But despite this enormous wealth, Zaire
remains one of the most heavily indebted countries not
only in Africa but in the world as a whole. Normally, a
situation where a nation's debt payments amount to one
quarter of its export earnings is considered dangerous.
But in two major African countries, Sudan and Zaire, debt
payments due in 1983 exceeded available export earnings,
leaving nothing for essential exports.51 The Western
banks which had loaned huge sums of money to Zaire before
1974 and also encouraged Mobutu to build glamorous, non-
essential projects were in the 1982 finding that Zaire
was unable to pay the loans on schedule. The banks were
forced to reschedule the debts and Western governments
were forced to come in with additional loans to try to
bail Zaire out of imminent threats of default.
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In addition to the economic mismanagement was the
epidemic corruption among the ruling class in Zaire.
Public funds were directed to personal accounts. Mobutu's
personal fortune is estimated to be in the billions of
dollars.52 Furthermore, there were then and now gross
human rights abuse in Zaire. It is therefore no surprise
that the Carter administration with the stand it took on
human rights would have decided to put a distance between
the U.S. and the government of Mobutu.
Since the Reagan administration came to power in
1981 the story has been a different one. Instead of the
human rights approach adopted by the Carter administration
which was a determining factor in the disbursement of aid,
the Reagan administration adopted what has now come to be
known as the "constructive engagement" approach to foreign
policy. According to the Reagan administration, no friend
of the United States should be forced to change its human
rights policy especially when such "changes" might lead
to a political change that might be detrimental to the
interests of the United States. For instance, if the
change in human rights policy in Zaire would lead to the
overthrow of Mobutu, a long time friend of the United
States, then the change is not worth it. Friends can be
quietly persuaded to carry out reforms as long as such
reforms do not lead to the erosion of power of such
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friendly governments. The reason is that since these so-
called friendly governments perceive that the United
States will support them irrespective of their economic
or human rights records, they have persistently refused
to carry out any wishes of their people. Zaire is a
typical case of a country in that situation.
The end result of this blind and uncritical support
is that the Mobutu government has become one of the most
brutal and repressive governments in Africa today.
Corruption and gross economic mismanagement have become
the rule of the day in Zaire. Essentially, the Mobutu
regime has been run on a monstrous patronage system in
which the president's entourage and subordinates are
totally dependent upon his wishes for their welfare and
wealth. Massive corruption is exemplified and institu
tionalized in all walks of life by Mobutu himself.
Indeed, Mobutu is quoted to have advised his people in a
speech delivered in a football stadium on May 20, 1976
before a crowd of 70,000:
If you want to steal, steal a little in a
nice way, but if you steal too much you
will be caught. And if you have succeeded
in stealing please reinvest in our country
the product of your theft. You become the
Republic's enemy if you transfer this
product overseas.53
Even by this standard Mobutu remains Zaire's greatest
enemy.
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Critics of Mobutu's regime point out that his "support
of patronage system and payoffs"54 has created an extort
ionist culture evident at all levels of society that is
becoming increasingly oppressive. Madeleine Kalb, for
instance, states that Mobutu "keeps the peace by dipping
into government coffers to pay off not only his supporters
but his potential rival and trouble makers as well."55
She points out that:
corruption affects all aspects of society
(in Zaire). Army officers pocket the pay
of their soldiers, who in turn extort
money from people. The system...is a farce.
The only efficient branch of government is
the secret police, which deals with trouble
makers who cannot be bought off - political
opponents are jailed, exiled or kept under
house arrest.5°
Economic experts agree that Zaire has become a per
fect example of Third World horror stories in negative
development. The only people who do not seem to be
bothered are those presently in the White House. For
instance, during the first year in office, the Reagan
administration proposed a fifty percent increase over
President Carter's military aid to Zaire. The amount of
military aid to Zaire from the U.S. for FY 1983 was
doubled from the 1982 figure with a request of twenty-one
million dollars. In addition, fifteen million dollars in
ESF was proposed - the most flexible form of aid which
could be used for anything from the purchase of grain to
mil itary trucks.
227
The Reagan administration admits that most of the
aid given in the past has been wasted.57 However, accord
ing to Chester Crocker, "we do not think it is helpful to
dissemble on that point."58 Furthermore, the administra
tion keeps believing that the "potential (for improvement)
is there and we are seeking to improve it at all times."59
As a result of the Reagan administration actions, the
Mobutu regime has become more emboldened to continue with
its failed policies despite the fact that thousands are
being directly hurt by these policies.
In September 1981, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, the former
Prime Minister of Zaire, came to Washington to testify
before the House African Subcommittee. He stated that
arrests and torture were on the increase in Zaire. He
also noted that popular unrest was mounting to the point
that Zaire was ripe for a third Shaba invasion or a revolt
in the capital. Bond passionately pleaded with the United
States to end its support for Mobutu. He warned of the
danger of "another Iran" and urged the West to withdraw
support from this inept government.60
After Bond's testimony, the State Department issued
the following statement:
Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond has de
clared himself the leader of opposition
to the present government of Republic of
Zaire. His accusations and counter accusa
tions generated by the public remarks are
an internal, Zairean matter. We do not
intend to comment, except to state that
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we fully support the legitimate and recog
nized government of the Republic of Zaire
...Zairean people, as a whole, will be
best served by the continued adherence to
our present policy.61
The Reagan administration took this stand despite the
continued deterioration of both economic and political
situations in Zaire since independence, Zaire at that
time being one of the richest countries in black Africa.
The events that followed Zaire plunged into deeper chaos
and confusion. After assuming office in 1965, Mobutu
proceeded to try and bring order in this chaotic situation.
He started with policies like currency devaluation and
definite attempts to attract foreign investors from the
Western world. Consequently, in 1969, the National Bank
of Zaire reported an increase in 6NP which had exceeded
that of 1959. Also, the country had a surplus in its
balance of payment and its foreign currency reserves
totalled $250 million due largely to the high world price
of copper, the nations' major export.
However, despite the fact that the construction of
state power since 1965 enabled the economic decision-
making to be concentrated in the governmental apparatus,
Zaire still remained a dependent state and played the
role of a modern "periphery capitalist state." In no way
was Zaire able to drastically change the structure of
uneven development which was a feature of the old colonial
pattern. Being a country characterized by uneven develop-
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ment meant in effect that any economic surplus has
increasingly depended upon mineral exports.62 The share
of agricultural output has constantly dropped, from forty
percent in 1958 to twenty-two percent in 1972. On the
other hand, mining and metallurgy rose during the same
period from thirty-three to forty-one percent. By 1972,
there had been a growth in GNP of fifty percent since
1965 but this was characterized by uneven development
since the fastest growing sectors were in trading, manu
factured goods, mixing, states services and public works.63
The end result of the above is obviously very
predictable. One result is that the agricultural sector
continues to suffer from negligence and consequently
millions of dollars are spent in the importation of food
items - part of which is borrowed from the United States
government through the PL 480 program. Secondly, as a
result of the negligence of the agricultural sector,
state income has become increasingly dependent upon the
production of mineral resources such as copper and upon
its fluctuations in price on the world markets.6^ it
should be pointed out that in 1959 the agricultural
sector accounted for forty percent of Zaire's total
exports mainly coffee, cotton, tea, palm oil, sisal and
groundnuts. In 1979, Zaire was even forced to import
palm oil from the United Kingdom. The extent to which
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agriculture development is neglected was demonstrated in
the budget allocation of 1979 which only specified four
percent of the total budget to agriculture as compared to
the seventeen percent directly allocated to Mobutu's
"Presidential Services."65
In 1950, Zaire was self-sufficient in corn production
but in 1970 it imported 87,500 tons of corn and by 1975
the figure had risen to 170,000 tons. Now Zaire spends a
substantial portion of its foreign exchange (33 percent
in 1977) for the importation of foodstuffs.66 Worse
still, most of the food products are from racist South
Africa which has been barred by the Organization of
African Unity from trading with independent African
states.
The question arises as to why Mobutu does not make a
concerted effort to improve the economic situtation or
situations as related to other areas. Most analysts
agree that Mobutu has perceived that there is no immediate
pressure on him to carry out any reforms. He has realized
that no matter what he does, because of Zaire's strategic
position, the United States in particular and most Western
countries in general, will give him the support he needs
to stay in power. He knows that even though he is not
under any immediate outside threat he will always be
supplied with enough arms to enable him to ward off any
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threats domestic or foreign. Mobutu believes that if the
worst comes in terms of food the United States will loan
him the money to buy grain and foodstuffs to pacify the
situation in Zaire and thus make it difficult for it to
explode. Finally, Mobutu believes that as long as he is
alive neither the United States nor any other Western
power would dump him over another alternative. It is
therefore no surprise that Mobutu under the above cir
cumstances makes no effort whatsoever to improve the
situation in Zaire.
In 1982, the Committee on Foreign Relations dispatched
a group of Senators to Zaire to study the impact of United
States foreign aid to Zaire. In this section we shall
examine this report and hopefully use it as one of the
tools to enable us to understand the impact of U.S.
foreign aid to Zaire.
During this visit to Zaire, the members of the
mission took time to talk to members of the United States
embassy in Zaire. In addition, visits were paid to AID
sponsored projects and a number of people in these projects
also were interviewed to enable the Senators make an
objective judgment on the aid situation. This study will
focus mainly on that section that dealt with aid sponsored
projects. The congressional staff reports on three projects
will be examined here, mainly the visits to: the military
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airfield - which gave them some glimpse into the use of
military aid; the Project North Shaba (PNS) - which
represented a major AID agricultural development effort;
and the Inga-Shaba Power Project.
The visit to the military airfield in Kinshasa
revealed some facts which illustrate the use of military
aid disbursed to Zaire. As we noted earlier in this
study, a good portion of the aid given to Zaire in recent
years went into the purchase and maintenance of a number
of C-130 transport aircrafts. According to the report,
during the visit to the airfield it was found that of the
seven aircrafts provided by the United States, one was
destroyed in a crash. Of the six remaining, only two
were operational on the day of the visit - two were
grounded because of crash damage and lack of parts, one
was in preparation to be sent to Italy for servicing and
one was already in Italy for the same purpose.
Of the two aircrafts that were operational, one was
Mobutu's personal plane, "purchased with FMS credits in
1977 but outfitted with "special executive capsule per
manently installed as president's own expense."67 Accord
ing to the report, "the complete and comfortable presiden
tial quarters...left little space in the aircraft for
cargo or military related equipment."68 Mobutu was
reported to have employed the aircraft wery frequently -
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which, of course, meant that if the aircraft was needed
for any emergency the chances that it would be available
would be very slim.
According to the Senate report, the only other
operational C-130 during their visit was found to be
loading a "cargo of cattle for livestock breeding."69
Later they found out that this mission, most likely, had
a private objective - "to transport the cattle to Mobutu's
ranch for improving his own land."70
It should here be noted that while section 4(a) of
the FMS law allows the use of FMS sponsored equipment for
a variety of purposes, it nevertheless, requires that
"such civic action or activities not significantly detract
from the capability of military forces to perform their
military missions" and that such use should be "coordinated
with and form a part of a total economic and social develop
ment effort."71 It seems evident from the above that
those aircrafts were used in total violation of the
purpose for which they were specified. Yet, it is not
difficult at all to see why that could be done. It is
obvious that Mobutu realizing that the Reagan admini
stration was willing to support him at all costs, was
willing to take that chance even to the point of breaking
the U.S. law before their Senators.
The Agency for International Development conducts
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programs in Zaire in the areas of agriculture, transport
development, health, nutrition and manpower development.
When the Senate mission was in Zaire it visited a major
AID agricultural development project called Project North
Shaba.
Project North Shaba had two goals, one of which was
to raise farmer income by the end of 1983 through increasing
annual corn production. Secondly, the project was to
establish a model for rural development for other parts
of the country. The project covered an area of 15,000
square kilometers.
The above goals were to be accomplished, firstly, by
reconstruction of 724 kilometers of previously abandoned
roads. It also involved the developments of new subsystems
in research and training, production and sale of tools.
Finally, it involved the organization of small cooperative
farmer groups and evaluation of the whole project.
At the time of the visit, Project North Shaba was
reported to have made good strides forward and the
directors were reported to have claimed a good deal of
success. However, they also acknowledged that there were
a number of problems that remained to be solved. For
instance, hundreds of sacks of maize were said to have
been stacked at one rail station, awaiting shipment
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because of the shortage of train cars. Besides, the
farmers were not able to bring additional grain for sale
due to scarcity of sacks. Again this graphically illu
strates how mismanagement on the part of the government
very often leads to inefficiency and sometimes total
breakdown in the ability to accomplish good results from
the use of aid money.
Project North Shaba also illustrates another point
that we have dealt with in this study before. This is
the fact that many of the AID projects are geared not
necessarily towards economic development but that they
are meant to be political showcases. According to the
report, PNS was regarded by Mobutu as a "high prestige
project showing the president 's ability to deli ver tangible
American aid to rural poor in troubled area."72 As a
result, rather than encourage the consolidation of the
project, Mobutu continued to urge the expansion of the
operation even further. This was done inspite of the
fact that AID staff expressed fears that the enormous
economic domestic and administrative problems will develop
after the project is handed over to Zaireans. According
to the congressional report:
Zaire's budgetary troubles coupled with
government's record of administration,
mismanagement and neglect left staff
wondering how long PNS and its various
subsystems can be properly maintained.73
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The Inga-Shaba Power Project is another example of
how aid money is wasted in Zaire. It also shows the lack
of planning and foresight in Mobutu's rule. Thirdly, it
is another vivid demonstration of a project constructed
mainly for political reasons - to use as a showcase to
confuse both the people of Zaire and those who lend money
to Mobutu.
The Inga-Shaba Power Project is made up of two com
ponents, namely, the Inga power transmitting site and the
Shaba power receiving site. This project was originally
planned to serve as a permanent lifeline across the whole
of Zaire. It was constructed to bring power from the
Inga Dam near Kinshasa to the mines of Shaba province.
As a result of overhead cost of imported materials and
machinery and the construction of thousands of miles of
access roads as well as construction village at the Shaba
site, at the completion of the project nearly a billion
dollars was spent on it. About $400 million dollars of
the cost of the project came from a combination of loans
and guarantees from the United States government.74
The construction of the Inga Shaba project started
in 1974 at a time when Shaba already had sufficient
hydroelectric resources. The power resources remained
sufficient at the time of the completion of the Inga
Shaba project. However, the project was meant to be
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future oriented - constructed in anticipation of a doubling
of mining activities from the 1974 level by the time it
was completed.
When the project was completed in 1981, the power
facility had no predictable use since instead of in
creasing, the mining activities had actually dropped
due to the sinking copper prices, the high cost of mining
operations in Zaire due to exchange rates and "eroding
investor confidence under present politico-economic con
ditions."75 The saddest part of this whole episode was
that while the project stood there not being made use
of other isolated areas and facilities along its paths
could have readily made use of the power. However, only
direct current could flow the distance from Inga to Shaba
making its use en route impossible. To be able to make
use of this facility, transformers would have to be
installed to transform the direct to alternating current.
At the time of completion only one such transformer was
installed outside Lumumbashi. Since the installation of
such transformers would cost additional millions of
dollars, none was planned at the time of the completion
of the project, thus the Inga Shaba project started
showing signs of neglect even before it really had an
opportunity to start off.
As we have maintained all through this study, the
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above report once again shows that there is no relation
ship between the economic development of Zaire and the
disbursement of U.S. aid. Our contention through this
study has been that United States foreign aid to Zaire is
more for political, strategic and ideological reasons
than it is for economic development. It is obvious that
the above study demonstrates these assertions.
The United States foreign aid to Zaire at present
cannot be interpreted in any other way than that the
United States is willing to tolerate indefinitely Zaire's
economic inadequacies and human rights abuses as long as
it continues to give the U.S. the political support it
has been getting over the years.
There is nothing in this study to indicate that U.S.
aid to Zaire has in any way helped unemployment, agri
culture or has helped raise the standard of living of the
people in any way whatever. Rather, there is indeed
every reason to believe that these projects will not
continue for long and those presently employed in different
projects stand the chance of losing their jobs once the
different projects are handed over to the government of
Zaire. This is because many skilled workers have fled
Zaire because of the repressive policies of Mobutu and
as it was indicated previously the chances that there
would be money to pay those presently working after AID
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hands over the projects are slim.
Of course, since there is doubt as to the continuation
of projects after AID contracts expire, there is also
some doubts as to the ability of the Zairean government
to replicate these projects elsewhere in the country.
There is one thing that is very certain as this
study examined, it is the fact that aid causes Zaire to
become dependent upon the donor. Many of the important
decisions in Zaire are made by the aid donors because of
Mobutu's style of rule. For instance, during the senato
rial mission to Zaire, the officials in the U.S. embassay
readily admitted to the visiting senators that "high turn
over among Zairean officials meant that there was little
difficulty in gaining approval of aid projects as proposed
by American embassy."76 Embassy officials also pointed
out that no Zairean official has been able to remain long
enough to gain the expertise that would enable him to
evaluate proposals. Likewise, none of the officials
remained long enough in power to implement the projects
to which they gave approval of.77
The chances that Mobutu will carry out any reforms,
be it political or economic, to relieve the tension in
the country is very far-fetched as long as he receives
foreign aid from the United States. The reason is that
Mobutu translates the disbursement of aid to be political
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support and an endorsement from Washington. His constant
drive for more security assistance arises from the need to
give credibility to this claim.
If the U.S. is very serious about giving the people
of Zaire a chance to develop, it must take a stand against
the rampant economic mismanagement and human rights abuses
by withdrawing its support from this inept and corrupt
government.
Finally, it may be worth pointing out that it will
be difficult for Mobutu and his regime to make independent
political judgments and decisions in international fora in
matters relating to the United States as long as it
continues to depend on the United States for support in
propping up his puppet regime. In other words, Zaire
will continue to be politically dependent upon the United
States for as long as aid continues to flow in whatever
form it may be.
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What is the effect of the United States foreign aid
to African countries? First of all, what is the effect
on economic development - that is the effect on economic
growth and inequality together? Secondly, what kind of
sociological effect does it have - for instance, on the
employment situation and consumption lifestyle? Thirdly,
what is the political effect that the United States dis
bursement of aid has on the important political decisions
made by each of the countries under study?
To conclude this study, the evidence thus presented
will be used to analyze the situation in Africa in four
different dimensions. These will include; direction of
impact (negative vs. positive), magnitude of impact (large
vs. small), timing of impact (short term vs. long term),
and domestic constituent or focus of impact (rich vs.
poor).
The review of the evidence presented in the above
study will undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that
directionally the overall impact of the United States
foreign aid to African countries has been negative.
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In none of the three countries studied has there been any
significant improvement in the overall standard of living
that could be attributed to the foreign aid disbursed to
these countries by the United States or any other developed
country for that matter. If anything, some decline in the
people's overall standard of living may have resulted from
the support given to these countries by the United States
disbursing aid to them. Zaire is a perfect example of
that. There is certainly no doubt about the fact that
part of the reason why Mobutu refused to carry out any
reforms that may lead to the improvement of the quality
of life is that he is sure that there would always be
help from the United States and other Western countries
should there be any domestic upheaval.
Before independence, Zaire was self-sufficient in
food. Over twenty years later, it is now importing palm
oil from Britain. Undoubtedly, this fall in the standard
of living has been caused by a number of factors, one of
which is economic mismanagement. However, the other
reason is that Zaire is indebted to Western nations,
particularly the United States by billions of dollars.
As a result, economic growth has been depressed due to
the fact that so much money is drained out of the country
by both capital and interest repayment.
Egypt is also so heavily indebted to the United States.
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And yet there is not much to show for the billions of
dollars loaned to Egypt by the United States over the
past several years. There has not been any significant
improvement in the overall living standard of the people.
This study in many ways goes to confirm the conclu
sions that many studies have already arrived at; namely,
that the effect of foreign aid has increased underdevelop-
ment and inequality in the countries that are recipients
of such aids. 1
Not only do these aid disbursements produce negative
results as far as economic growth is concerned, but they
tend to deepen the gap between the income distribution of
the poor and the rich. The poor become poorer by virtue
of exploitation by the core who drain resources from
these periphery countries which are needed for development.
Secondly, profits on interests on credit transfer value
from the periphery to the core retard the development of
the periphery.
In each of these three countries it is also obvious
that external oriented production distorts the economic
structure of these countries. This is particularly
evident in Egypt and, of course, also in Zaire in which
the aid proposal is drawn in the American embassy,
evaluated by American experts and implemented by American
technicians. As a result, the differentiation and
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integration of national economies are obstructed and
patterns of resource use are created that maintain a
state of dynamic underdevelopment.
Another observation is actually the collary of the
above, namely, that links between the elites in the donor
countries and the elites of the periphery act to surpress
autonomous mobilization of national resources. For in
stance, Egypt is being dumped with consumer goods that it
has to buy if it must spend the money allocated to it.
Therefore, it ends up buying consumer goods not because
it needs them but just to be able to spend the money
allocated to it.
Finally, aid affects income inequalities in two ways
- first it is the ruling class that obtains a large share
of national income through government contracts and salary
inflation. Egypt is also a good example of this. But
besides that, as in the case of Zaire, not only is their
income increased but they also prevent the distribution
of income because of their alliances with the core.
Secondly, foreign aid enlarges the wage-earning working
class and salaried middle class which in turn lowers the
income distribution and enlarges overall inequality.
Having therefore examined the nature and direction
of impact of United States foreign aid in these countries,
the next section of this paper will focus on the magnitude
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of impact. In other words, are the impacts resulting
from this disbursement of aid large or small and if so
how small is it?
As it has already been discussed in the above section,
there has been no evidence to indicate that there has been
any significant improvement in the standard of living,
economic growth or overall income of the people in these
countries. There have, no doubt, been significant improve
ments in the standard of living of the elites of these
countries. This is very evident in all the three countries.
If anything there has been a dramatic drop in the standard
of living of the people in the lower class section of the
society. Undoubtedly, there are many factors contributing
to this including population explosion and mismanangement.
However, there is no doubt that the dramatic drop in the
overall standard of living in these countries could be
attributed also to the massive debts resulting from the
purchase of unnecessary military hardware, the building
of roads that are never utilized to their full capacities
or the building of dams and electrical installations that
are not fully utilized.
The study of these three countries produces evidence
that would lead to the conclusion that whatever improve
ment in economic growth that resulted from aid disburse
ment was only short term. This is true especially in the
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case of Zaire. The study of the country showed that
there was no evidence to indicate that the programs that
were being carried out as a result of AID activities
would be replicated. And in the case of Egypt, most of
the money was spent on consumer goods and construction of
large infrastructures. There was no evidence to indicate
that these infrastructures would be properly maintained
after AID personnel were gone. Therefore, for the majority
of people the so-called gains that were made were temporary
and could only be sustained by additional aid and indebted
ness to these donor countries which in this case happens
to be the United States.
Most of the foreign aid extended to Sudan, as it has
been demonstrated, has been for military hardware and
training. The justification has always been that Sudan
is being surrounded by outside enemies, where the real
problem has been more of an internal nature than an
external one. If Sudan has ever had enemies it has not
been Libya as it has been the disgruntled members of
Sudanese society. The truth is that the masses of people
are tired of African heads of state who feed fat on the
wealth of the nation but deliver yery little on the
promises they make. Consequently, the leaders always
fear that they might be ousted from their positions. To
prevent this they always arm themselves to the teeth
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ready for any indication of discontentment from the
masses. Therefore, the arms purchased with millions of
dollars of the people's money end up being used against
the very people they were supposed to protect. The
argument has always been that even though the purchase of
arms does not yield immediate economic benefits, neverthe
less, it helps in the long run to produce a quiet environ
ment for economic development.
The above argument would, of course, be true if
there was a concerted effort on the part of leaders to
develop. It would be true if the arms were not ultimately
turned against the people they were supposed to protect.
But the fact is that very often this is what happens and
the people continue to be on the losing end of the battle
against poverty in spite of millions of dollars spent on
foreign aid.
It is \/ery obvious from this study who are the bene
ficiaries of aid in whatever form it may be. The main
beneficiaries of aid in every situation studied above
have been the government contractors. Whether it be the
construction of a new road or the importation of consumer
goods the contractor ends up having the bigger share of
the pie. People get employed on a temporary basis but
go back to the employment line after the contracts are
completed.
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Not only do the contractors and civil servants
benefit from these contracts but they very often are the
only ones able to afford to import consumer goods.
Therefore, either way this whole issue is looked at, it
is the people who need the most help that receive none
and those who do not need help who end up receiving all
the help. In a sense, this is actually what the donors
of aid want to happen. Their aim may not necessarily be
to perpetually subject the masses of people to chronic
poverty but it has always been to pacify those who have
the capability to paralyze the government so that their
national elites may continue to be in power.
In the final analysis, then we could say that the
study just concluded shows, without any doubt, that aid
produces dependence and dependence produces various kinds
of inequality. Indeed, from this study it could be
concluded that dependence and inequality whether it be
sectoral or income are two mutually reinforcing patterns.
The effect of dependence on sectoral inequality, as we
have found out, is due to the peculiarly uneven develop
ment caused by the foreign aid which promotes growth in
the immediate sector that attracts aid but structurally
retards overall economic growth and development in other
sectors. For instance, in all the countries studied
emphasis was laid on the development of such programs as
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electrical power projects and dams to the negligence of
agricultural research and development. Development of
the agricultural sector is neglected in all the three
countries studied.
The effect of dependence on income inequality is due
to its effects on class structure of the countries studied
and the translation of this class structure into political
power. Since people in the higher income group tend to
be more politically organized it follows that they also
end up controlling most of the power. Therefore, we find
out that the masses end up losing not only economically,
but also politically and sociologically.
Despite the official rhetoric of the United States
government, aid has never been disbursed for the purpose
of economic development. Rather the aim of disbursing
aid has been to help protect the national strategic
interest of the United States. In neither of the three
cases studied could it be said that aid was disbursed for
the expressed purpose of development and in none of the
countries did the disbursement lead to development.
One of the reasons why aid has been so ineffectively
applied is that the purpose of aid has never been clearly
defined. It will help the cause of aid so much if a
clear definition of the purpose of aid is given and there
is adherence to this purpose by the United States. What
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has happened in the past was that while aid was said to
be given for economic development purposes, it was never
theless aimed at fulfilling other purposes than the
officially designated one.
Another recommendation that will strongly enhance
the cause of United States foreign aid in Africa is that
the recipients of United States foreign aid such as Egypt,
Sudan and Zaire must be given the opportunity to make a
greater input in the decision-making process of aid than
it is at the present. For example, recipients of foreign
aid must make a greater input as to how foreign aid money
should be spent than they do now.
Thirdly, if the United States is genuinely interested
in the use of aid for economic development it should
increase economic aid rather than the present trend of
increasing military aid to Africa. This study, therefore,
recommends an increase in economic rather than military
aid which is being hiked up every year.
Fourthly, for the United States foreign aid to be
effective in Africa the part of foreign aid devoted to
technical aid should be increasingly spent on training
African nationals rather than the present trend of spending
it to hire expensive consultants from the United States.
Furthermore, in the light of all the findings in the
study, national policies in African nations which stress
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self-reliance and careful control over inputs from the
core must be seen as other than reactive ignorance. In
deed, if the U.S is genuinely interested in the economic
development of African countries such policies should be
encouraged.
Also, regional agreements such as the Economic Commu
nity of West African States and others which emphasize
regional cooperation must be developed to provide an
alternative to the present heavy dependence upon foreign
aid by key African states.
Lastly, aid will not be effective as long as it
continues to be tied. Foreign aid must be untied to make
it more effective.
It is my belief that if these recommendations are
implemented it will go a long way in improving the
condition of aid and thus making it possible for foreign
aid to be effectively employed.
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